Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2012/294) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 11 September 2012 [ FWAFB 7267] for result of appeal.
 FWA 1360
Fair Work Act 2009
Sunstate Airlines (Queensland) Pty Ltd T/A Qantas Link
MELBOURNE, 5 MARCH 2012
Application for unfair dismissal remedy.
 This is an application under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) by Ms Eleanora (Nora) Jalea (the Applicant) for relief from unfair dismissal.
 Ms Jalea was employed as a flight attendant with Sunstate Airlines (Queensland) t/as QantasLink (QantasLink or the Respondent). She commenced employment in late 2005 and her employment was terminated on misconduct grounds on 20 June 2011.
 On 10 June 2010 an incident 1 occurred at the QantasLink office in Brisbane involving Ms Jalea and Ms Norma Todkill, her manager. Ms Jalea had been asked to come into Ms Todkill’s office where Ms Todkill sought to raise issues with respect to Ms Jalea’s language and to suggest mediation between Ms Jalea and Ms Britt Vidler, another Flight Attendant. Ms Jalea responded in a manner not acceptable to the Respondent.
 As a result of this incident the Applicant was stood down from her employment on the evening of 10 June 2010.
 Ms Todkill made a formal written complaint about the incident. Ms Nicholette Bowen of QantasLink was appointed to investigate the incident. Ms Bowen interviewed Ms Todkill and as a result of this put a number of allegations to Ms Jalea in a letter dated 25 June 2010.
 In the course of her investigation Ms Bowen also interviewed Ms Zanthe Shepherd, Ms Kate Harvey, Ms Annette Rose, Ms Sarah Rasmussen and Mr Steve Jeffries, all of whom provided information on what they had seen and heard at the time of the incident.
 Ms Jalea provided a response to the allegations on 6 July 2010, met with Ms Bowen with respect to the allegations on 16 July 2010 and provided further information on 19 July 2010. At the time of the meeting on 16 July 2010 Ms Jalea also made formal complaints against Ms Todkill and Mr Martin Pannan, a pilot with QantasLink.
 On 13 August 2010 Ms Bowen delivered her letter of findings arising from the allegations in a meeting with Ms Jalea. In the letter Ms Bowen detailed each allegation and whether it was substantiated, substantiated in part or unsubstantiated. Ms Bowen concluded in her letter that:
As result of this investigation, it has been substantiated that you used inappropriate language towards your Manager which was witnessed by other employees, that you have failed to follow a reasonable direction from your Manager to stop using inappropriate language and to leave her office, and that you used physical force to try and gain entry into your Manager’s office when Ms Todkill was standing in the doorway. Such conduct is completely unacceptable.
Throughout the investigation you have stated that your inappropriate behaviour towards your Manager can be explained by the workplace issues you have with another Flight Attendant relating to your personal life. The Company wishes to make it very clear that there is no justifiable reason for such unacceptable conduct.
Outcome - show cause
Nora, these findings are very serious and the Company is considering disciplinary action against you, which may include termination of your employment. Before deciding the appropriate outcome, I would like to provide you with some time to consider the findings of this investigation and your employment history with Sunstate Airlines
On behalf of Gordon McKirdy...I ask you to provide a written response as to why your employment should not be terminated. Please provide your written response...by 5pm Wednesday 18 August 2010. 2
 Ms Jalea provided her response on 27 September 2010 (her requests for further time to respond were agreed to) and the meeting with Mr McKirdy was held on 26 November 2010.
 Ms Jalea taped the meeting of 26 November 2010.
 On 3 March 2011 Mr McKirdy delivered his decision with respect to the investigation into Ms Jalea’s conduct on 10 June 2010:
The substantiated allegations as outlined in the Findings Letter [of Ms Bowen] constitute a breach of the Standards of Conduct Policy as set out in the Findings letter. As you are aware, Qantas Group employees are expected to comply with all Qantas Group policies at all times during their employment.
Peter O’Toole and I met with you and your nominated support person (Ms Lexie Warren) on Friday 26 November 2010. We discussed the findings and Ms Warren provided further information in response to the Findings Letter which we have now had the opportunity to review and consider. I also note that I received a letter from Ms Warren on your behalf responding to the Findings Letter on 15 September 2010 (Response).
Your Continued Employment with QantasLink
The Company has taken all relevant matters into account, including the matters contained in the Response, the findings of the investigation, the statements from individuals that were present at the time of the incident, the matters discussed at our meeting, the information you provided of events prior to the incident and your previous employment record.
Again, having reviewed all the information before me, it has become apparent that I cannot support you continuing to work in the QantasLink business in Brisbane.
Given the above and as an alternative to termination of your employment, I am prepared to offer you the opportunity to transfer to the QantasLink Sydney base.
Eleanora, I must reiterate that if you do not accept the offer to relocate to the Sydney base I will have no other option but to move forward and terminate your employment with QantasLink on the grounds set out above.
If you choose to relocate to the Sydney Base...this letter will serve as a First and Final warning.
 On 14 March 2011, in accordance with the Standards of Conduct Policy (the Policy), Ms Jalea appealed the decision of Mr McKirdy on numerous grounds. 3
 The appeal was considered by Mr Arturo Norbury, Manager People Policy, Qantas Airways Ltd. On 15 April 2011 Mr Norbury delivered his findings on the appeal:
In considering this appeal, I have reviewed all documents and materials provided to me by QantasLink, including (but not limited to) correspondence, witness statements, applicable policies and procedures.
After reviewing and considering all of the documentation in this matter, I have found that Ms Jalea’s appeal in respect of grounds 1 & 4 above is upheld (in part). Ms Jalea’s appeal in respect of grounds 2 & 3 above, is dismissed. The Schedule attached to this letter provides detailed reasons for each of the appeal findings.
My conclusion is that although a thorough and appropriate investigation was undertaken in this matter, the failure to appropriately consider evidence that was brought to Mr McKirdy’s attention prior to the final outcome decision being handed down, breached the investigation guidelines (clause 17.19) of the Standards of Conduct Policy (full details of my findings in this respect are in the attached Schedule - in particular see (1)(b)(ii)&(v)).
Accordingly, I recommend that the decision of Mr McKirdy outlined in his letter dated 3 March 2011 be set aside, pending consideration of Ms Shepherd’s letter dated 12 February 2011, and if necessary, a further interview with Ms Shepherd.
 In accordance with Mr Norbury’s decision the matter was further considered by Mr McKirdy who gave his decision on 11 May 2011. In that letter Mr McKirdy stated:
In Ms Bowen’s Findings and Outcome of Investigation letter dated 13 August 2010, Ms Bowen found the following matters to have been substantiated:
On the basis of the above, I find that Ms Shepherd’s evidence does nothing to displace the first two substantiated matters, and goes some way to explaining the context of the third mater.
Having taken all of the above into account, I remain of the view that your actions, behaviours and language towards your manager were unacceptable and a breach of the Qantas Group Standards of Conduct Policy. Based on your actions within our business your employment with QantasLink should be terminated.
However, as I have indicated previously, I am prepared to offer you the opportunity to transfer to another QantasLink base outside of Queensland...
 In accordance with the Policy Ms Jalea appealed this decision on a number of grounds.
 This appeal was considered by Mr James Allan, Head of People, QantasLink. On 1 June 2011 Mr Allan gave his decision on that appeal. After considering each of the grounds of appeal Mr Allan found:
On the basis of the above, I dismiss the Appeal. I consider that the investigation was thorough and appropriate and that Mr McKirdy’s decision was reasonable and appropriate, having regard to all of the circumstances.
 On 2 June 2011 Ms Jalea’s solicitor, Ms Warren, wrote to Mr Norbury raising what she considered were two serious errors in Mr Allan’s letter of 1 June 2011.
 Mr Norbury advised Ms Warren on 6 June 2011 that his involvement in the matter was limited to the determination of Ms Jalea’s March appeal and that he therefore did not intend to deal with the substance of her letter. He also advised that Mr Allan would ‘respond (if appropriate) to the concerns you raise.’ 4
 Mr Allan responded by email to Ms Warren on 8 June 2011:
I acknowledge that you and your client do not agree with the outcome of the appeal... As you would appreciate, there is no provision in the Standards of Conduct Policy for an appeal against the outcome of an appeal. Notwithstanding this, I have considered the matters raised in your correspondence. Having regard to those materials, I do not propose to re-open my consideration of the appeal.
 As a result of the appeal decision of Mr Allan, Mr McKirdy wrote to Ms Jalea on 3 June 2011:
I refer to my letter to you dated 11 May 2011.
In that letter, I set out the final outcome and determination with respect to your conduct, having taken into account the findings of Mr Arturo Norbury regarding the appeal against my initial determination.
On 19 May 2011, I received an appeal against the outcomes set out in my letter of 11 May 2011...James Allan, Head of People, QantasLink, has now determined and responded to that appeal, and that the findings and outcomes in my letter of 11 May 2011 stand.
Given the above, I now require your response to my correspondence, and, in particular, I require that you notify me as to whether you wish to take up the opportunity to relocate to another base. As noted in my previous letter, I have concluded that your conduct was such as to warrant the termination of your employment. Accordingly, the opportunity to relocate to another base is put as the alternative to that outcome.
In order to facilitate this process, I would like to meet with you on Tuesday 7 June 2011...At this meeting, I expect you to inform me of your decision. Should you not wish to meet, you should inform me of your decision by no later than 4.00pm on Monday 6 June 2011.
 Ms Jalea did not attend the meeting on 7 June 2011 nor did she inform Mr McKirdy of her decision. By email at 1.39 a.m. on 7 June 2011 Ms Warren advised Mr McKirdy that ‘[a]s it has been established that Mr Allan erred in making his decision in regards to the matter, notably in light of two (2) significant errors identified [in the appeal decision of Mr Allan of 1 June 2011], any request for the meeting is premature.’ 5
 Mr McKirdy again wrote to Ms Jalea on 8 June 2011 and advised that he would give her a final opportunity to respond to the request in his letter of 3 June 2011 to advise him of her decision. For this purpose he asked that she attend a meeting at 1.00 p.m. on 14 June 2011 or she could advise her decision in writing by 4.00 p.m. on 13 June 2011. He then stated:
If you fail to attend or otherwise respond, I will make a decision without further input from you. The outcome as set out in my letters of 11 May and 3 June 2011 remain in place.
 On 14 June 2011 at 7.53 a.m. Ms Warren requested that the meeting proposed for 14 June 2011 be delayed.
