[2010] FWA 1524 |
|
DECISION |
Workplace Relations Act 1996
s.643 - Application for relief re (Harsh, Unjust or Unreasonable) termination of employment
COMMISSIONER SPENCER |
BRISBANE, 9 MARCH 2010 |
Jurisdictional issue - Extension of time.
Introduction
[1] Ms Cuk (the Applicant) made an application on the grounds of s.643(1)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (the Act) in relation to the termination of her employment by Oaks Hotels & Resorts Pty Ltd (the Respondent).
[2] The matter was listed for conciliation. Some time was devoted to endeavouring to conciliate the matters. Two conferences were held in this matter, however, conciliation was ultimately unsuccessful. The Respondent submitted that the application was not within jurisdiction as it was filed out of time.
[3] The parties disagree as to the date of termination and therefore whether the application was filed out of time. The Applicant claimed that the termination occurred on 30 April 2009 and therefore the matter is not out of time as it was filed on 13 May 2009. Alternatively the Respondent claimed the termination occurred on 2 April 2009 and is therefore twenty days out of time. Section 643(14) of the Act provides the Commission with discretion to allow an extension of time with regard to the 21 day time limit prescribed in the Act. The Respondent opposed the granting of the extension of time.
[4] Directions were set in this matter seeking written submissions regarding the extension of time and a copy of the relevant criteria for the determination, set out in the "Brodie-Hanns" decision was attached.
[5] Whilst not all of the evidence, submissions and materials received have been referred to in this decision, all of such has been considered in the determination of this matter.
Relevant legislation
[6] The legislation relevant to this extension of time decision is as follows:
“643 Application to Commission to deal with termination under this Subdivision
(1) Subject to subsections (5), (6), (8) and (10), an employee whose employment has been terminated by the employer may apply to the Commission for relief in respect of the termination of that employment:
(a) on the ground that the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; or
(b) on the ground of an alleged contravention of section 659, 660 or 661; or
(c) on any combination of grounds in paragraph (b) or on a ground or grounds in paragraph (b) and the ground in paragraph (a).
…
(14) An application under subsection (1) or (3) must be lodged within 21 days after the day on which the termination took effect, or within such period as the Commission allows on an application made during or after those 21 days.
Note: In Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 the Industrial Relations Court of Australia set down principles relating to the exercise of its discretion under a similarly worded provision of the Industrial Relations Act 1988.”
[7] The Brodie- Hanns Principles 1 noted in s.643 were stated by Marshall J as follows:
“1. Special circumstances are not necessary but the Court must be positively satisfied that the prescribed period should be extended. The prima facie position is that the time limit should be complied with unless there is an acceptable explanation of the delay which makes it equitable to so extend.
2. Action taken by the Applicant to contest the termination, other than applying under the Act will be relevant. It will show that the decision to terminate is actively contested. It may favour the granting of an extension of time.
3. Prejudice to the respondent including prejudice caused by delay will go against the granting of an extension of time.
4. The mere absence of prejudice to the respondent is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.
5. The merits of the substantive application may be taken into account in determining whether to grant an extension of time.
6. Consideration of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a like position are relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion.” 2
[8] Sections 647 and 648 of the Act, provide that s.643(14) applications may be decided by the Commission without conducting a hearing. The sections are in the following terms:
“647 Extension of time applications may be decided without a hearing
If:
(a) an employee whose employment has been terminated by an employer makes an application (the extension of time application) under subsection 643(14) requesting the Commission to allow an application to be lodged under subsection 643(1) after the period of 21 days after the termination took effect; and
(b) the proposed application under subsection 643(1) is an application:
(i) on the ground referred to in paragraph 643(1)(a); or
(ii) on grounds that include that ground;
the Commission is not required to hold a hearing in relation to the extension of time application.”
[9] Section 648 of the Act outlines the considerations that must be taken into account in the decision not to have a hearing:
“648 Matters that do not require a hearing
(1) The Commission must, in deciding whether or not to hold a hearing for the purposes of deciding:
(a) whether to make an order under subsection 645(5) or (6) or 646(1) or (2); or
(b) whether to grant an extension of time application within the meaning of section 647;
take into account the cost that would be caused to the business of the employer concerned by requiring the employer to attend a hearing.
