Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2010/3658) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 18 June 2010 [[2010] FWAFB 4195] for result of appeal.

[2010] FWA 2263

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FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute

National Tertiary Education Industry Union
v
Victoria University
(C2010/87)

COMMISSIONER GOOLEY

MELBOURNE, 17 MARCH 2010

Dispute relating to workloads of Academic Staff

[1] On 18 February 2010, the National Tertiary Education Industry Union (NTEU) notified a dispute between it and Victoria University (VU) pursuant to section 739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). The dispute was referred to Fair Work Australia (FWA) pursuant to the dispute settlement procedure in the Victoria University (Academic & General Staff) Enterprise Agreement 2009 1 (the 2009 Agreement). The notice of dispute set out the matters in dispute as follows:

[2] The file was allocated to me and after conferring with the parties the matter was listed for hearing initially on 4 March 2010 and then relisted for 10 March 2010.

[3] On 23 February 2010 Mr Hickman the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of Victoria University wrote to my chambers requesting the matter be referred to another member of Fair Work Australia because in their submission there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in respect of my involvement. Mr Hickman advised that they were not suggesting actual bias. In his letter he stated that the basis of the application was:

[4] I determined that it was appropriate that this application be dealt with at the hearing of the application.

[5] At the hearing Mr Bandt of counsel appeared for the NTEU and Mr O’Grady appeared for VU. No party opposed counsel being given permission to appear and permission was granted.

[6] Mr O’Grady advised that VU had sought from the NTEU copies of all letters of advice received by the NTEU from Maurice Blackburn in the conduct of the case brought by the NTEU against Victoria University in 2007 2 and/or in relation to the Victoria University workloads model.

[7] Mr O’Grady advised that the NTEU had produced a letter signed by me and that he did not require the NTEU to waive privilege in relation to that letter. Mr O’Grady subsequently agreed that that correspondence did not set out any advice given by me to the NTEU relevant to this application 3.

[8] Both Mr O’Grady and Mr Bandt provided outlines of submissions and supplemented those submissions orally 4.

[9] The following facts are not in dispute:

4. I was the instructing solicitor for the NTEU in NTEU v Victoria University 6 (the 2008 proceeding). While Mr O’Grady referred to these proceedings as the 2008 proceeding, an examination of the Federal Court website establishes that the application was filed on 16 February 20077 and the matter was heard by Justice Ryan on 10, 11 and 12 September 2007 and his decision was handed down on 3 November 2008. Mr Bandt’s submission was that my involvement was for parts but not all of the proceedings. I do not consider that anything turns on this difference.

5. I appeared in 2007 for the NTEU at the directions hearing and the mediation of the 2008 proceeding.

[10] Mr O’Grady submitted that the matters canvassed in NTEU v Victoria University involved the ability to generate a dispute under the Disputes Resolution Procedure in the Victoria University (Academic & General Staff Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 2005 8 (the 2005 Agreement) in respect of the workload model and the operation of the workload model9.

[11] It is clear from the decision of the Ryan J that the operation of the workload model was part of the dispute notified by Dr Jamie Doughney in December 2006. Dr Doughney’s dispute was the foundation of the claim brought by the NTEU in the 2008 proceedings however the amended application of the NTEU 10 did not seek any orders in relation to the operation of the workload model and only sought orders about the operation of the Dispute Resolution Procedure of the 2005 Agreement. There was no consideration by Ryan J of the merits of Dr Doughney’s dispute about the operation of the workload model.

[12] Mr O’Grady submitted that the there was an overlap in the issues considered as part of the 2008 Proceedings and the issues raised by the current application.