 Mr McKirdy wrote to Ms Jalea on 20 June 2011 and advised her:
I am satisfied that:
I have taken this and all matters into account. In this regard I direct your attention in particular to my letters dated 11 May and 3 June 2011. I have decided to terminate your employment, with effect from today’s date, 20 June 2011. You will be paid four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice, together with any accrued but untaken leave entitlements.
Reason for termination
 Ms Jalea’s employment was terminated because she used inappropriate language towards her manager that was witnessed by other employees; she failed to follow a reasonable direction from her manager to stop using inappropriate language and to leave her office; and she used physical force to try and gain entry into Ms Todkill’s office when Ms Todkill was standing in the doorway. 6 Such conduct constitutes a breach of Policy.7
 The decision to terminate Ms Jalea’s employment was taken following an investigation into a number of allegations and the substantiation of some or part of these allegations.
Incident outside work
 Ms Jalea had a personal relationship with Mr Pannan. She was also close friends with Ms Vidler. Some months after Ms Jalea and Mr Pannan’s relationship ended Mr Pannan and Ms Vidler commenced a relationship. This caused the end of the friendship between Ms Jalea and Ms Vidler.
 In March 2010 Mr Pannan obtained an ex parte Temporary Protection Order against Ms Jalea. This matter was heard in Brisbane on 2 June 2010 where the order was lifted. Ms Vidler, as well as Mr Pannan and Ms Jalea, was involved in the court case.
 Evidence for the Applicant was given in these proceedings by Ms Jalea.
 Evidence was given for the Respondent by:
Consideration of the evidence
 The events of 10 June 2010 were not one single event but rather a series of events. On the evidence of Ms Todkill and Ms Jalea there were at least three interactions between them: first when Ms Todkill asked Ms Jalea to come into her office, second the incident at Ms Todkill’s office door and third when either Ms Todkill invited Ms Jalea back to her office or said she would only speak to her with another manager present. In between each of these interactions Ms Jalea was in the reception area or corridors or possibly outside the building.
 Few, if any, witnesses observed or heard each and every one of the interactions and what Ms Jalea did or said in between. That the witnesses are not aware of which part of the total incident they saw or heard does not, of itself, diminish the reliability of their evidence.
 Despite this limitation, I consider that I do have adequate evidence on which to make findings. There are, in addition, a number of admissions made by Ms Jalea as to some of the matters on which I am required to make findings, which assists in this process. 8
 The extent of cross examination of witnesses was particularly long and gruelling resulting in lengthy proceedings. I am not convinced that the level of cross examination has added any more to the body of evidence than might otherwise have been achieved with more focussed cross examination. That said, of course all of the evidence given by witnesses has been considered by me. That some evidence might not be specifically mentioned in this decision does not mean that it has not been considered.
 In making my findings I have taken into account all of the evidence before me except (with a minor exception) that of Ms Zanthe Shepherd.
 Ms Shepherd has made five statements at various times between 11 June 2010 and 5 October 2011 with respect to the incident on 10 June 2010. 9 None of these statements is fully consistent with any other statement.
 In her oral evidence Ms Shepherd suggests that her last statement is the most accurate because she has had time to think and remember what occurred on 10 June 2010.
 In general I find the evidence of Ms Shepherd unreliable. I do not believe the inconsistencies to be deliberate on Ms Shepherd’s part but rather a reflection of her friendship and emotional involvement with Ms Jalea up until August 2011 when their friendship ended. I do accept Ms Shepherd’s oral evidence that Ms Jalea talked to her often about the case and told her that her recollection of events was wrong. I consider that this action by Ms Jalea has tainted the statements provided by Ms Shepherd up until August 2011, and in part explains the inconsistencies between various statements. The exception to this is the first statement of Ms Shepherd of 11 June 2010. This information was furnished the day after Ms Jalea was stood down and before any allegations were put to her. It is highly unlikely that she influenced Ms Shepherd with respect to this. Further, I am not convinced that Ms Shepherd has not sought to over compensate for what she considered as Ms Jalea’s influence in making her statement for these proceedings.
 For these reasons I have generally discounted Ms Shepherd’s evidence.
 Ms Warren, in submissions, has made a number of claims with respect to alleged collusion between the Respondent’s witnesses. This is based on claims that those witnesses have used similar or the same words to describe Ms Jalea’s language in their statements to these proceedings that differ from the words used in their statements made to Ms Bowen. The issue of collusion was, to the extent it was put to the witnesses, denied. I do not find any evidence of the alleged collusion. The critical evidence in this matter is to what people saw or heard. That an individual might have described Ms Jalea as speaking loudly in their statement to Ms Bowen but have used the word ‘yelling’ in their statement to the Tribunal does not alter what the individual heard or that they heard it. Whilst such variations are not ideal I do not find that it adversely affects the credibility of the evidence given in these proceedings.
 Part of the conduct subject to these proceedings involved inappropriate language. A number of witnesses hesitated in using that language and abbreviated it to ‘effing’, the ‘f-word’ and the ‘c-word’. I accept that in using such abbreviations the witnesses were referring to the full words themselves.
 The submissions received are long and detailed. What follows is a brief summary of them. The full submissions have been considered by me in reaching my decision.
 Ms Warren for the Applicant submits that the Respondent has not met the onus of proof on it to show that the conduct complained of occurred and that it provided a valid reason for the termination of the Applicant’s employment.
 She says that, on the basis of the evidence available as at 13 August 2010 (and even though Ms Jalea admitted to certain allegations), the version of events of the Respondent could not be substantiated. Even if there was misconduct there was not misconduct such as to warrant termination of employment.
 In determining whether the conduct occurred it is submitted that I should limit myself to matters in evidence and statements taken at the time of the investigation.
 The incident of 10 June 2010 occurred in an environment where Ms Todkill had sworn at the Applicant on 16 April 2010; where Ms Todkill fostered an environment in which flight attendants could express their concerns including the use of light swear words; where Ms Todkill was issued with a warning with respect to using the ‘f-word’ on 16 April 2010; and where the Respondent has taken action to address swearing in the workplace. In determining if there is a valid reason Ms Warren submits this should be assessed against a culture of tolerance of swearing in the workplace and two sets of rules in the workplace.
 It is submitted that the conduct of the Applicant should be seen as occurring in the heat of the moment and against a background of a recently completed court case involving Mr Pannan and Ms Vidler, which caused the Applicant ‘personal stress.’
 Further, in the meeting with Ms Jalea on 10 June 2010 Ms Todkill failed to follow the provisions of the Policy, she did not provide Ms Jalea with a notice of the reason for the meeting, the door was closed during the meeting and she acted officiously.
 The Applicant was stood down on pay and, on termination, provided with four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice indicating the conduct was not serious misconduct.
 The reason for termination is unclear.
 Ms Warren submits that the decision to stand the Applicant down on the evening of 10 June 2010 before any complaint was made breached procedural fairness as she was not given an opportunity to respond prior to the stand down.
 The Applicant was denied access to the witness statements (during the investigation) or the substance of those statements such that she could not properly respond, yet findings were made on the basis of those statements. Further, the Respondent has sought to rely on signed statements given to Ms Bowen that were altered from the ones Ms Bowen relied on in her investigation.
 The letter of findings issued on 13 August 2010 was referred to by the Respondent as a ‘show cause’ letter, which did not give the Applicant an opportunity to give her advice with respect to clause 17.21 of the Policy before the Respondent determined the appropriate outcome. The Respondent should have considered other disciplinary actions before considering if termination was appropriate. Further, the Respondent failed to have proper regard to matters raised by the Applicant in her letter of 27 September 2010 demonstrating that the Respondent did not give the Applicant a proper opportunity to respond.
 The Applicant was not given an opportunity to be heard at the dismissal meeting [of 14 June 2011] before the letter of termination was issued on 20 June 2011.
 The failure of the Respondent to reschedule the meeting of 14 June 2011 amounts to an unreasonable refusal to allow the Applicant to have a support person present.
 Ms Warren submits that there has been apparent collusion in the statements of a number of witnesses and that little or no weight should be given to the witness statements signed after 13 August 2010 of Ms Rose (dated 13 October 2010), Mr Jeffries (14 August 2010) or Ms Shepherd (20 August 2010). Further, no weight should be given to the statement of Ms Rasmussen and the veracity of the evidence of Ms Bowen is seriously in doubt.
 Overall Ms Warren submits that the investigation was flawed, the evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses is doubtful, the Respondent did not abide by its Policy, the show cause process was tick-a-box exercise and in any event the decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment was disproportionate to the conduct of the Applicant, for which she has expressed remorse.
 Mr Rogers for the Respondent submits that there was a valid reason for the termination of the Applicant’s employment based on her misconduct in breach of the Respondent’s Policy. The Applicant is bound by the Policy and has received training on the Policy.
 The Applicant used derogatory language and behaved inappropriately by: slamming her manager’s office door with force; swearing and abusing her manager; swearing loudly and extensively in the workplace which impacted on other employees; and attempting to gain unauthorised access to her manager’s office by verbally and physically accosting her manager.
 The witness evidence supports that the Applicant swore and abused Ms Todkill loudly and extensively. Witness evidence also supports that the Applicant attempted to gain unauthorised access to Ms Todkill’s office with physical force and verbally abused Ms Todkill whilst trying to gain entry. The Applicant admitted to slamming the door, which was also witnessed by other employees.
 The conduct of the Applicant was inappropriate, hostile and intimidating. Even if swearing is common in the workplace the manner of the swearing in conjunction with the other conduct constitutes serious misconduct.
 Mr Rogers submits that the Applicant’s conduct was serious misconduct and provides a valid reason for the termination of her employment. The Applicant was notified of the reason for her dismissal and given an opportunity to respond at various points in the procedures.
 The show cause letter was only unusual to the extent that the inclusion of the phrase ‘provide a written response as to why your employment should not be terminated’, which is only included where the allegations are serious and the findings substantiated or part substantiated. The Applicant was invited to attend a show cause meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to give the Applicant an opportunity to provide further information relevant to the consideration of whether the Applicant’s employment should be terminated.
 In the meeting of 26 November 2010:
 In Dickinson v Calstores P/L 10 it was held that the Tribunal is able to have regard to an employee’s behaviour during counselling when considering whether a decision to dismiss an employee is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. On this basis, the Applicant’s conduct during the show cause meeting reinforces the validity of the termination of the Applicant’s employment.
