[2013] FWCFB 1705

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FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.604 - Appeal of decisions

G.J.E. Pty Ltd
(C2012/6403)

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT ACTON
DEPUTY PRESIDENT SMITH
COMMISSIONER RYAN

MELBOURNE, 3 APRIL 2013

Appeal against decision [[2012] FWA 9549] of Commissioner Gooley at Melbourne on 13 November 2012 in matter number AG2012/9480 - substantial characters of enterprise - industries of employer - General Retail Award 2010 coverage - better off overall test - enterprise agreement approval refused.

Introduction

[1] G.J.E Pty Ltd (GJE) has appealed a decision 1 of Commissioner Gooley of 13 November 2012 in which the Commissioner declined to approve the All Equipment Hire Enterprise Agreement 2012 (the Agreement). The Agreement covers GJE and all its employees employed in the job classifications in the Agreement.

[2] In a statutory declaration filed with the application for approval of the Agreement, Mr Gordon Elley, Managing Director of GJE deposed to the effect that the Agreement covered four employees and that no modern award covered GJE in relation to any employees covered by the Agreement. The Commissioner subsequently sought submissions in regard to this declaration and then made a decision, 2 prior to the decision the subject of the appeal, that the General Retail Award 20103 (Retail Award) was relevant for the purposes of assessing whether the Agreement passed the better off overall test (BOOT).4 The Commissioner affirmed that decision in the decision the subject of this appeal and concluded that she was not satisfied the Agreement passed the BOOT. She went on to reject GJE’s application for approval of the Agreement as GJE had been provided with the opportunity to provide written undertakings to meet the Commissioner’s concern that the Agreement did not pass the BOOT, but had not done so.

Relevant law

[3] Section 186(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) provides that if an application for approval of an enterprise agreement is made, the Fair Work Commission (FWC) must approve the agreement if the requirements set out in ss.186(2) - (6) and 187 of the FW Act are met.

[4] Section 186(2) provides that:

[5] Section 193 concerns the BOOT and relevantly provides that:

Evidence before and submissions made to the Commissioner

[6] The evidence before the Commissioner in respect of GJE was that:

[7] There was also evidence before the Commissioner that the Australian and New Standard Industrial Classification system used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics separates the hire of goods and equipment from retail trade.

[8] GJE submitted to the Commissioner that it was not covered by any modern award, including the Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010, 6 Clerks - Private Sector Award 2010,7 the Storage Services and Wholesale Award 2010,8 the Miscellaneous Award 2010,9 or the Retail Award.

Commissioner’s decision

[9] In her decision the Commissioner set out the coverage clause of the Retail Award as follows :

[10] The Commissioner then went on to consider the terms of the coverage clause against the evidence and submissions of GJE as follows:

[11] The Commissioner concluded as follows:

Grounds of appeal

[12] GJE submitted, in essence, that the Commissioner made an appealable error in concluding the Retail Award was a relevant modern award for the purposes of the BOOT, there being no relevant modern award covering GJE. Further, GJE submitted it is in the public interest that permission to appeal be granted because the appeal involves an important question regarding the scope of the Retail Award which has broader implications for other employers and employees in the equipment hire industry.

[13] In respect of these grounds of appeal, GJE submitted the Commissioner found the Retail Award covered GJE because it “hires equipment to consumers for their personal ... consumption.” 13 However, GJE said the “substantial character” of GJE’s enterprise is the hiring of goods to “trade customers”. Such “trade customers” are not “final consumers” hiring goods “for personal ... consumption” within the meaning of the coverage clause of the Retail Award, as concluded by the Commissioner. The Commissioner’s definition of the word “personal” in the coverage clause of the Retail Award is too broad as it extends to anyone, including a corporation, who uses the goods. The Commissioner’s definition leaves no work for the word “household” in the coverage clause of the Retail Award.

[14] GJE submitted the conjunctive phrase “final consumers for personal or household consumption” in the definition of the “general retail industry” in the Retail Award is directly attempting to exclude “trade customers”. The Retail Award is directed towards the sale or hire of goods for a personal or domestic purpose without any profit motive or gain, as opposed to goods which are to be used for a commercial or industrial purpose for profit or gain. GJE said this is exemplified by the word “household” and the list of inclusions in the definition of the “general retail industry” in the Retail Award.