(2) If the Commission decides not to hold a hearing, the Commission must, before making a decision:
(a) invite the employee and the employer concerned to provide further information that relates to whether the order should be made or the extension of time granted; and
(b) take account of any such information.
(3) If, as a result of information provided as mentioned in subsection (2), the Commission considers that it would be desirable to hold a hearing, the Commission may do so.
(4) An invitation under paragraph (2)(a) must:
(a) be given by notice in writing to the employee and the employer concerned; and
(b) specify the time by which the information referred to in the invitation is to be provided…”
[10] These matters have been taken into consideration. Both parties indicated they had no objection to the matter being determined on the basis of the written materials. Accordingly, on this basis and taking into account the above considerations, the matter has been determined on the filed materials.
Summary of the Applicant’s Submissions
[11] The Applicant submitted that her Application filed on 13 May 2009 was not filed out of time because her employment was terminated on 30 April 2009; or in the alternative, if the Commission disagrees with the Applicant as to the date upon which her employment was terminated, she is entitled to an extension of time for the reasons set out below.
[12] The Applicant submitted that in order to determine this matter the Commission must first determine when Ms Cuk’s employment was terminated, in this regard the Applicant stated the relevant effective date was not when the Applicant was given notice that her employment was to be terminated, but when the termination actually took effect. On this point the Applicant submitted that she was given four (4) weeks’ notice of the termination of her employment on 2 April 2009 and that her employment was terminated on 30 April 2009. The Applicant says that this view is supported by the final pay slip provided by the Respondent which provided that the Applicant’s last day of employment was 30 April 2009. The Applicant also relied on her Certificate of Service provided by the Respondent which provided that the Applicant’s last day of employment was 30 April 2009.
[13] The Applicant also stated that the Respondent’s Notice of Appearance conceded that the date of termination was 30 April 2009.
[14] The Applicant acknowledged that:
“Such a position is inconsistent with the language adopted by Mr Anderson on 2 April 2009 and the drafting of the letter of termination. However, it is respectfully submitted that the Commission should give more weight to the Certificate of Service, which was provided after the Applicant had specifically requested that the Certificate of Service reflect her last day of employment, and the Respondent’s Notice of Appearance.
In circumstances where the Application clearly raised the issue of the date of termination, the Respondent’s concession was unlikely to have been an error. Moreover, when this matter was raised with the Respondent by the Solicitors for the Applicant, the Respondent affirmed the answer given in the Notice of Appearance. 3
It is therefore respectfully submitted that on 2 April 2009 the Applicant was given notice of her termination, which took effect four (4) weeks later on 30 April 2009.”
[15] The Applicant’s submissions concluded that as the application was filed on 13 May 2009, it was filed within 21 days after the day on which the termination took effect. Accordingly, the Applicant was not, at the time of filing the Application, out of time.
[16] In the alternative, the Applicant argued that if the Commission is not minded to accept the Applicant’s primary submission that her employment was terminated on 30 April 2009, the Applicant seeks an extension of time in accordance with Section 643(14) of the Act.
[17] In this regard, the Applicant relied upon the decision of Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd 4.
[18] The Applicant provided evidence on the explanation for the delay. It was stated that the delay was caused because she had relied upon the Respondent’s representations that the termination of her employment did not occur until 30 April 2009. 5
[19] The submissions state:
“The Applicant’s reliance on the Respondent’s representations and subsequent view as to the date upon which her employment was terminated was reasonable in circumstances where:
a. the Respondent’s termination advice was unclear and contradictory; 6
b. the Applicant took steps to have the contradiction clarified; 7
c. the Applicant promptly sought legal advice after what she believed to be the termination of her employment; 8 and
d. after seeking legal advice the Applicant promptly acted to seek the Commission’s assistance in relation to the termination of her employment.
The Applicant was also of the understanding that she was not lawfully entitled to advance an application for unfair dismissal until after her employment was formally terminated on 30 April 2009. 9 Such a view was reached after the Applicant took steps to inform herself of her legal position and was, in light of s.643 of the WR Act, entirely reasonable.”
[20] The submissions set out that following the 30 April 2009, the Applicant sought legal advice regarding matters including the relevant time limitation. The Applicant further promptly instructed her lawyers to file an Application on her behalf. 10 It was submitted that the Application was subsequently filed within 48 hours of the Applicant first receiving legal advice.