 Mr Rogers submits that the Applicant lied in the show cause meeting about having sought the transcript of her court proceedings concerning Mr Pannan. In Streeter v Telstra Corporation 11 a Full Bench found that it was a valid reason to terminate the employment of an employee who had failed to answer reasonable enquiries honestly.
 The actions of the Applicant in covertly taping the show cause meeting demonstrate that the Applicant behaved dishonestly and disrespectfully towards her managers. By recording the meeting, the Applicant demonstrated a lack of respect, honesty and openness towards the Respondent. Her actions are calculated or likely to damage the relationship of trust between the Applicant as employee and Respondent as employer.
 The Respondent submits that in Lever v Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation 12 it was held that an employee’s conduct in covertly recording a meeting amounted to misconduct and was a valid reason for the termination of employment. In Byrne and another v Australian Airlines Limited 13 it was held that ‘facts which existed at the time of the dismissal, but which come to light only subsequently, might justify the dismissal when otherwise it would be harsh, unjust or unreasonable’.14
 The Applicant was afforded procedural fairness throughout the process. The Respondent conducted as full and extensive an investigation and appeal into all of the matters as is reasonable in the circumstances. Further, the Applicant was given every reasonable opportunity to respond, she was not denied access to a support person and Mr McKirdy had sought to have the investigation carried out by a human resources professional. Ms Bowen took a cautious approach in her investigation, in that she sought to avoid details of the disciplinary history of the Applicant and required that for an allegation to be substantiated it be corroborated by two witnesses. Any delay in the progress of the matter was caused by numerous requests of the Applicant for extensions of time to provide responses to allegations and the show cause letter, and to meet with the Respondent.
 Mr Rogers submits that the investigation and disciplinary process was conducted to a standard expected of a large organisation and that the process was fair in all of the circumstances.
 Mr McKirdy wrote to the Applicant inviting her to meet with him on 7 June 2011 in order for the Applicant to elect relocation. Alternatively, the Applicant could respond in writing. Mr McKirdy then gave the Applicant a further opportunity to meet on 14 June 2011 or provide a response in writing by 13 June 2011 with respect to the offer to relocate. The Applicant neither attended nor replied in writing.
 The decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment was an appropriate disciplinary decision made by the Respondent in the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the Applicant.
 The processes of the Respondent in the investigation and appeals were not a tick-a-box exercise.
Applicant in reply
 In reply Ms Warren submits, further to her initial submissions:
Ms Jalea’s conduct
 I find that Ms Jalea used physical force to stop Ms Todkill closing her office door.
 Ms Jalea admits that she stood in Ms Todkill’s doorway and did not move to allow Ms Todkill to close the door 15 although denies that she was pushing against the door16 or sought to gain unauthorised access to Ms Todkill’s office. Ms Jalea’s evidence is that her jacket was caught on the door and she was attempting to free it.
 Ms Todkill’s evidence is that, after she approached Ms Jalea and asked her to calm down after Ms Jalea first left her office (this occurred at the T-intersection of the hallway and reception area 17) they moved back towards the door to Ms Todkill’s office with Ms Jalea insisting that Ms Todkill give her a copy of the letter [of complaint made by Ms Vidler].18 Ms Todkill says that whilst in the doorway Ms Jalea attempted to move past her into the office, Ms Jalea had her hands on Ms Todkill’s chest19 and Ms Todkill braced herself in the doorway to stop Ms Jalea entering her office.20 Ms Todkill did not push Ms Jalea but held her so she would not get hurt as Ms Todkill attempted to close the door.21 After closing the door Ms Todkill could not recall if she opened her office door again but she may have as she generally left her keys in the door. Prior to closing the door Ms Todkill saw someone in the photocopying room.22
 Ms Harvey’s evidence is that from where she sits in her office, she can see Ms Todkill’s office door through reflections in the glass walls of the curved passageway. 23 Ms Harvey saw in the reflection Ms Jalea ‘forcefully pushing on Ms Todkill’s door’ and she says Ms Jalea appeared angry and aggravated.24 It appeared to Ms Harvey that Ms Jalea was using force on the door as it was not being easily opened or closed.25
 Mr Jeffries’ evidence is that, having heard yelling, he went to his doorway where he saw Ms Jalea standing outside Ms Todkill’s office swearing and trying to get into the office. 26 Mr Jeffries could see Ms Todkill standing behind the door trying to hold the door closed.27 Ms Jalea was yelling ‘show me the effing letter’.28 Mr Jeffries believed Ms Jalea was attempting to get into Ms Todkill’s office because ‘she was pushing into the door and Norma was standing behind the door trying to keep her door closed because I assume that Norma had another person in there she was interviewing or whatever.’29
 I am satisfied that, because of the curve in office hallway and the presence of glass partitions that Mr Jeffries could see Ms Todkill’s office door and the incident in the doorway and that Ms Harvey could see Ms Todkill’s office door and the incident in the doorway in the reflection whilst seated at her desk.
 Ms Bowen’s evidence is that, when she interviewed Ms Jalea on 16 July 2010, Ms Jalea demonstrated how she had put her foot down and was pushing against the door. 30
 I prefer the evidence of Ms Todkill, Mr Jeffries and Ms Harvey to that of Ms Jalea on this matter. My conclusion on this issue is supported by Ms Bowen’s evidence as to what she says occurred in her meeting with Ms Jalea. Whilst Ms Jalea raised briefly the issue of her jacket being caught on the door little supporting evidence was adduced to enable me to draw a conclusion on that. Taking into account all of the evidence I find that Ms Jalea did use physical force to stop Ms Todkill closing her office door.
 I do not find that Ms Jalea sought unauthorised access to Ms Todkill’s office. There is no evidence to suggest that Ms Jalea sought to enter into Ms Todkill’s office, just that she sought to stop Ms Todkill shutting her office door as she demanded the letter. This does not diminish the seriousness of what I have found with respect to using force against the door. I have reached the conclusion and find that Ms Jalea did not intend to move until she had been shown a copy of the letter and she intended to stop Ms Todkill closing the door until she got the letter. This is not a minor matter.
 I find that Ms Jalea used inappropriate language towards her manager, some of which was witnessed by other employees.
 Ms Jalea admits that she said to Ms Todkill ‘of course it is my fucking business, it’s about me and I have the right to know.’ 31 She denies, however, that she said ‘show me the fucking letter’ or that she used inappropriate language such as ‘bitch,’ ‘slut’ and ‘fucking’.32 Ms Jalea also admits that when Ms Todkill first raised matters with her in her office she got upset and responded that ‘this is all fucking bullshit’ and described Ms Vidler as ‘that little bitch’33 but says she was mumbling to herself and that she was not loud or aggressive.34
 Ms Todkill’s evidence is that, whilst Ms Jalea was in her office, she said ‘I hate that fucking bitch’, ‘god I hate her’ and ‘are you fucking kidding me, how many fucking times is she going to put in fucking complaints. That fucking slut, dumb bitch.’ She also used inappropriate language in describing Mr Pannan. 35
 Ms Rose gave evidence that she heard Ms Jalea shout loudly ‘show me the fucking letter, show me the fucking letter’. 36 Mr Jeffries gave evidence that he heard Ms Jalea swearing and saying words to the effect of ‘I want to see that fucking letter, I want to see that fucking letter.’37 Ms Harvey’s evidence is that she heard Ms Jalea yelling words to the effect of ‘I want to see the fucking letter.’38
 Ms Rose could not see who Ms Jalea was shouting at. Mr Jeffries did not see directly who Ms Jalea was yelling at but he did see Ms Jalea at Ms Todkill’s office door and heard her swearing 39 and he soon after saw Ms Todkill behind her door.40 Ms Harvey assumed Ms Jalea was yelling at Ms Todkill as she was outside Ms Todkill’s door.41
 I accept that a number of witnesses heard Ms Jalea demand to see the ‘fucking letter’. From the evidence, including Ms Jalea’s evidence that she saw such a letter on Ms Todkill’s desk, 42 I accept that she was demanding the letter of Ms Todkill.
 Ms Jalea says she was not using inappropriate language towards Ms Todkill but rather was ‘venting’. I find the totality of this incident was not ‘venting’ in the sense of letting off a bit of steam about something that has happened but rather a stream of language directed at her manager. In this respect I find the language was directed at Ms Todkill. The demand of Ms Jalea to ‘show me the fucking letter’ and assertion that ‘of course it is my fucking business’ by their linguistics indicate that they were directed at the person in front of Ms Jalea at the time, that is, her manager
 I prefer the evidence of Ms Todkill, Ms Rose, Ms Harvey and Mr Jeffries to that of Ms Jalea on this matter. Taking all of the evidence into account I conclude and find that Ms Jalea did use inappropriate language directed at her manager.
 Ms Jalea gave evidence that Ms Todkill was yelling at her to ‘get the fuck out of my office, leave me alone, I have had enough.’ No one else gave evidence of having heard Ms Todkill swear during the incident. Ms Jeffries gave evidence that he heard Ms Todkill raise her voice 43 but not that he heard her swear. Ms Todkill denies that she swore at Ms Jalea. I prefer the evidence of Ms Todkill on this matter and find that Ms Todkill did not swear at Ms Jalea.
 I find that Ms Jalea raised her voice whilst using inappropriate language. This finding is based on Ms Jalea’s admission that she may have raised her voice when she said ‘give me the letter’ when standing in Ms Todkill’s doorway 44 and that she was asked by Ms Todkill to stop raising her voice.45
 Ms Todkill’s evidence is that, after Ms Jalea left her office the first time she could hear her in reception area loudly using terms such as ‘bitch’, ‘slut’, ‘mole’ and ‘fucking’ 46 and that at times during the incident Ms Jalea became enraged and fiery, full of adrenaline and angry.47
 Ms Rose, Ms Harvey and Mr Jeffries all heard Ms Jalea demanding the letter whilst they were in their own offices some 15 metres away from Ms Todkill’s office. 48
 Whilst Ms Todkill may have raised her voice I find that this was in response to Ms Jalea’s raised voice.
 On the basis of the evidence I am satisfied that Ms Jalea raised her voice whilst using inappropriate language.
 I find that Ms Jalea did not calm down when requested to by Ms Todkill.