[13] Mr O’Grady submitted that the current dispute is about changes to the terms of the workload model without either negotiation or agreement with the NTEU. He submitted that the issue raised by the dispute is the extent to which there is a requirement for agreement of the NTEU to affect changes to the workload model. He submitted that involves a consideration of the workload model including the mechanisms for change contemplated by it and the status of the model under the 2009 Agreement and the 2005 Agreement. There is also an issue as to the capacity of the dispute to prevent or impede the implementation of changes made to the workload model. 11

[14] Mr O’Grady submitted that the overlap would appear to mean that:

[15] Mr Bandt submitted that the 2008 proceeding raised a question for determination that was different to that in the current proceeding. He submitted that the decision in the 2008 proceeding has limited relevance to the current proceeding and even if the decision of Ryan J was relevant to the current proceeding there can be no suggestion that the Commissioner would do anything other than apply the decision as required by law and that my involvement in that matter does not disqualify me from sitting.  13

[16] Mr Bandt submitted that in the current matter I am being asked to determine a dispute about the operation of the academic workloads clause in the 2009 Agreement with respect to the implementation of the model by VU from 12 January 2010 and to determine whether that implementation ought to be subject of orders from FWA 14.

[17] Mr Bandt submitted that I am not being asked to rule upon the correctness or propriety of any advice given to the NTEU. 15

The Principles

[18] The principles to be applied in responding to such an application were not in contention between the parties. Both parties provided submissions in which they set out the applicable law and agreed that the test to be applied is “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide” 16.

[19] The High Court further said in Re Polites and another; ex parte the Hoyts Corporation Pty Limited that “the test in Livesey cannot be pressed too far when the qualifications for membership of the tribunal are such that the members are likely to have some prior knowledge of the circumstances which give rise to the issues for determination or to have formed an attitude about the way in which such issues should be determined or the tribunal’s powers exercised. Qualification for membership cannot disqualify a member from sitting. 17

[20] The FW Act at 627(3) sets out the qualifications for appointment as a Commissioner with FWA.

[21] While the High Court in its decision referred to the qualifications required for appointment to Deputy President the reasoning applies equally to commissioners.

[22] The High Court in Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association  18 also took the view that “it would be an abdication of judicial function and an encouragement of procedural abuse for a judge to adopt the approach that he should automatically disqualify himself whether he was requested by one party to do so on the grounds of a possible appearance of pre-judgement or bias, regardless of whether the other party desired the matter be dealt with by him as the judge to whom the hearing of the case had been entrusted by the ordinary procedures and practices of the particular court.”19

A prior relationship of legal adviser and client

[23] The High Court in Re Polites: Ex Parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and ors  20 said “a prior relationship of legal adviser and client does not generally disqualify the former adviser, on becoming a member of a tribunal (or of a court, for that matter) from sitting in proceedings before that tribunal (or court) to which the former client is a party. Of course, if the correctness or appropriateness of advice given to the client is a live issue for determination by the tribunal (or court), the erstwhile legal adviser should not sit. A fortiori if the advice has gone beyond an exposition of the law and advised the adoption of a course of conduct to advance the client’s interests, the erstwhile legal adviser should not sit in a proceeding in which it may be necessary to decide whether the course of conduct taken by the client was legally effective or was wise, reasonable or appropriate. If the erstwhile legal adviser were to sit in a proceeding in which the quality of his or her advice is in issue, there would be reasonable grounds for apprehending that he or she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the issue. Much depends on the nature of his or her relationship with the client, the ambit of the advice given and the issues falling for determination.” 21

Independent knowledge/ communication with one party

[24] The High Court in Re Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd 22 said that “As a general rule, a judge or a member of a tribunal that is bound to act judicially should disclose his or her independent knowledge of factual matters that bear or may bear on the decision to be made. In some cases, it may be that he or she should stand down from the proceedings. However, precisely what should be disclosed and what, if any, other action should be taken may involve a consideration of the nature of the tribunal, its composition and organisation.23

[25] Further the High Court in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL 24 has held that it is a central element of our system of justice that it would be inconsistent with basis notions of fairness that a judge should take into account, or even receive, secret or private representations on behalf of a party or from a stranger with reference to a case which he has to decide”25

[26] Both parties accepted that the mere fact that a tribunal member was a solicitor for one of the parties in the proceedings does not provide a sufficient basis for a finding that there is reasonable apprehension that the tribunal member might not bring an impartial or unprejudiced mind to the proceeding 26. Neither does the fact that the law firm to which the Tribunal once belonged continues to represent a party to a proceeding provide a sufficient basis for the finding27. Mr O’Grady however did submit that those factors when considered with the other factors to be considered do form part of the matrix of factors which should be considered28.