[21] It is submitted that in the circumstances where the Respondent had:
“Made a clear and unequivocal representation which the Applicant has relied upon to her detriment, it is unfair and unconscionable for the Respondent to now attempt to resile from its earlier representations. 11 Whilst the Applicant does not assert that the equitable doctrine of estoppel is strictly binding on the Commission, the Applicant submits that the matters discussed by the High Court are helpful considerations in these circumstances where the Commission is required to determine questions of fairness and equity between the parties.
It is respectfully submitted that:
a. in these circumstances there are special circumstances to justify the delay on the part of the Applicant. Namely, that the Employer gave contradictory and confusing advice as to the effective date of the termination of the employment;
b. there is a reasonable explanation for the delay in that the Applicant relied upon the Respondent’s representations and was waiting for the termination to formally take effect before commencing proceedings; and
c. in the circumstances where the delay has been occasioned by the Respondent’s conduct and the Applicant relied on that conduct, it would be fair and equitable for the Commission to grant the extension.”
[22] Furthermore, it was submitted that the Applicant has a strong case, as she had received no prior warnings in relation to the alleged unsatisfactory performance for which she was terminated; 12and was not given an opportunity to respond to the alleged reasons for the termination.13 In addition, it was argued that the Applicant’s performance and conduct in the respects relied upon for the termination were not below the required standards.
[23] The Applicant stated that the Respondent would have been aware at all times that the Applicant contested her dismissal as she had liaised with the Respondent on two occasions following her termination. 14
[24] The Applicant submitted that it would be contrary to the interests of justice for the Respondent to avoid the Applicant’s challenge to the termination on the basis that it is out of time, given that the Applicant contends that it was the Respondent’s conduct that brought about the Applicant’s delay in filing.
[25] The Applicant also stated that if the Application was made out of time (which is not admitted), it was only late by a relatively short period of time and that such period of time cannot be attributed to the Applicant or have caused any prejudice to the Respondent.
Summary of the Respondent’s Submissions
[26] The Respondent submitted the termination took effect on 2 April 2009.
[27] The Respondent stated that the means by which the Applicant’s employment was terminated was by personal attendance by the General Manager; and he directed that her employment was terminated effective immediately.
[28] The Respondent stated that the General Manager used the following words of relevance:
“(a) she would receive four (4) weeks notice in lieu and rather than have her remain in employment and embarrass or humiliate her, her termination of employment was effective immediately and she would be paid the four (4) weeks notice in lieu rather than working out that notice period;
(b) the Applicant was no longer responsible for the building and she had to hand over her master keys and mobile phone;
(c) although the Applicant could remain in her caretaker’s apartment for a period of two (2) weeks she was no longer responsible for caretaking responsibilities as of that point and a new caretaker/manager was appointed immediately;
(d) the Applicant, although remaining in the caretaker’s unit, was not to speak to the body corporate connected with any matter concerning the Respondent;
(e) the staff remaining in the building were advised of her termination of employment and the Applicant would not return and she was to have no access to behind the counter;
(f) the Applicant packed her employment related possessions and left her office immediately.
The importance of four (4) weeks pay in lieu of notice cannot be discounted in any way. The clear intent of any employer paying four (4) weeks (or any amount) in lieu of notice demonstrates the employment is terminated, effective immediately and the employer/employee relationship is at an end at that point.”
[29] The Respondent addressed the material of the Applicant which stated that, in effect, as of 2 April 2009 and she did not know whether her termination of employment took effect on that day and she then refers to the final pay slip and the final Certificate of Service and relied upon a view her employment was terminated on 30 April 2009. There is also reference to the Respondent’s Notice of Appearance which will be dealt with separately, but should be noted was filed of course well after the Applicant relied upon her employment being terminated on 30 April 2009.
[30] The Respondent stated that:
“The Applicant concedes the language of the Respondent’s Mr Anderson of 2 April 2009 and the Letter of Termination is inconsistent with the position taken by the Applicant but asks the Commission to give more weight to the Certificate of Service.
The strong position of the Respondent is all of the statements outlined by Mr Anderson on 2 April 2009 would have left the Applicant in no doubt her employment was terminated as of 2 April 2009 and the employer/employee relationship was at an end as at that date.