 Ms Jalea admits that, while she was in the reception area after leaving Ms Todkill’s office after the first interaction, Ms Todkill approached her and asked if she had calmed down and to come back into Ms Todkill’s office. 49 Ms Jalea says she did not calm down when asked to as she was too upset.50 Ms Jalea also admits that after she left Ms Todkill’s office the second time Ms Todkill again asked her if she was going to calm down and talk to her. Ms Jalea agreed to calm down and says she went back to Ms Todkill’s office.51
 Ms Todkill’s evidence is that when she heard Ms Jalea swearing in the reception area she left her office and asked Ms Jalea to settle down. Ms Todkill denies she asked Ms Jalea to come back to her office.
 The suggestion that asking Ms Jalea to calm down is lip service or something said without reasonable expectation that she would calm down 52 is a silly proposition which I do not accept. If Ms Todkill asked Ms Jalea to calm down it is reasonable to assume that she wanted her to calm down. It was a reasonable request and there is no acceptable reason given as to why she did not comply with the request.
 On the basis of this evidence I am satisfied that Ms Jalea did not calm down when requested to by Ms Todkill.
 There is no evidence on which I can find that Ms Todkill specifically asked Ms Jalea to stop using inappropriate language. It is implicit, however, in asking Ms Jalea to calm down at a time when she was using inappropriate language, that Ms Todkill wanted her to stop raising her voice and using inappropriate language. By refusing to calm down Ms Jalea did fail to follow a reasonable direction centred on her language, the volume of her voice and her agitated state.
 I find that Ms Jalea behaved inappropriately by slamming Ms Todkill’s office door with considerable force causing the wall to shake.
 Ms Jalea’s evidence is that, during the first meeting in Ms Todkill’s office she was crying, was not calm and left Ms Todkill’s office, slamming the door saying ‘this is fucking bullshit’ 53 in a normal voice.54 Ms Jalea denies that she slammed the door so hard that the walls shook.
 Ms Todkill’s evidence is that she commenced the meeting with the door open and that when Ms Jalea launched into a fit of rage and became aggressive she got up and closed her office door. 55 Ms Jalea then ‘stormed out of my office and slammed the door with such force the entire glass wall shook.’56
 Ms Rasmussen’s evidence is that she was in the photocopier room when she heard the door to Ms Todkill’s office slam shut and saw Ms Jalea walk past. She says that she heard the glass panelling in the door shudder when the door slammed quite loudly, although on questioning agreed it was the glass surrounding the door that shuddered. 57 After the door slammed she saw Ms Jalea walk past the door of the photocopying room58 in the direction of operations59 (towards the offices of Mr Jeffries, Ms Rose and Ms Harvey).
 Whilst Ms Jalea denies she slammed the door so hard that the walls shook, her admission that she was not calm and that she was upset in the meeting with Ms Todkill draws me to conclude that she did, on the balance of probabilities, slam the door hard enough for the glass in the walls to shake. I accept the evidence of Ms Todkill and Ms Rasmussen on this point.
 I find that Ms Jalea was in a rage at times during the incident but that at other times she was calm. This finding is based on the evidence of Ms Todkill that Ms Jalea was enraged, fiery, raised her voice and was not calm and on Ms Jalea’s admission that she was upset and not calm. In addition I have taken into account that Ms Jalea was speaking loudly or yelling and, on Ms Rose’s evidence, sounded angry and upset. 60
 Rage in this sense describes an anger, intensity or immoderation in Ms Jalea’s actions and language. 61
 I find, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Jalea was in a rage at times during the incident.
 I find that Ms Jalea’s conduct towards her manager was enraged, inappropriate and unnecessary. Her conduct in the office area was disrespectful to her fellow workers, inappropriate and unnecessary.
 Ms Jalea, in her conduct, failed to treat her co-workers and manager with dignity, respect and fairness. Her outburst was prolonged, her language inappropriate and her consideration for the effect of her conduct on others non-existent. I find that the conduct of Ms Jalea was in breach of the Policy, in particular:
6. Standards of Personal Behaviour
6.1 (d) Treating other Qantas Group Staff with respect and working as a team. This means Employees must:
(i) co-operate with other Qantas Group Staff for the benefit of customers; and
(ii) treat other Staff with trust, dignity, respect, fairness and equity.
 Ms Jalea’s conduct included verbal abuse (including inappropriate language and a raised voice) and she disobeyed a reasonable and lawful direction to calm down. Whilst that direction may not have been directed at how she performs her specific functions, it is reasonable to direct an employee as to their general conduct in the workplace. This is the form of direction given to Ms Jalea when she was asked to calm down. It is a direction she did not heed. I find Ms Jalea’s conduct was in breach of the Policy, in particular:
16. Unacceptable Behaviour, Misconduct and Serious Misconduct
16.1 threatening and intimidating behaviour including verbal or written abuse, physical abuse or assault;
16.4 disobeying or disregarding a reasonable and/or lawful direction...
 It should be noted that the Policy also specifies that employees are responsible for their own behaviour at all times and for treating staff fairly and with respect. 62 Ms Jalea must take responsibility for her conduct.
 To the extent it is relevant in these proceedings I do not find that there was a culture of swearing in the workplace. That Ms Todkill swore once at Ms Jalea in April 2010 does not create a culture. Evidence of other swearing in the workplace was hearsay. I make this finding on the basis of the evidence of Ms Bowen as to the outcome of her investigation into Ms Todkill. In making this finding I do not suggest that there is not swearing in the workplace. Swearing, in particular the use of the word ‘fuck’, so oft repeated in the incident leading to these proceedings, is very common. Acceptable standards of language across workplaces are not uniform. What might be acceptable on a building site is unlikely to be the accepted norm in an office environment. While the line might be unclear, there is also a substantial difference between ‘conversational’ swearing and an outburst of the type that occurred during this incident.
 I find that Ms Todkill did not breach the Policy in convening the meeting with Ms Jalea and in the way it was conducted. Ms Jalea was not denied access to a support person and she was aware of the purpose of the meeting at its start. There is no evidence to suggest she could not have stopped the meeting until she had a support person if that was what she wished. Further, on her own evidence and knowing what Ms Todkill wanted to talk about with her, Ms Jalea voluntarily returned to Ms Todkill’s office, on her evidence, on a second and third occasion with no support person.
 I suggest, however, that neither Ms Todkill nor the industrial relations staff member she consulted adequately took into account the proximity of the court case involving Ms Jalea, Mr Pannan and Ms Vidler in determining to proceed to speak to Ms Jalea on 10 June 2010.
 A number of other allegations were made in the letter to Ms Jalea of 25 June 2010 and in the course of these proceedings. Except insofar as I have made specific findings in other parts of this decision I find that of those matters I do not need to make a specific finding or there is no evidence before me on which I can make a finding. This is not a finding that the other events did not occur but that I make no findings on the matter based on the evidence before me.
Harsh, unjust or unreasonable
 The Act provides that a dismissal is unfair (other criteria being met) if it is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The concepts of harsh, unjust or unreasonable were considered by the High Court in Byrne and another v Australian Airlines Limited 63:
It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted. 64
 The Act states:
387 Criteria for considering harshness etc.
In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, FWA must take into account:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that FWA considers relevant.
 An employee is entitled to both procedural and substantive fairness with respect to a dismissal. Substantive fairness will be satisfied if the grounds of the dismissal are fair. Procedural fairness if the manner or process of the dismissal and investigation leading up to the dismissal are just. 65
 Consideration of harsh, unjust or unreasonable is not limited by s.387 to the facts as they existed at the relevant time. Section 387(e) allows Fair Work Australia to have regard to any other matters considered relevant. Consideration of a valid reason should not result in a failure to consider other matters. 66
Is there a valid reason? (s.387(a))
 For a reason to be valid it must be sound, defensible and/or well founded. 67
 Where the reason for termination of employment is misconduct it is necessary to determine if the conduct alleged to have occurred actually took place. 68 Such a decision must be made on the basis of the evidence in the proceedings before Fair Work Australia.69
 Ms Warren for the Applicant submits that conduct that is not wilful misconduct or wilful flouting of the Respondent’s Policy is not a valid reason for termination of employment. 70 In Kaur v Services Management Pty Ltd t/a SMI Security Group71 misconduct was considered as action so seriously in breach of the contract that by standards of fairness and justice the employer should not be bound to continue the employment.
 I do not accept Ms Warren’s submissions on this point.
 In Potter v WorkCover Corporation 72 a Full Bench held that:
The meaning of the term "valid reason" is not to be limited by importing a test amounting to repudiation of the employment contract. The issue is not whether the conduct in question amounted to serious misconduct at common law but whether it gave rise to a valid reason for termination of employment. 73
 In Annetta v Ansett Australia 74 it was held that a reason may be valid even if there would not be grounds for summary dismissal at common law.
 I have set out above my findings in respect of Ms Jalea’s conduct on 10 June 2010.
 Ms Jalea’s reaction to the request of her manager to have an informal chat was inappropriate and unacceptable. There is no reasonable excuse for her language, her conduct, or her rage. Ms Jalea had the opportunity to walk away from Ms Todkill but chose not to. Her actions were in breach of Policy.
 In all of the circumstances I find that there was a valid reason for the termination of Ms Jalea’s employment in that her conduct was in breach of the Policy.
Was the person notified of the reason? (s.385(b))
 Ms Jalea was notified of the reasons for the termination of her employment. She was provided with a letter of allegations, a letter of findings against the allegations (and was advised in that letter that a possible outcome was that her employment may be terminated), a final outcome letter and, following two appeals, a final decision. Ms Jalea was given an opportunity to discuss the reasons for the findings in a meeting with Ms Bowen on 13 August 2010. Further, she was given an opportunity to meet with Mr McKirdy on 26 November 2010 prior to him making his decision and, once he had made his decision, she was given the opportunity to appeal it.
Was the person given an opportunity to respond? (s.385(c))
 Ms Jalea was given a number of opportunities to respond to the reason for the termination of her employment. She utilised these opportunities in her solicitor’s letter of response to the allegations of 6 July 2010, further response of 19 July 2010, reply of 27 September 2010 to Ms Bowen’s findings and first and second appeals of 14 March 2011 and 19 May 2011. She was also given the opportunity to meet with relevant managers prior to a decision being made as to disciplinary action.
 These opportunities were all utilised by the Applicant and detailed responses to the allegations and various decisions were made. In responding to the findings and making the appeals Ms Jalea detailed her response to both procedural and substantive matters.
 Where Ms Jalea sought extensions of time to lodge material or sought adjustments to the dates of meetings these were, in the main, accommodated.