[27] I have had regard to these principles in this decision.

The current application

[28] The starting point then is to determine what is in dispute between the parties in the current application and to what there is an overlap between the 2008 proceedings and the current application.

[29] The dispute notified to FWA arises from the 2009 Agreement. The 2009 Agreement was approved by a valid majority of employees on 21 December 2009 29. The 2009 Agreement was approved by FWA on 22 January 2010 and operated from 29 January 201030. According to the NTEU on 12 January 2010 VU changed the terms of the Academic Workloads Model without negotiation or agreement with the NTEU and continued to implement those changes. On 3 February 2010 the NTEU advised that it was in dispute with VU over the application of clause 47 of the 2009 Agreement.

[30] Clause 47 of the 2009 Agreement provides as follows:

[31] The Dispute Resolution Procedure in the 2009 Agreement provides as follows:

[32] On 1 February 2010 the NTEU wrote to VU seeking their agreement not to make any changes to the academic workloads model as it stood on 11 January unless “agreement is reached in accordance with the workloads provisions of the Heads of Agreement between the University and the NTEU and the new agreement (Victoria University (Academic & General Staff) Enterprise Agreement 2009).” 31

[33] On 3 February 2010 the NTEU further advised VU that the NTEU was in dispute with the University over the application of clause 47 of the 2009 Agreement 32.

[34] On 4 February 2010 VU wrote to the NTEU and set out its response to the matters raised by the NTEU.

[35] On 9 February 2010 the NTEU wrote again to VU advising of the dispute and called on VU not to make any changes to the work staffing or the organisation of the work and not to take any action likely to exacerbate the dispute. 34

[36] On 11 February 2010 VU again wrote to the NTEU advising their position that any dispute initiated by the NTEU over the application of clause 47 and pursuant to clause 63.3 of the 2009 Enterprise Agreement cannot in a jurisdictional sense relate to the Acting Vice-Chancellor’s determination of 13 January 2010. 35

The 2008 Proceeding

[37] The 2005 Agreement provided for an academic workload model as follows:

[38] As can be seen the 2005 Agreement established a process for developing and implementing an academic workload model.

[39] The Academic Workloads Committee which had developed the Academic Workload Model had been unable to reach agreement on one aspect which concerned the transitional arrangements for 2007 in respect of academic staff who did not have a Research Active Index score which would entitle them to workload points. The Vice Chancellor then, in accordance with clause 47.5 of the 2005 Agreement made a determination in respect of the transitional arrangements. The Vice-Chancellor’s determination was recorded in a memorandum dated 4 December 2006 36.

[40] On 11 December 2006 Dr Doughney wrote to the Executive Dean of the Faculty of Business and Law at VU and raised a dispute in accordance with clause 63 of the 2005 Agreement. 37

[41] He alleged that the implementation of the workloads model in Semester 1 2007 was a breach of the 2005 Agreement and outlined the basis of his complaints.

[42] On 14 December 2006 Mr Hickman wrote to Dr Doughney stating that because Dr Doughney was not directly affected by the new workload model he did not have standing to raise a dispute 38.

[43] The NTEU on behalf of Dr Doughney then sought to have the Disputes Committee meet to deal with Dr Doughney’s dispute and Mr Hickman advised the NTEU that VU did not believe there was a dispute 39.

[44] VU declined to nominate two members of the disputes committee and would not convene a meeting of the disputes committee to consider Dr Doughney’s dispute 40.

[45] VU then implemented the Academic Workload Model with the transitional arrangements which had been determined by the Vice-Chancellor 41.

[46] The application in the 2008 proceeding is set out in the decision of Ryan J 42.

[47] The NTEU submitted that the disputes over the Academic Workloads Model could be resolved through clause 63 of the 2005 Agreement.

[48] Clause 63 of the 2005 Agreement provided as follows:

[49] VU submitted that the process ordained in clause 47 of the 2005 Agreement had been followed and that the adoption of an Academic Workload Model pursuant to that clause was incapable of giving rise to a dispute which could be referred to a Disputes Committee.