Further the Letter of Termination, which is the document setting out the reasons for termination and should be found to be the supporting primary reference point to the statements of 2 April 2009, clearly sets out the employment was terminated effective 2 April 2009. In that Letter of Termination the letter begins and ends with those statements. If the Applicant believed there was any doubt about when her termination took effect she should have been alerted to that doubt by reflecting upon the words used by Mr Anderson and the direct terms of the Letter of Termination and she should have then sought appropriate information and advice.”
[31] The Respondent submitted as follows in relation to the statement of service:
“Given that the Applicant places considerable weight on the Certificate of Service a reflection upon the email exchanges concerning the preparation of that document is instructive. The following points can be made:
(a) the Certificate of Service, in its original form, was dated 7 April 2009, which is well prior to 30 April 2009 and does not refer to any length of service;
(b) the second Certificate of Service was issued after contact by the Applicant with the Human Resources Department of the Respondent. The Certificate of Service is still dated 7 April 2009, which is well prior to 30 April 2009, and was prepared, it is submitted, on a balanced view of the email exchanges given the Applicant’s request that her length of service be noted on that document. The Human Resources Department of the Respondent had raised concerns about mentioning termination and on its face the document is prepared clearly indicating the Applicant’s employment was terminated well prior to 30 April 2009 given its date is 7 April 2009. Further, the email exchanges clearly indicate the Applicant was not seeking confirmation of the last day of her employment or when the termination took effect, it was directed at length of service so a future employer would know between which dates she had been employed by the Respondent. There can be no conclusion drawn that the Certificate of Service in its amended form was prepared for any other reason other than the Applicant wishing to utilise a Certificate of Service for further employment. The document was not requested for the purposes of assisting the Applicant in assessing time periods relative to when the termination took effect. It is clear from the Respondent’s actions of 2 April 2009 and the Letter of Termination of 7 April 2009 the termination was effective 2 April 2009 and the employer/employee relationship ended on that day. Further the request by the Applicant in respect of the Certificate of Service was 22 April 2009 (not 10 April 2009 as set out in the Applicant’s Affidavit), which is twenty (20) days following the termination of her employment on 2 April 2009. There is no suggestion in the email exchanges that there was some urgency required for an assessment of that document, given the Applicant’s stated knowledge of a twenty one (21) day time period. At the time of sending the 22 April 2009 email the Applicant had no control over whether and when the Respondent would reply and prepare another Certificate of Service to her requirements. It could be asked rhetorically of the Applicant why urgency was not required, given the twenty-one (21) day time period would expire the day after she sent that email. Further it was the Respondent clarifying the terms and use of the Certificate of Service on 22 April 2009. The Applicant could have stated she had concerns on effective termination date as it related to an Application to be filed – particularly given it was the twentieth (20th) day after termination. It should also be noted it is the Respondent that has exhibited the email exchanges and not the Applicant.”
[32] Further, the submissions in relation to the final payslip and the date on the Notice of Appearance were as follows:
“With the Letter of Termination of 7 April 2009 the Applicant was provided with a final pay slip – in fact two payslips as referred to in the Affidavit of Mr Anderson. The pay slips are issued well prior to 30 April 2009. The Respondent cannot escape the fact one pay slip records a 30 April 2009 date. The explanation provided by the Respondent is that it relates to the Respondent’s practice in terms of its pay roll system and how it adds a notice period to the termination day. In the scheme of things that pay roll slip is a minor document and does not change the fact the termination of employment was effective 2 April 2009 and the employer/employee relationship came to an end on that day.
The Respondent’s Notice of Appearance was filed as it should have been after the Respondent was served with a copy of the Applicant’s Application document. The document marks clearly (although faintly on a facsimile transmission) the Respondent contested the issue of time and the Applicant’s Application was filed out of time, but the Respondent would still attend a Conciliation Conference. The document as prepared does refer to 30 April 2009 and there can be no doubt there was some confusion when that document was prepared in reference to the Certificate of Service document and its terms, but at the same time the document makes it clear the Respondent believed the Application was filed out of time. It can be seen by the Respondent’s Employee Action Form that within the Human Resources Department there could be no doubt that as at 6 April 2009, when that document was completed, the termination of employment was effective 2 April 2009. That document was then relayed to Pay Roll section for their uses. The Notice of Appearance cannot detract from the fact that by all the actions and words of 2 April 2009 and the Letter of Termination of 7 April 2009 the termination of the Applicant’s employment was effective 2 April 2009 and the employer/employee relationship was at an end at that time. Further, given those matters, the Applicant should have taken advice well prior to the time that she did and ensured that her Application was filed within the twenty-one (21) day time period.”