 Ms Jalea submits that she was not given an opportunity to be heard at the dismissal meeting (or on 14 June 2011). There is no requirement under the Policy for a dismissal ‘meeting’ as such. To the extent that the meeting of 14 June 2011 did not occur I deal with this below. Otherwise I find no basis to this claim.
 In all of the circumstances I find that Ms Jalea was given an opportunity to respond.
Was there an unreasonable refusal to have a support present (s.385(d))
 The Policy states that an employee involved in an investigation process has the right to a support person. 75 In all of the meetings conducted with Ms Jalea there was no unreasonable refusal to allow Ms Jalea to have a support person present. In fact Ms Jalea was allowed to have a support person and/or advocate present in all of the meetings she had with QantasLink.
 The Applicant submits that, in refusing to reschedule the meeting of 14 June 2011, Ms Jalea was unreasonably denied the opportunity to have a support person present. In some circumstances I might agree that a refusal to reschedule a meeting to enable a support person to be present could be characterised as an unreasonable refusal to allow a person to have a support person present. It is not so in this case. With respect to both the proposed meetings of 7 and 14 June 2011 Ms Jalea’s solicitor advised of her unavailability and hence the unavailability of Ms Jalea only hours before each of the proposed meetings. Such lack of notice to Mr McKirdy at such a critical time by the Applicant’s solicitor is discourteous at best. To complain the meeting of 14 June 2011 was not rescheduled in such circumstances is disingenuous.
 The meetings of 7 and 14 June 2011 were called by Mr McKirdy to enable Ms Jalea to respond to the offer of relocation. Ms Jalea’s solicitor advised that the meeting on 7 June 2011 was premature as ‘it has been established that Mr Allan erred in making his decision’ (emphasis added) in the second appeal, 76 when, in fact, it was not so established. This was an assertion on the part of the Applicant’s solicitor. It does not make it fact. It was not a reason for refusal to attend the meeting. Mr McKirdy would have had reasonable grounds to proceed to termination at this point but instead he provided Ms Jalea with a further opportunity to respond to his offer of a transfer to another base. Ms Jalea was given six days’ notice of the proposed meeting. Early in the morning of the day of the meeting Ms Jalea’s solicitor again advised she and Ms Jalea were unavailable and suggested a meeting sometime in the week commencing 27 June 2011. Mr McKirdy then proceeded to issue the letter of termination of employment to Ms Jalea.
 Ms Jalea was provided with adequate notice of the meeting on 14 June 2011. She could have arranged a written reply or taken her other support person to the meeting. I do not find that there was an unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the Applicant to have a support person present to assist at the meetings.
 I do not consider Ms Todkill unreasonably refused Ms Jalea to have a support person present for reasons given above.
The size of the employer’s undertaking (s.385 (f)&(g))
 QantasLink is part of the Qantas group. The Policy, which underpins the employee discipline process, applies across the entire Qantas group. QantasLink have access to and utilise the resources of the Qantas Group. Mr Norbury who conducted the first appeal held the position of Manager People Policy for Qantas Airways at the time he determined the appeal.
 Given the size of the organisation and the human resources expertise that exists within the organisation it is reasonable to assume that well developed procedures for use in such circumstances would be available and that those procedures would be adhered to. I deal with this specific matter below.
 I do not accept that the size of the Qantas group and the access to human resources expertise should mean that any error in process, if established, should automatically negate the entire investigation process, findings and decision.
 I find that no special consideration is required to be given to the Respondent on the basis of the size of the undertaking or its access to human resources specialists.
Any other matters (s.385(h))
 The Applicant has raised a substantial number of additional matters. I set out below my consideration and findings as appropriate to a number of these. I have considered all matters raised but detail below those matters of substance which have had a bearing on my decision.
Conduct of investigation
 Ms Warren argues that the investigation undertaken by Ms Bowen was flawed. Mr Rogers submits the investigation was carried out pursuant to the Policy.
 The Policy provides for a formal process to be undertaken:
17.16 Formal process
A formal disciplinary process should generally be used to address Employee conduct that is serious in nature and/or frequency and if substantiated, may warrant documented Disciplinary Action or Dismissal.
(a) In a formal disciplinary process, a full investigation into the alleged conduct should generally occur prior to any formal Disciplinary Action being taken. However, if appropriate, interim action may be taken pending the outcome of the investigation.
(b) An Employee may have a Support Person present during any meeting or discussion which takes place as part of a formal disciplinary process. A Company Witness should also generally be present at any such meetings or discussions.
 The investigation guidelines are set out in the Policy:
17.19 The investigation process guidelines
Disciplinary investigations should generally be conducted as confidentially and promptly as is practicable having regard to the general principles of procedural fairness. Such investigations should generally incorporate some or all of the following stages:
(a) obtaining a written complaint or statement from the Complainant or a report about the alleged behaviour (the Allegation(s));
(b) gathering other evidence relevant to the Allegation(s) eg closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage, emails, leave applications, Cardinal Rules or EEO training records;
(c) preparing a letter of allegation to put to the Respondent;
(d) providing the Respondent with an opportunity to given a written response to the Allegations;
(e) if important facts are disputed, obtaining written reports from relevant Witnesses;
(f) conducting further interviews with the Complainant and Respondent (if necessary) to clarify information, or seeking such clarification in writing, if appropriate;
(g) making an assessment of the evidence and a determination of whether the Allegation(s) are substantiated or unsubstantiated on the balance of probabilities; and
(h) communication of the outcome of the investigation to the Complainant (where relevant) and the Respondent. This communication should be made by the investigator, face to face where appropriate.
 The general principles of procedural fairness are also set out in the Policy:
17.18 Procedural Fairness
In conducting an investigation, the investigator and any relevant decision makers should seek to adhere to general principles of procedural fairness. In any investigation:
(a) allegations should be provided to the Respondent, generally in writing;
(b) the Respondent is entitled to know the substance (but not necessarily full particulars) of any allegations or complaint(s) made against them;
(c) Employees involved in investigation processes have the right to a Support Person;
(d) the Respondent must be provided with an adequate opportunity to respond to allegations put to them;
(e) the Company must consider the response of the Respondent;
(f) correct and thorough documentation must be maintained, so far as reasonably practicable;
(g) all parties must act in a reasonable and timely manner to facilitate the conduct of the investigation and the making of findings; and
(h) all parties to the decision must be given an opportunity to be heard and all relevant arguments considered before a decision is made.
 Ms Bowen was given the task of investigating the 10 June 2010 incident on 11 June 2010. She completed this task on 13 August 2010 when she issued her letter of findings. Matters post this date were dealt with by Mr McKirdy.
 In undertaking the investigation Ms Bowen followed the steps generally laid out in the Policy. She received a copy of the complaint made by Ms Todkill. After speaking to Ms Todkill she asked Ms Todkill to prepare a statement setting out her version of the events of 10 June 2010. 77 Following receipt of this she put together the letter of allegations sent to Ms Jalea on 25 June 2010.78
 Ms Bowen met with Ms Jalea and her support person on 16 July 2010 in Brisbane. The meeting went for several hours during which Ms Jalea was given the opportunity to present her side of the story, address each of the allegations, demonstrate what occurred at Ms Todkill’s door, provide further information with respect to her behaviour and raise her own complaints. 79 Ms Jalea provided the names of witnesses during the meeting. She was also provided with a copy of the statement completed by Ms Todkill.
 Ms Bowen received a further response to the allegations from Ms Jalea on 19 July 2010. She also received numerous phone calls from Ms Jalea during the course of her investigation telling her how the investigation should be conducted. Ms Bowen perceived Ms Jalea to be ‘very forceful and impatient.’ 80
 Ms Bowen met with Ms Jalea twice during the investigation, on 16 July and 13 August 2010. Ms Bowen said of Ms Jalea that at the first meeting she was a lot more open than the second meeting and I would say that she was obviously very, very concerned about the matter...but she was also quite directive, so she would actually spend a lot of time telling me what I was going to find and what I was going to do and, you know, what determinations I was going to make ...While she denied certain things had actually occurred, overall she admitted that, you know, this incident where she had become very upset had occurred. It changed sort of by the second meeting. It was all about, "I was justified in what I did because of all these...things that were going on with my manager and...the people around me," so there was less sort of...whether she'd actually done anything wrong. 81
 In determining if an allegation was substantiated Ms Bowen concluded that if a matter was witnessed by more than one person (including Ms Todkill or Ms Jalea) then, on the balance of probabilities, she could conclude that the allegation was substantiated. 82 The approach used by Ms Bowen is a conservative one to determining a matter on the balance of probabilities. In taking this approach Ms Bowen sought to minimise the risk that she would find an allegation substantiated that was in fact false.
 The primary criticisms of Ms Bowen’s investigation appear to be that she did not speak to all potential witnesses, that some witnesses signed their statements after Ms Bowen issued the letter of findings on 13 August 2010 and that these were altered from the unsigned statements.
 Ms Bowen spoke to those witnesses who were named by at least two others as possibly having seen or heard matters during the incident. Mr Flockhart, Mr Ringwood, Mr Turton and Mr Pannan were not named by more than one other person and she did not interview them. 83 She did, however, speak to Ms Young84 who was only named by Mr Jeffries as being a possible witness. Ms Bowen’s handwritten notes with respect to Ms Young indicate that she was unable to provide any information as she was having lunch in the terminal at the time of the incident so nothing rests on this.
 The witnesses named by Ms Jalea in her correspondence of 19 July 2010 relate to ‘witnesses that have had incidents with Norma [Todkill]’, ‘persons that may have witnessed inappropriate behaviour from Norma,’ witnesses to ‘defamatory comments by Captain Martin Pannan,’ witnesses to ‘harassment and breach of confidentiality in the workplace’ and a list of staff who Ms Bowen could contact if she required ‘further information’. 85 None of these people were put forward as witnesses to the incident on 10 June 2010 and there is no reason for Ms Bowen to follow them up in relation to the investigation of this matter.
 The people Ms Jalea named in the meeting of 19 July 2010 relating to the incident on 10 June 2010 were Mr Jeffries and Ms Rasmussen (who were interviewed) and Mr Turton. Whilst a number of others are named in the notes of the meeting 86 these names relate to events other than the incident on 10 June 2010.
 Whilst Ms Rasmussen gave a statement to Ms Bowen about what she saw and heard on about 2 July 2010 by phone she does not recall confirming the statement and believes there may have been some confusion because she was home on maternity leave at the time and Ms Bowen may have tried to contact her on her work email, which she did not have access to at home. 87 Whilst this may have affected Ms Bowen’s conclusion as to the slamming of the door, I accept Ms Rasmussen’s oral evidence and written statement to these proceedings on this point. Such an error would not change my conclusions and I do not consider that it would tarnish the totality of Ms Bowen’s investigation or the remainder of the process afforded to Ms Jalea.