[50] Ryan J upheld the submissions of VU and found that “a complaint that the Model as formulated was unfair or otherwise an inappropriate resolution, as between VU and its staff, of the issues of workload allocation generally, was incapable of raising a dispute which a Disputes Committee could entertain. 43

[51] Ryan J did deal with a number of other submissions raised by the parties about the standing of Dr Doughney to raise the dispute and whether the failure to convene the disputes committee in fact prevented Dr Doughney from taking the dispute to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. These matters are not relevant to the matters before me as the dispute resolution procedure in clause 63 of the 2009 Agreement is in a different form to that considered by Ryan J.

[52] I have set out in detail the nature of the 2008 Proceeding and the current application along with the relevant clauses in the agreements to show that while both disputes arise out of the Academic Workload Model, the dispute in 2007 is not the same dispute as the dispute in 2010. The NTEU is not seeking to raise a dispute about the transitional arrangements approved for 2007 by the Vice Chancellor nor is it seeking to raise a dispute about the dispute settlement clause in the 2005 Agreement nor the status of an individual staff member to raise such a dispute.

[53] When it was put to Mr O’Grady in response to his submission  44 that this dispute was not about the changes considered in the 2008 proceedings he submitted that the “particular issue that was of concern and was determined by his Honour Ryan J in the 2008 dispute is not before you here but, in my submission, there is a high level of overlap between the mechanisms that were there considered and the mechanism that is going to be considered here, and the underlying substrata, or underlying dispute is very much the same, which is , what is the model there to achieve, and the contending views of the university on the one hand and the NTEU on the other in that regard.45

[54] While one might assume that the NTEU does not approve of the changes made to the Academic Workload Model made in January 2010 the issue it brings before this tribunal does not go to the merits of such change. Mr Bandt accepted that “the issues agitated before Ryan J have been determined by Ryan J, and that stands for the authority for how the old agreement was to operate.”  46 Mr Bandt submitted that the matter before Ryan J was one of the construction of the 2005 Agreement not the merits of the workload mode, it wasn’t about whether it was fair transparent etc. Now that does not arise under the new clause.”47

[55] I therefore reject the submissions that there is any relevant overlap between the 2008 proceeding and the current application.

[56] As such I reject the contention of VU that any advice provide by me to the NTEU in connection with the 2008 proceeding could go to the issues raised by the current application. Whether the changes made to the model in 2007 were appropriate or not, the changes currently in dispute are not those changes.

[57] Mr O’Grady seeks to rely on the commonality of witnesses in both proceedings. Even if the persons called to give evidence in the current proceeding are the same as gave evidence in the 2008 proceeding their evidence will go to different issues. Further it is difficult to imagine that this will be a matter in which the credit of any witnesses will be challenged. Certainly Mr O’Grady made no such submissions.

[58] Mr O’Grady seeks to rely upon assertions of facts relayed to me as part of the preparation of the 2008 proceeding and submits that they could be relevant to the determination of the Application 48.

[59] This submission relies on a proposition that the factual matters in the current application are ones with “may bear” on the decision. No particulars or examples of the types of factual matters that were provided to me in the 2008 proceedings were provided to the Tribunal by Mr O’Grady. It is, in fact difficult to conceive that there are any assertions of facts relayed to me as part of the preparation for the 2008 proceedings that would be relevant to this application or to the decision to be made. In any event I am unable to recall except in the most general terms any discussions I had with representatives of the NTEU or its witnesses at the time.

[60] In relying on my role as solicitor for the NTEU Mr O’Grady sought to distinguish this application from the circumstances before Senior Deputy President Polites in the Hoyts case 49. In fact there was a greater overlap between the matters Senior Deputy President Polites had provided advice on in that case than in the current application. In that matter one of the courses of action suggested by His Honour was “to have a separate and distinct company employ the labour in such complexes”. While the High Court correctly pointed out that that advice was not acted upon at the time, Hoyts did in fact 2 years latter establish 2 companies to employ labour in all its cinemas. The High Court held that “it must be accepted that the interposition of subsidiary companies for the purpose of “enabling labour to be employed on terms and conditions other than those prescribed by the awards” may be relevant to a number of issues which will fall for decision in the proceedings before the Commission50. Even so the Court decided that “it was difficult to see how a letter of advice of 1 August 1986 could give rise to a reasonable apprehension that Mr Deputy President Polites might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to their resolution”51.