[33] The Respondent stated that taking into account these matters and given the actions and words of 2 April 2009 and the breadth of matters canvassed there could be no doubt in the Applicant’s mind her employment was at an end as at 2 April 2009 and the employment relationship had come to an end as at that date. If the Applicant was confused by the Certificate of Service (which the Respondent does not concede given it is clear from the email exchanges that it was prepared for future employment rather than seeking clarification on termination dates) then why did the Applicant not seek legal advice earlier than she did?
[34] In relation to the Extension of Time, the Respondent repeats and relies upon the information set out in the first part of these Submissions.
“The Respondent’s position is the Applicant did not seek to have a stated contradiction clarified. The email exchanges clearly indicate on the twentieth (20th) day after the employment came to an end, the Applicant sought to have an expanded Certificate of Service state length of service and the document was to be used for future employment purposes. At no stage did the Applicant take issue or seek clarification by specifically referring to what she believed might have been a contradiction in terms. In the 22 April email exchanges the Applicant did not take issue or seek clarification by specifically referring to what she believed might have been a contradiction in terms.”
[35] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant stated she sought information from the AIRC. The Applicant was aware of a twenty-one (21) day time period. The Applicant states she believed there was then a contradiction in dates. If there was such a contradiction why did the Applicant not seek legal advice to have her position clarified? The Respondent stated that the Applicant was in no doubt her employment was at an end as at 2 April 2009.
Considerations
Date of termination
[36] The argument advanced by the Applicant that her employment did not end until the expiration of the period represented by that which is equivalent to the wages paid in lieu of notice is not sustainable on the case law. However, it is acknowledged that the current circumstances of the Applicant’s matter may be distinguishable on the basis that she alleged that the Respondent made written representations to this outer term being the date of dismissal.
[37] I refer to the decision of Roberts, C in David Miller v Gunnedah Timbers Pty Ltd 15 in which the circumstances were somewhat similar except for the latter payment of long service leave. The decision states:
“It is submitted by Mr Miller that his employment did not actually end until 27 July 2009, the notional expiry date of the four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice which he received on 29 June 2009.
In my view, Mr Miller’s argument is not sustainable. It is apparent on the facts that Mr Miller was paid a sum of money in lieu of four weeks’ notice on 29 June 2009 and no longer worked for Gunnedah from that day. He did not remain in Gunnedah’s employ during the subsequent four weeks. Accordingly, the termination of Mr Miller’s employment cannot be the subject of an application for relief pursuant to the FWAct. If the date proposed by Mr Miller was to be accepted, it would lead to the logical inconsistency of his application for relief being filed prior to the actual termination of employment occurring.
As noted above, both sides cited relevant case law. None of that case law appears to support the contention advanced by Mr Miller. The reasoning of Wilcox CJ in Siagian v Sanel Pty Ltd 16 is compelling:
“It seems to me that in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, it should usually be inferred that the employer intended the termination to take effect immediately. This conclusion not only reflects the more accurate meaning of the phrase ‘payment in lieu of notice’; it accords with common sense. An employer who wishes to terminate an employee’s services, and is prepared to pay out a period of notice without requiring the employee to work, will surely usually wish to end the relationship immediately. If the employee is not to work, there is no advantage to the employer in keeping the relationship alive during the period for which payment is made; and there is the disadvantage that the employer will be burdened with employment related costs, such as workers’ compensation insurance, payroll tax, liability for leave payments etc. The employer also incurs the risk that some new burden will be imposed in respect of the employment during the period.
I see nothing in the presence case to suggest that Sanel intended that its employment relationship with Mr Siagian should continue until 15 April. The statement of account given by Mr Bryant to Mr Siagian might be called back to work before the expiration of the period of notice. Mr Bryant supplied a separation certificate on 31 March, an action that would have been premature if the employment had not then terminated.