 Ms Bowen determined not to follow up ‘crew in the flight operations room’ or ‘pilots in the crew room’ as she had no specific names and did not wish to go on a fishing expedition.
Whilst it might be argued that Ms Bowen should have sought out ‘crew in the crew room’ as potential witnesses post her interview with Ms Jalea on 16 July 2010, to determine who these individuals may have been would require making it widely known that an investigation was taking place. Given Ms Jalea had already expressed concerns with respect to people talking about her court case 88 or breaching confidentiality it is reasonable that Ms Bowen did not do so.
 Ms Bowen did not delve into the nature of the complaint made by Ms Vidler against Ms Jalea but with the incident [on 10 June 2010] itself. 89 Ms Bowen stated that Ms Jalea was however:
insistent that this complaint didn't exist and that was one of the things that she'd said, that, you know, Norma [Todkill] had created this complaint to upset her because she knew that it would upset her and that went to one of her reasons as to why she became upset; because Norma knew that she would get upset if she raised another complaint from Britt [Vidler], because Britt and her had this history together. 90
 Ms Bowen was broadly aware of the history of complaints between Ms Jalea and Ms Vidler but stayed away from any disciplinary history of the person being investigated as it impacts on the investigation. 91
 There was nothing to stop the Applicant approaching others she believes may have witnessed the incident and asking them for statements she could then provide to Ms Bowen, Mr McKirdy, include in her appeals or present in these proceedings. That she was prepared to seek such statements is evidenced by the material she did obtain from Ms Shepherd.
 There is no basis on which to conclude that persons not interviewed by Ms Bowen would have provided evidence contrary to that which I have received. Apart from throwing a wide net to catch some reason as to why Ms Bowen’s investigation did not meet the requirements of the Policy there is little substance to the complaints made by the Applicant as to the conduct of the investigation.
 As to the issue of the signed and unsigned statements, Ms Bowen made her decision on the material she had at 13 August 2010. These were the unsigned statements. There is no evidence that the signed statements existed prior to Ms Bowen making her decision. That there are statements that were signed after the letter of findings was issued by Ms Bowen is a matter for me in determining what weight should be given to those statements and the reliability of the contents of the statements. I have made my decision on the basis of all of the evidence before me. In the context of the extensive evidence before me, including hundreds of pages of cross examination of witnesses, I find little utility in a forensic examination of why an individual may have corrected typographical errors or made other minor changes to their unsigned statement at the time they signed them.
 Ms Bowen considered that she was dotting the ‘i’s and crossing the ‘t’s in getting the statements signed as she closed off the file.
 The Respondent referred me to the decision in Schaale v Hoechst Australia Ltd 92 where Heerey J said that:
It would be harsh, unjust and unreasonable for an employer to dismiss an employee...without taking steps to investigate [the] allegations...
Employers are not required to have the skills of police investigators or lawyers. By inspecting the site of the alleged entry and taking statements from potential witnesses it seems to me the respondent acted quite reasonably. 93
 I have taken into account that Ms Bowen is a human resources officer. She is not an expert investigator and her evidence is that undertaking an investigation such as this was one of the many tasks she performed in her role.
 That Ms Bowen did not exhaustively talk to everyone who was or may have been in the vicinity of the incident does not diminish the thorough nature of the investigation. That the decision was made based on statements made to her but not signed does not diminish the overall reliability of what those witnesses told Ms Bowen they saw and/or heard.
 It is inevitable that, regardless of the size or type of organisation, an internal investigation could have been conducted better or differently than it was. Such an admission from Ms Bowen is not an admission that she did not comply with the requirements of the Policy. It is not unusual to look back and consider how things might have been done better. It is this self reflection and analysis that maintains quality of process and enables us to learn and develop. That we do reflect on past activities does not mean what we did or how we did it is necessarily wrong.
 That a party does not accept the outcome of an investigation or the findings that derive from it is not, in and of itself, proof that the investigation was flawed. That it might have been done differently or better is not, in and of itself, evidence that the investigation process was flawed. Even if there were errors in the initial investigation (I do not make such a finding) these are adequately compensated for by the extensive process of appeals and further hearings afforded to the Applicant under the Policy. The purpose of such appeals is to allow fresh eyes to look at the situation and determine if the process, including the investigation, was carried out appropriately.
 Both Mr Norbury and Mr Allan, in dealing with the appeals of Ms Jalea, determined that a thorough and appropriate investigation was undertaken.
 I am satisfied that the investigation by Ms Bowen was conducted in accordance with the Policy and that there was no substantive or procedural unfairness in the investigation.
 The Respondent submits that the findings from the internal investigation may be relevant to the determination I need to make on the matters before me if that inquiry was a full and extensive examination of the matters as was reasonable in the circumstances. 94
 In this case I have taken into account, but have not solely relied upon, the internal investigation and its outcomes. It is an input into the evidence before me relevant to the determination of whether the conduct complained of occurred.
 For completeness, and as is relevant, Ms Bowen also conducted (separately) an investigation into allegations made by Ms Jalea against Ms Todkill. 95 The allegation that Ms Todkill used inappropriate language to Ms Jalea in April 2010 was substantiated. Allegations that Ms Todkill fostered an environment in which it was okay to swear and that she did not take complaints made by Ms Jalea seriously were unsubstantiated.96
 Ms Warren submits that there are mitigating circumstances that should be taken into account in this matter. These relate to the external court case involving Ms Jalea, Mr Pannan and Ms Vidler. These circumstances should have been (and in the Applicant’s submission were not) taken into account in determining the appropriate disciplinary outcome under the Policy. 97
 In Qantas Airways Limited v Cornwall 98 a Full Court of the Federal Court found that:
[C]onduct is not committed in a vacuum, but in the course of the interaction of persons and circumstances, and the events which lead up to an action and those which accompany it may qualify or characterise the nature of the conduct involved. 99
 In that case the supervisor ‘pursued a relatively trivial matter somewhat relentlessly and inappropriately...unnecessarily and officiously.’ 100 Soon afterwards there was an angry altercation and Mr Cornwall hit his supervisor. At the time Mr Cornwall was ‘in a state of emotional distress, having been served, less than two days before, with an application by his wife to the Family Court for leave to take the children of their marriage out of Australia.’101
 The Applicant also referred me to Olcayoz v Goulburn Valley Health 102and Merolla v Mainstreet International Marketing Group P/L103 in support of the proposition that I should consider other matters that may have a mitigating effect on the conduct of the Applicant.
 I have taken into account Ms Jalea’s involvement in the court case. I do not consider Ms Jalea was in a state of emotional distress on 10 June 2010. The court case was completed eight days prior to the incident. There is no evidence that Ms Jalea was otherwise distressed by the case. She had not taken time away from work or responded inappropriately to other staff or customers in the days following the court case and prior to this incident.
 Had Ms Jalea’s reaction to Ms Todkill been limited to the first part of the incident in Ms Todkill’s office such a mitigating circumstance might weigh more heavily on my consideration. As it was, Ms Jalea did not stop at the first outburst but continued when she returned to Ms Todkill’s office (invited or otherwise is not relevant) yelling that she wanted to see the ‘fucking letter’ in such a loud voice that others in the office heard her. Further, the Applicant did not leave Ms Todkill’s office when requested and she used force to stop Ms Todkill closing the office door.
 Whilst the court case is a relevant mitigating circumstance, it does not explain or excuse the totality of Ms Jalea’s conduct.
 Ms Warren argues that Ms Jalea was denied procedural fairness, in particular in three areas: firstly, she was stood down before any complaint or allegations were made against her; secondly, she was denied access to witness statements or the substance of those statements to enable her to respond; and thirdly, the investigation was not dealt with in a timely manner.
 The Policy allows for an employee to be stood down immediately, generally without loss of pay. 104 Ms Jalea was stood down in accordance with the Policy. There is no limitation, implied or otherwise, that an employee cannot be stood down until a complaint or allegations have been made. Mr McKirdy acted in accordance with the Policy and there is no denial of procedural fairness in doing so.
 The Policy further states that Ms Jalea is entitled to know the substance (but not necessarily the full particulars) of any allegations against her. 105 I find that Ms Jalea was aware of the detail of the allegations made against her. She was ultimately aware of the substance of the evidence against her when the letter of findings was issued. She had the capacity to respond to that material. That Ms Jalea did not have direct access to the witness statements was not a denial of procedural fairness under the Policy.
 The Policy requires that when an employee is suspended an investigation should be conducted as quickly as possible and the procedural fairness provisions of the Policy require that all parties should act in a reasonable and timely manner. 106
 The incident occurred on 10 June 2010. Ms Jalea was stood down that evening. The next morning Ms Bowen was appointed to undertake an investigation that concluded in a timely manner on 13 August 2010 when she presented her findings to Ms Jalea. From this point on there were delays in the process caused by the Applicant and the Respondent. Some of these delays were inexplicably lengthy, some for good reason. Ultimately Ms Jalea’s employment was terminated on 20 June 2011, more than 12 months after the incident and 10 months after the findings of the investigation were issued.
 I do not intend to apportion blame for the delay in finalising the matter to one party or the other except to say that the Applicant cannot complain of the delays when a proportion of them are because of her requests for extensions of time or an inability to attend meetings. The delay in concluding this matter is unfortunate but, in these circumstances, is not a matter I have taken into account in making my decision.
Compliance with Standards of Conduct Policy
 Ms Warren submits that QantasLink did not comply with all aspects of the Policy. She relies on Carter v Qantas Airways Limited 107 where she says Fair Work Australia found that the failure to consider the other disciplinary types of action before immediately asking the employee to show cause against termination was a breach of the Policy and notably clause 17.22(c)(i).
 In Carter the Applicant received a letter detailing the outcome of the investigation, which advised the termination of his employment. Deficiencies were indentified (although not detailed) in the process in respect to a support person, communication of appeal rights and the lack of consideration of alternatives to dismissal. 108
 In this case the Applicant relies on the fact that the letter of findings issued by Ms Bowen is referred to as the ‘show cause’ letter by the Respondent and states: ‘I ask you to provide a written response as to why your employment should not be terminated.’ The Applicant relies on this to argue that the Respondent had made a decision as to penalty prior to giving the Applicant an opportunity to be heard.