[15] GJE maintained the Commissioner erred in the manner in which she construed the word “personal” in the coverage clause of the Retail Award and that error led the Commissioner to wrongly conclude that GJE is covered by the Retail Award and, thereby, that the Retail Award was a relevant award for the purposes of assessing whether the Agreement passed the BOOT.

Consideration of the grounds of appeal

[16] The Retail Award covers employers throughout Australia in the “general retail industry”. The Retail Award states that the “general retail industry” means:

[17] The coverage clause of the Retail Award also provides as follows:

[18] Industrial law provides that whether or not the enterprise of an employer is in a particular industry is a question of fact 14 determined by the “substantial character” of the enterprise in which the employer and its employees are concerned.15 However, the enterprise of an employer can have more than one character and be in more than one industry.16 Where an enterprise has more than one character it is not necessary to decide which is predominant,17 but a character must be substantial before it can ground a conclusion that the enterprise is in a particular industry.18

[19] A majority of a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) summarised the relevant law in Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 19 as follows:

[20] In our view, such an approach is relevant to determining whether an employer is covered by a modern industry award.

[21] The evidence in this matter reveals that a substantial proportion, nearly 30%, of the revenue of GJE is derived from the hire of its equipment to non-trade, presumably domestic, customers and unidentified trade customers. In the evidence, it was not suggested the percentage of this proportion attributable to the unidentified trade customers is significant.

[22] A substantial character of the enterprise of GJE therefore is the “sale or hire of goods...to final consumers for personal or household consumption”. 20

[23] With such a substantial character, GJE is in the “general retail industry” as defined in Retail Award. As a result, the Retail Award covers GJE.

[24] That is not to say that GJE, consistent with the law, does not have another substantial character which also places it in another industry and covered by another modern award. Indeed clause 4.7 of the Retail Award, which we have earlier set out, recognises that an employer may be covered by more than one award. Clause 4.7 provides that where an employer is covered by more than one award, an employee of that employer is covered by the award classification which is most appropriate to the work performed by the employee and to the environment in which the employee normally performs the work. However, GJE submitted that it was not covered by any modern award and there was an insufficient basis in the submissions or evidence for us to conclude any modern award, other than the Retail Award, covers GJE.

[25] GJE refuted the notion that it could have more than one substantial character and be in more than one industry on the basis that it was one indivisible enterprise, and also citing the decision of a Full Bench of the AIRC in Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Budget Rent a Car Operations Pty Limited. 21 However, we are not persuaded that GJE is one indivisible enterprise. GJE itself differentiated its hiring to its trade customers from its hiring to its non-trade customers. Further, the Budget decision does not assist GJE. Budget concerned, in part, whether the Budget Rent a Car Operations Pty Limited (Budget Rental) car rental operations at Brisbane airport were in or in connection with the transport industry. The Full Bench held that the transport industry must mean the commercial transport industry and involve the transport of persons or goods for reward. The Full Bench noted that the business of Budget Rental was vehicle rental but that the evidence before it as to the purpose of the rentals was sparse. The Full Bench said that while it was possible that some of Budget Rental’s customers were in the transport industry, as some of those renting trucks may do so for commercial purposes, the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia had failed to show that the proportion of customers so engaged was of such significance that it could be said that Budget Rental’s operations were in connection with the transport industry.22 In this matter there is clear evidence about the significant proportion of GJE’s revenue attributable to non-trade, presumably domestic, customers.

[26] In respect of the BOOT and the Agreement in this matter, not only must the Retail Award cover GJE but it must also cover the employees in relation to the work they are to perform under the Agreement.

[27] The Retail Award covers employees in the classifications in clause 16 of the Retail Award. 23 Clause 16 of the Retail Award is as follows:

[28] Schedule B of the Retail Award defines a Retail Employee Level 1 - 8 as follows:

[29] The employees covered by the Agreement are those employed by GJE in the job classifications set out in the Agreement. 24 The job classifications are described in Schedule 1 to the Agreement as follows:

[30] A comparison of the descriptions of the job classifications in Schedule 1 of the Agreement with the definitions of a Retail Employee in Schedule B of the Retail Award indicates the job classification descriptions fall within the Retail Employee definitions. As a result, the Retail Award covers the employees of GJE in relation to the work they are to perform under the Agreement.