I conclude that the payment made to Mr Siagian in lieu of notice did not have the effect of extending his employment until 15 April.” 17
The only leg on which Mr Miller’s contention appears to stand is that a payment for long service leave was made to him on or about 21 August 2009 and therefore that the full employment relationship was not ended on 29 June 2009. The payment for long service leave is not relevant to the date of termination of employment.
All in all, I find that Mr Miller’s employment ended on 29 June 2009 and he therefore has no right to apply for relief pursuant to the FWAct. His application is therefore dismissed. Given my finding, it follows that Mr Miller may be entitled to make an application pursuant to the WRAct but he should note that any such application would require the granting of an extension of time for filing. The application purporting to have been made under the FWAct cannot be also considered, in the alternative, to be an application under the WRAct.”
[38] This decision is applicable to the current circumstances, that is the payment of wages in lieu of notice does not alter the dismissal date. However, given the quoting of the latter date in other documentation provided by the Respondent, the Applicant’s confusion is acknowledged.
Extension of Time
[39] Accordingly, in relation to the current matter where an extension of time has been sought, I have considered that matter as follows:-
[40] The Commission is required to determine whether leave should be granted under s.643(14) of the Act. In making this determination the “Brodie-Hanns” principles referred to in the Act have been considered. The prima facie position is that a period of time should be complied with, unless there is an acceptable explanation for the delay, which makes it equitable to so extend the time limit.
Action taken by the Applicant
[41] The Applicant relied on the documents and information conveyed to her by the employer. Whilst she may have been under a misapprehension as to the effective date of the termination, her confusion, as outlined, appears to have some basis. The Applicant took prompt action to address the dismissal by seeking legal advice and filing an application as soon as she was aware of the termination, however, the action has to be measured against the timeframe that the Applicant assumed from the dates on the documents provided by the Respondent.
Prejudice to the Respondent
[42] It is acknowledged that the mere absence of prejudice to the Respondent is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time, however, the Respondent does indicate that there would be an effect on the business in having to accommodate the Applicant.
Merits of the Substantive Application
[43] An assessment of the merits in this matter given the series of issues between the parties can only be properly assessed by the determination at a hearing.
[44] The Full Bench determined in Telstra-Network Technology Group and Kornicki 18 that the merits of the matter in determining whether an extension of time should be granted should not assume significant consideration. Accordingly, in this jurisdictional matter the Commission does not seek to determine the merits of the application, given the disparity between the parties on these issues, the determination would require the assessment of sworn evidence.
Consideration of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a like position
[45] On the basis of the submissions of the parties, in the circumstances, this criteria does not have significant weight in the consideration of this matter.
Determination
[46] In the current circumstances, a decision to exercise the discretion pursuant to s.643(14) of the Act to grant an extension of time would not render the prescribed time limit meaningless. There was some ambiguity in relation to the date of the dismissal, for the Applicant, given that recorded on the documents. The Applicant sought advice and then took action to file the Application.
[47] In consideration of all of the circumstances of this matter against the principles enunciated in the “Brodie-Hanns” decision, it is determined that the Commission’s discretion should be exercised to allow for the extension of the legislative timeframe pursuant to s.643(14). I order accordingly. The matter will be listed for conciliation/directions.
COMMISSIONER
1 (1995) 67 IR 298.
2 Ibid, para 299.
3 Paragraph 3 of Mr Massy’s affidavit.
4 (1995) IR 298.
5 See paragraph 22 of Ms Cuk’s Affidavit.
6 Paragraphs 4, 9-20 of Ms Cuk’s Affidavit.
7 Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Ms Cuk’s Affidavit,
8 Paragraphs 21-24 of Ms Cuk’s Affidavit.
9 Paragraphs 21-22 of Ms Cuk’s Affidavit.
10 Paragraphs 23-24 of Ms Cuk’s Affidavit.
11 For example see Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387.
12 Section 652(3)(d) of the WR Act.
13 Section 652(3)(c) of the WR Act.
14 Paragraphs 9-19 of Ms Cuk’s Affidavit.
16 (1994) 1 IRCR 1.
17 Ibid at 23.
18 Ross VP, SDP Watson, Gay C, 22 July 1997, P3168.
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