 The complaint of the Applicant ignores the totality of the letter of findings issued on 13 August 2010:
Nora, these findings are very serious and the Company is considering disciplinary action against you, which may include termination of your employment. Before deciding the appropriate outcome, I would like to provide you with some time to consider the findings of this investigation and your employment history with Sunstate Airlines.
 The evidence of Ms Bowen and Mr McKirdy is that, in serious cases where termination of employment is a possibility, it is proper that the employee be aware that termination is a possible outcome.
 Ms Bowen states that the advice in the letter sent to Ms Jalea on 13 August 2010 that ‘the Company is considering disciplinary action against you, which may include the termination of your employment...I ask you to provide a written response as to why your employment should not be terminated’ 109 should be read as ‘tell us why we shouldn't proceed down that path and we'll consider that and we'll also consider other options, as well’.110
 If the decision had already been made at the time of the letter of 13 August 2010 to terminate Ms Jalea’s employment Ms Bowen says the company would ‘write in there, "We've found that your employment is terminated.” They wouldn't even ask for explanations. They haven't decided what they were going to do...’ 111
 In both her letter of 27 September 2010 in reply to Ms Bowen’s letter of findings and in the meeting with Mr McKirdy on 26 November 2010 the Applicant put forward what she considered to be acceptable alternative disciplinary outcomes. 112
 Mr McKirdy’s evidence is that at the meeting of 26 November 2010 he was ‘looking for...additional information that I needed to understand before I made a decision on this, and I walked away from that meeting with a view that everybody else was at fault, and there was no responsibility by the individual herself that she had done anything wrong.’ 113
 Mr McKirdy indicated in his letter of 3 March 2011 that ‘[t]he Company has taken all relevant matters into account, including the matters contained in the Response [of 27 September 2010], the findings of the investigation...the matters discussed at our meeting, the information you provided of events prior to the incident...’ 114 It is clear that Mr McKirdy, in deciding to terminate Ms Jalea’s employment, has taken into account the Applicant’s submission with respect to alternatives to termination in the discipline provisions but ultimately decided that termination of employment was the appropriate disciplinary action.
 The circumstances of this case vary substantially from Carter not least of all in the contents of the correspondence to the Applicant. The decision in Carter is not relevant to the facts of this matter.
 I do not find that the Respondent did not comply with its Policy.
Two sets of rules
 The Applicant submits that there are two sets of rules operating in the workplace in that the Applicant had her employment terminated but Ms Todkill did not, even though it was found that she did use inappropriate language (on 16 April 2010) toward the Applicant.
 The Applicant referred me to the decision in Heffernan v Tabro Meat Pty Ltd 115 in support of the proposition that two different standards should not be allowed to exist in a workplace. In that matter I found that ‘the employer cannot use such [robust] language with employees and be surprised when they use it back.’116
 I have already found above that there was no culture of swearing in this workplace. Further, the conduct substantiated with respect to Ms Todkill (that she used inappropriate language at Ms Jalea in April 2010) is not the same as the conduct I have found occurred in this instance. In this matter there was continued use of inappropriate language both in Ms Todkill’s office and in the reception area. The language was loud and heard by others at their desks. In addition, I have found that the Applicant slammed Ms Todkill’s office door and later used force to stop Ms Todkill closing her office door. The two findings of misconduct are substantively different.
 To suggest that the Applicant’s conduct is no more than that of Ms Todkill is a poorly disguised attempt to gloss over the extent of the actions and conduct of the Applicant. There is no evidence before me that there are substantially different tolerances in the workplace such that the reasoning in Heffernan could hold here.
 The suggestion that there are two sets of rules because only the Applicant and not Ms Todkill was stood down has no substance. No complaint was raised against Ms Todkill at the time Ms Jalea was stood down and no complaint of the serious nature as that against Ms Jalea was made against Ms Todkill.
 There is no evidence to support the contention that there were two sets of rules in the workplace that should somehow explain or excuse Ms Jalea’s conduct.
Did Ms Jalea show remorse?
 The Respondent in this matter says that Ms Jalea has not shown remorse for what occurred on 10 June 2010. Mr McKirdy says that she has made no attempt to apologise to Ms Todkill. He says that he did not believe Ms Jalea was truly remorseful and this was reflected in the fact that, in the meeting of 26 November 2010, she continued to blame others for what occurred and did not accept responsibility herself.
 The Applicant contends that she has indicated her remorse on a number of occasions including in her letter of 27 September 2010 117 and during the meeting of 26 November 2010.
 In the meeting of 26 November 2010 Female 1 [Ms Warren] says, in reference to the letter of 27 September 2010, ‘my letter actually says that Nora accepts that it was a situation that unfortunately developed regrettably and that in retrospect maybe she could have done something differently.’ 118
 The Applicant says it was not possible for her to apologise to Ms Todkill because she was not at work. I note that this absence from the workplace did not stop her staying in contact with Ms Shepherd. Had she wanted a message of apology passed to Ms Todkill she could have arranged for that to occur through Ms Shepherd, Ms Bowen or Mr McKirdy. Alternatively she could have arranged it through her solicitor.
 Whilst I accept that the Applicant regrets what happened on 10 June 2010 and wishes things had happened differently, I do not consider she is at all remorseful over the event. It is my opinion that her regret is directed at how events have transpired for her as opposed to the effect her conduct had on others.
The effect of termination on the Applicant
 The Applicant submits that the effect of the termination of employment on her has been extensive. She was stood down on pay, but this did not include allowances she would otherwise have received while flying, substantially decreasing her fortnightly income. Evidence was produced that demonstrates the financial relief the Applicant has sought through her superannuation, her bank and her friends.
 Mr Rogers submits that I should reject the evidence of financial hardship as the first application for hardship assistance made by Ms Jalea occurred eight days after she was stood down. Her financial hardship can hardly be blamed therefore on the stand down or termination of her employment.
 It is inevitable that a termination of employment will have economic consequences for an employee and this may be a relevant consideration. The evidence leads me to conclude that any financial hardship Ms Jalea experienced, however, commenced before her employment was terminated and perhaps prior to her being stood down.
Comments made at and after the show cause meeting
 Mr Rogers submits that I can and should have regard to matters that came to light after the decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment was taken and take these into account in making my decision. In particular the Respondent says I should take into account that the Applicant lied during the show cause meeting.
 The Applicant taped the show cause meeting on 26 November 2010 without the knowledge of the employer representatives present or her solicitor. The transcript of that meeting was admitted into evidence 119 as was the disc containing a copy of the recording.120
 In the course of the meeting with Mr McKirdy on 26 November 2010 Female 2 [Ms Jalea] says:
I have applied and paid a lot of money for the transcripts to come through. I’m still waiting for them which are legal documentation... 121
 Later in the meeting the following comments were made by Female 1 [Ms Warren]:
[Ms Jalea’s] actually ordered transcripts about the matter...So, do you, how long ago did you order that?
They can take six to eight weeks, depending. 122
 The transcript of the recording of the meeting ends at the conclusion of the meeting. The recording, however, continues for a period beyond the end of the meeting when the Applicant, her solicitor and support person have left the meeting. In that recording the following exchange occurs between the Ms Jalea and Ms Warren:
Ms Jalea: I haven’t rang (sp) for the transcripts, I’m going to ring today.
Ms Warren: You can actually get digital.
Ms Jalea: I know but I just said that because at the thing, but I haven’t but I will ring.
Ms Warren: You can get them on digital which I think you should get a fairly quick turnaround. Mags (sp) Court matters usually do take 6-8 weeks but you can get digital within a week turnaround sometimes.
 The Applicant admits that she had not, in fact, ordered the transcript. This is contrary to what she clearly said to Mr McKirdy in the meeting.
 In submissions Ms Warren says that the Applicant did not seek to mislead Mr McKirdy about the transcript and that she referred to ‘transcripts’ as she was holding the digital recording of the proceedings and had also had discussions with the transcript section of the court to obtain the transcripts in written form, secondary to the recorded version. 123 This submission would appear to be misleading. When the Applicant admitted she had not ordered the transcripts her solicitor said she could get them on digital. There was no response from the Applicant that she already had the digital recording. The only response from the Applicant was that she would ‘ring.’
 No evidence was given in these proceedings that, at the time of the meeting on 26 November 2010, the Applicant held a digital recording of the court proceedings.
 Regardless of how the Applicant may attempt to portray this issue, she did mislead Mr McKirdy in the meeting of 26 November 2010 and, in submissions, has sought to mislead the Tribunal. There is no evidence she had the digital recording of the court proceedings at 26 November 2010 or that she had ordered transcript.
 This is information that has come to light following the termination of the Applicant’s employment. In accordance with the principles in Byrne and another v Australian Airlines Limited 124 it is a matter which may justify a dismissal that was otherwise harsh, unjust or unreasonable.125 In accordance with the principles in Streeter126 I may take this conduct into account in determining if dismissal is justified.
 What is more astounding is that, on a matter that the Applicant argues is critical to her defence and explains why she behaved in the way she did, she made no attempt to access the transcript before a meeting about the future of her employment. Further, she could not explain why no response was provided to Mr McKirdy when he asked that the transcript be provided by 15 December 2010. 127
 I have taken these matters into account in reaching my decision.
Secret recording of the show cause meeting
 The Respondent submits that, in secretly recording the meeting of 26 November 2010, the Applicant has destroyed the trust that her employer is entitled to have in her.
 When questioned about recording the meeting the Applicant said that she recorded the meeting with a tape recorder in her bag. She did not tell people in the room that she was taping the meeting 128 and this was the first time she had taped a meeting.129 The following exchange then took place in the cross examination of Ms Jalea:
Don't you think it's strange that you would attend a meeting with one of the senior managers of the company and that you would tape-record a conversation and not let them know that it's being tape-recorded?---No, because I'm using it for my own purposes.
I put it to you that's most unusual to occur in the workplace?---When people lie, when people change statements, when people aren't honest.
Are you suggesting Mr McKirdy is lying?---No, I'm saying in general. You've asked me if it's strange that that occurs. It's not strange if you have to have proof. Sometimes in life you can't do anything without proof. 130
 Mr McKirdy was not aware that Ms Jalea was taping the meeting. He was surprised and disappointed that it was taped. 131 He did not become aware that the meeting had been taped until the first day of this unfair dismissal proceeding.132
 This exchange would suggest that Ms Jalea expected that people would lie in the meeting and that she would need proof of this. To take such an attitude into a meeting with senior management of the Respondent would suggest that she has little trust in management. That she taped the meeting without telling those present may justifiably harm the trust management have in her as an employee.