[31] There is no issue that the Retail Award is and was in operation at the “test time”. 25

[32] The appeal in this matter has raised general issues regarding the coverage of modern awards and, in particular, the Retail Award. Given the generality of the issues raised, we are satisfied it is in the public interest for us to grant permission to appeal and we do so. For the reasons we have given, however, we confirm the Commissioner’s decision that the Retail Award is the relevant modern award for the purposes of assessing whether the Agreement passes the BOOT.

Conclusion

[33] The Commissioner went on to indicate she was not satisfied the Agreement passed the BOOT, noting that GJE accepted that if the Retail Award was the relevant modern award the Agreement would not pass the BOOT. The Commissioner then noted GJE had been given the opportunity to provide her with undertakings. 26

[34] Section 190 of the FW Act provides that the FWC may approve an enterprise agreement with undertakings, given by a relevant employer, that meet the FWC’s concerns that the enterprise agreement does not meet the requirements for the FWC’s approval. However, GJE did not provide such undertakings to the Commissioner. Consequently, the Commissioner rejected GJE’s application for the FWC’s approval of the Agreement.

[35] Before us, GJE submitted that they did not dispute that if the Retail Award was the relevant modern award for the purposes of assessing whether the Agreement passes the BOOT, then the Agreement did not pass the BOOT and the Commissioner was right to dismiss the application.

[36] Like the Commissioner, we are not satisfied that at the test time each award covered employee, and each prospective award covered employee, for the Agreement would be better off overall if the Agreement applied to the employee than if the Retail Award applied to the employee. We are not satisfied the Agreement passes the BOOT. Since GJE is not prepared to give undertakings pursuant to s190 of the FW Act to meet that concern, 27 and there is no proper basis on which we can be satisfied that, because of exceptional circumstances, the approval of the Agreement would not be contrary to the public interest,28 we confirm the Commissioner’s decision to refuse to approve the Agreement.

[37] An order 29 giving effect to our decision is being issued at the same time as this decision.

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT

Appearances:

M Follett, of counsel, for the appellant.

Hearing details:

2013.

Melbourne:

31 January.

 1  Endnotes:

Re G.J.E. Pty Ltd [2012] FWA 9549.

 2   Re G.J.E Pty Ltd [2012] FWA 8232.

 3   General Retail Award 2010, MA000004.

 4   Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth.), ss186(2)(d) and 193.

 5   Exhibit A2 in AG2012/9480.

 6   Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010, MA000010.

 7   Clerks - Private Sector Award 2010, MA000002.

 8   Storage Services and Wholesale Award 2010, MA000084.

 9   Miscellaneous Award 2010, MA000104.

 10   Re G.J.E. Pty Ltd, [2012] FWA 9549.

 11   Ibid.

 12   Ibid.

 13   Ibid at [23].

 14   R v Hibble; Ex parte Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 290 at 297; Re Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees Union of Australia; Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1976) 51 ALJR 266 at 268.

 15   R v Central Reference Board; Ex parte Thiess (Repairs) Pty Ltd (1948) 77 CLR 123 at 135; Re Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees’ Union of Australia; Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1976) 51 ALJR 266 at 268.

 16   R v Drake Brockman; Ex parte National Oil Pty Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 51 at 57; Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, PR956868 at [51].

 17   R v Isaac; Ex parte Transport Workers Union, (1985) 59 CLR 323 at 333.

 18   R v Central Reference Board; Ex parte Thiess (Repairs) Pty Ltd (1948) 77 CLR 123 at 131; Burgess v Connell-Mott (1979) 27 ALR 427 at 442; Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, PR956868 [50]-[51].

 19   PR956868.

 20   From the definition of the “general retail industry” in clause 3.1 of the General Retail Award 2010, MA000004.

 21   PR968492.

 22   Ibid at [16] - [18].

 23   General Retail Award 2010, MA000004, clause 4.1.

 24   All Equipment Hire Enterprise Agreement 2012, clause 2.

 25   Fair Work Act 2012 (Cth), ss193(4), (5) and (6).

 26   Re G.J.E. Pty Ltd, [2012] FWA9549 at [25]. See also Re G.J.E. Pty Ltd, [2012] FWA 8232 at [26].

 27   Transcript in C2012/6403 at PN14-15 and 209.

 28   Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s189.

 29   PR535117.

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