[61] In this matter no formal advice was given by me to the NTEU 52 though as Mr O’Grady correctly points out advice does not need to be written to enliven the principles. However given the acceptance by the NTEU of the decision of Ryan J 53 no issue will arise about the correctness or appropriateness of any advice given to the NTEU in or in connection with the 2008 proceeding and it is clear that in fact no issue that was live in the 2008 proceeding is in issue in this proceeding.

[62] Further clause 47 of the 2005 Agreement and the 2009 Agreement are substantially different and the dispute resolution procedure has also changed since the 2005 Agreement. The NTEU is able, under the 2009 Agreement, to raise a dispute in its own right and there is no longer a disputes committee.

[63] Consequently the substantive issues determined by Ryan J in the 2008 proceeding are not relevant to the matter before me.

[64] Mr O’Grady also sought to rely on what he described as the combination of factors namely the overlap of these proceedings with the 2008 proceeding, the fact that Maurice Blackburn were and continue to act for the NTEU and that I was the instructing solicitor in the 2008 proceeding.

[65] However when one removes the overlap from consideration as there is clearly no relevant overlap then Mr O’Grady is left with my previous association with the NTEU and my previous firm’s current association with the NTEU. The authorities clearly establish that these grounds are insufficient reasons for a member of a Tribunal to stand down.

[66] For the foregoing reasons I decline to disqualify myself from this matter and Victoria University’s application is refused.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

A Bandt for the National Tertiary Education Industry Union

C O’Grady for Victoria University

Hearing details:

2010

Melbourne

March 10

 1   [2010] FWAA 441

 2   NTEU v Victoria University [2008] FCA 1630

 3   Transcipt Pn 9 and 102

 4   Exhibit VU 5 and NTEU 1

 5   Exhibit VU 2

 6   NTEU v Victoria University op cit

 7   Federal Court of Australia website VID122/2007

 8   Print PR 965491

 9   Exhibit VU5 at [8]

 10   NTEU v Victoria University op cit [1]

 11   Exhibit VU 5 at [4] and [5]

 12   Ibid at [20]

 13   Exhibit NTEU 1 at [13]- [19]

 14   Ibid at [13]

 15   Ibid at [14]

 16   Johnson v Johnson 201 CLR 488 at 492

 17   Re Polites and another; ex parte the Hoyts Corporation Pty Limited and others 173 CLR 78 at 86

 18   Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288

 19   Ibid at 294

 20   Re Polites:Ex Parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and ors op cit

 21   Ibid at 87 and 88

 22   Re Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd 119 ALR 206

 23   Ibid at 210

 24   Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342

 25   Ibid at 349

 26   Exhibit VU 5 at [18] and NTEU 1 at [10]

 27   Transcript Pn 18 and Exhibit NTEU 1 at [20]

 28   Transcript Pn 41

 29   NTEU Form F10

 30   [2010] FWAA 441

 31   Attachment to NTEU Form F10 dated 1/2/2010

 32   Ibid dated 3/2/2010

 33   Ibid 4/2/2010

 34   Ibid 9/2/2010

 35   Ibid 11/2/2010

 36   NTEU v Victoria University op cit at [10]

 37   Ibid at [4]

 38   Ibid at [5]

 39   Ibid at [6]

 40   Ibid at [8]

 41   Ibid at [16]

 42   Ibid at [1]

 43   Ibid at [43]

 44   Transcript Pn 54

 45   Ibid at Pn 59

 46   Ibid at Pn 64

 47   Ibid at Pn 67

 48   Exhibit VU 5

 49   Re Polites:Ex Parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and ors op cit

 50   Re Polites:Ex Parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and ors op cit at page 643

 51   Re Polites:Ex Parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and ors (1991) op cit at page 643

 52   Transcript Pn 101-103

 53   Ibid Pn 64



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