Conclusion as to harsh, unjust or unreasonable
 I have found that a valid reason exists to terminate Ms Jalea’s employment. A valid reason on its own, however, does not dispense with the matter. The determination I must make, taking into account all of those matters set out above, is if the termination of employment is harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
 Taking into account all of the circumstances I am not convinced the termination of employment was unjust. Ms Jalea’s conduct on 10 June 2010 was unacceptable, unnecessary and showed a lack of respect for her manager. It was within her control to stop and she did not. Her conduct clearly put her in breach of Policy and termination of employment can be justified.
 The decision to terminate her employment was not unreasonable. The process and the decision were subject to a number of internal reviews. Both appeals found that the investigation had been carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Policy. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances advanced by the Applicant the decision is still not unreasonable. The Respondent properly considered alternatives to termination prior to deciding to terminate the Applicant’s employment. Importantly, the test is not if other disciplinary outcomes might be reasonable but that the decision to terminate was not unreasonable in all the circumstances.
 My decision is reinforced by the fact that Ms Jalea’s actions in taping the meeting of 26 November 2010 and misleading management about the transcript of the court case impact on the trust her employer may have in her.
 The decision to terminate Ms Jalea’s employment certainly has had an economic impact. As I said above this is to be expected in almost every termination of employment. For a termination of employment to have no impact would make it an irrelevant disciplinary tool. In this case the impact is heightened because of investment decisions Ms Jalea has made with respect to her finances. I do not believe these are an appropriate consideration for me in deciding if the termination is harsh because of its economic effect. I reach this conclusion primarily because the economic situation of Ms Jalea was perhaps exacerbated by her dismissal, but not caused by it.
 The critical question is whether the termination was harsh in that it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct.
 Both parties have put before me an array of decisions where it has been found harsh, unjust or unreasonable to terminate an employee’s employment because of disrespectful conduct and/or inappropriate language towards a manager or where termination for such conduct was found not to be harsh, unjust or unreasonable. What is clear from all of these cases is that it is the particular circumstances on which a case must be decided.
 The language and conduct that I have found occurred in this case is not common or normal in an office environment. Had it occurred on a building site or been common in the workplace I might have formed a different opinion.
 It would be wrong, however, to concentrate only on the language in isolation of the other conduct I have found occurred, that is that Ms Jalea was speaking at such a volume (whether it is described as yelling, shouting or speaking loudly is not the point) that others heard, that she used force to stop Ms Todkill closing her door, that she refused to calm down when asked, that she slammed the door with force such that the wall shook and refused to leave Ms Todkill’s office when asked. I also cannot ignore that she went back to Ms Todkill’s office after she left on the first occasion and recommenced the confrontation.
 The Policy states that dismissal may be an appropriate disciplinary response to substantiated instances of serious misconduct or repeated instances of misconduct. Serious misconduct includes conduct which is inconsistent with the continuation of the employee’s employment. I do not consider that the existence of the Policy or the wording of the Policy constrains me in determining if the dismissal was disproportionate or if it was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In all respects the processes of the Respondent abided by the Policy.
 Given my findings as to the conduct of the Applicant, her lack of remorse, matters affecting trust and other findings detailed above I am satisfied that, in all of the circumstances of this case, the Applicant’s conduct is inconsistent with the continuation of her employment.
 In all of the circumstances I do not consider that the decision to terminate Ms Jalea’s employment was disproportionate to the conduct that I have found occurred.
 I therefore find that the decision to terminate Ms Jalea’s employment was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In reaching this decision I have taken into account the procedures used by the Respondent under the Policy. Whilst there is room for improvement in this process (for example the process does not refer to a ‘show cause’ letter or meeting) these deficiencies and any omissions do not make for an improper application of the procedure.
 For all of the reasons given above the application is dismissed. An order to this effect will be issued concurrent with this decision.
L Warren for the Applicant.
V Rogers for the Respondent.
October 13, 14.
Melbourne and Brisbane (video hearing):
November 16, 17, 18, 30.
January 10, 11, 13.
Final written submissions:
16 and 20 January 2012.
1 The use of the word ‘incident’ to describe the totality of the events on 10 June 2010 is not intended to indicate the severity or otherwise of the events.
2 Exhibit R8, attachment NB14.
3 Exhibit R9.
4 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ51.
5 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ52.
6 Exhibit R6, attachment GM24, decision letter of 11 May 2011.
7 Exhibit R6, attachment GM 20.
8 See exhibit A1, attachment EJ4.
9 See exhibit R14; exhibit A2, attachment EJ85; and exhibit R13.
10  FWA 6858.
11  AIRCFB 15.
12  AIRC 784.
13 (1995) 185 CLR 410.
14 (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 430.
15 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ4, page 6.
16 Transcript PN447.
17 Transcript PN3162.
18 Transcript PN3140-1.
19 Transcript PN3189-90.
20 Transcript PN3190.
21 Transcript PN3207-8, PN3216.
22 Transcript PN3227.
23 Transcript PN9008-9, PN9011.
24 Exhibit R11, paragraph 7.
25 Transcript PN9179-80.
26 Exhibit R3, paragraph 9; transcript PN2303.
27 Transcript PN2300.
28 Transcript PN2309.
29 Transcript PN2322.
30 Transcript PN6257; exhibit R8, attachment NB11, page 6 of handwritten notes.
31 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ4, page 6.
32 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ4, page 7.
33 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ4, page 5.
34 Transcript PN375-6.
35 Exhibit R5, paragraphs 41-2. It is not necessary for the resolution of this matter to repeat the particular language.
36 Exhibit R1, paragraphs 3-4; transcript PN1537.
37 Exhibit R3, paragraph 5; see also transcript PN2309.
38 Exhibit R11, paragraphs 4-5.
39 Exhibit R3, paragraph 9; transcript PN2303.
40 Transcript PN2300.
41 Transcript PN9133-4.
42 Transcript PN972-6.
43 Transcript PN2416.
44 Transcript PN445.
45 Transcript PN451.
46 Exhibit R5, paragraph 49.
47 Transcript PN3180-2.
48 Mr Jeffries believes when he was standing in his doorway he was about 15 metres from Ms Todkill’s office. Ms Rose and Ms Harvey were in the next office past Mr Jeffries. See Exhibit R2.
49 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ4, page 6.
50 Transcript PN416, PN419, PN405 and PN581.
51 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ4, page 6.
52 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ16, page 10, dot point 11.
53 Transcript PN581.
54 Transcript PN412-4.
55 Exhibit R5, paragraph 46.
56 Exhibit R5, paragraph 47.
57 Exhibit R10, paragraph 4; transcript PN8796.
58 Transcript PN8781.
59 Transcript PN8786.
60 Exhibit R1, paragraphs 3-4; transcript PN1537.
61 Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie, 5th ed, 2009), definitions of rage and violence.
62 Exhibit R9, clause 5.2.
63 (1995) 185 CLR 410.
64 (1995) 185 CLR 410, 465.
65 Bi-Lo v Hooper (1994) 53 IR 224.
66 Australian Meat Holdings v McLauchlan (1998) 84 IR 1, 8.
67 Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371, 373.
68 Edwards v Giudice and others  FCA 1836.
69 King v Freshmore AIRC Print S4213, 17 March 2000.
70 Farley v Toll Transport Pty Ltd t/a Toll Liquid Distribution  FWA 1683.
71  FWA 2295.
72 AIRC PR948009 (15 June 2004).
73 AIRC PR948009 (15 June 2004) .
74 (2000) 98 IR 233.
75 Exhibit R9, section 17.18(c); see also ‘definitions’ section of the Policy.
76 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ52.
77 Exhibit R8, attachment NB3.
78 Exhibit R8, paragraph 17.
79 Exhibit R8, paragraphs 29-33; notes from the meeting are at exhibit R8, attachment NB11.
80 Exhibit R8, paragraph 36.
81 Transcript PN6207.
82 Transcript PN6192.
83 Transcript PN6850-1, PN6884, PN7076.
84 Transcript PN6889.
85 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ6.
86 Exhibit R8, attachment NB 11.
87 Transcript PN8850-1, PN8860.
88 Ms Jalea made a complaint to Ms Bowen with respect to Mr Pannan telling others at work of the court case during the course of the meeting of 16 July 2010.
89 Transcript PN6430.
90 Transcript PN6425.
91 Transcript PN6480.
92 (1993) 47 IR 249.
93 (1993) 47 IR 249, 252.
94 Australian Meat Holdings v McLauchlan (1998) 84 IR 1.
95 Transcript PN8575.
96 Transcript PN8618, PN8623.
97 Exhibit R9, clause 17.
98 (1998) 83 IR 102.
99 Qantas Airways Limited v Cornwall (1998) 83 IR 102, 110.
100 Qantas Airways Limited v Cornwall (1998) 83 IR 102, 102.
101 Qantas Airways Limited v Cornwall (1998) 83 IR 102, 103.
102  FWA 413.
103  FWA 570.
104 Exhibit R9, clause 17.17(a).
105 Exhibit R9, clause 17.18(b).
106 Exhibit R9, clause 17.17(a) and 17.18(g).
107  FWA 8025.
108 Carter v Qantas Airways Limited  FWA 8025 ,  and .
109 Exhibit R8, attachment NB14.
110 Transcript PN8467.
111 Transcript PN8496.
112 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ16 page 31, paragraph .12-.13; exhibit A2 attachment EJ95, pages 45, 47, 48, 53, 54.
113 Transcript PN3898.
114 Exhibit R6, attachment GM20.
115  FWA 8192.
116  FWA 8192, .
117 Exhibit A1, attachment EJ16, page 31 at dot point 11.
118 Exhibit A2, attachment EJ95 page 11.
119 Exhibit A2, attachment EJ95.
120 Exhibit A5.
121 Exhibit A2, attachment EJ95, page 21.
122 Exhibit A2, attachment EJ95, page 57.
123 Applicant’s submission, 20 January 2012, page 30, paragraph 52.1.
124 (1995) 185 CLR 410.
125 (1995) 185 CLR 410, 430.
126  AIRCFB 15.
127 Transcript PN700-704.
128 Transcript PN669-72.
129 Transcript PN677.
130 Transcript PN674-6.
131 Transcript PN3902-3.
132 Transcript PN3900-1.
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