[2014] FWC 2645

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

REASONS FOR DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.418 - Application for an order that industrial action by employees or employers stop etc.

Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd
v
Transport Workers' Union of Australia
(C2014/4065)

COMMISSIONER HAMPTON

ADELAIDE, 30 APRIL 2014

Application for an Order to prevent unprotected industrial action - whether notice requirements of the Act were met - degree of specificity to be assessed in the context of each case and the circumstances of the business - some notices vague and uncertain and not sufficient to outline the nature of the industrial action - other notices sound but when considered as a whole fail to provide the extent of notice required by the protection action ballot order - industrial action not protected - orders issued.

1. The application and its determination

[1] This decision concerns an application by Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd (Armaguard) seeking that the Fair Work Commission make orders in relation to certain industrial action that was being organised by the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (TWU).

[2] The application was made pursuant to s.418 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) on the grounds that certain industrial action was not protected within the meaning of the Act and as a result, orders should be issued preventing that action. The basis of that contention was essentially that the notice of the proposed industrial action was not consistent with the relevant notice requirements of the Act for the taking of protected industrial action.

[3] The application was filed on 16 April 2014 and heard on the afternoon and evening of the following day. Having considered the evidence and submissions in the context of the statutory obligations bearing upon the issues, I issued an Order 1 late on 17 April 2014 preventing unprotected industrial action pursuant to s.418(1) of the Act. In so doing, I indicated that I would publish reasons for my decision, which I now do.

2. The background to the application

[4] This application took place in the context of bargaining for a proposed enterprise agreement and some of the background to this matter is set out in the decision 2 of the Commission granting a protected action ballot order application of the TWU (the PAB decision).

[5] Armaguard is Australia’s largest cash-in-transit security company and the proposed agreement would cover the road crews in South Australia who undertake the cash transit and ATM servicing for the company in that State. The employees concerned currently fall under the scope of the Armaguard and Transport Workers’ Union Road Crew (South Australia) Union Collective Agreement 2011.

[6] The TWU is a bargaining representative for many of the employees to be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement. In March 2014, despite objections from Armaguard, I granted orders 3 allowing the TWU to conduct a protected action ballot (PAB). One of the issues to be determined was whether an extended period of notice of certain proposed industrial action should be required.

[7] Section 443(5) of the Act provides, in effect, that if there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in s.414(2)(a) being longer than 3 working days, the protected action ballot order may specify a longer period of up to 7 working days in relation to the proposed industrial action that is the subject of the PAB.

[8] In the PAB decision, I found as follows:

[9] I determined that the bans on two-person crewing, ATM servicing and stoppages over four hours, would be subject to five working days notice. 4

[10] The consequent ballot endorsed various forms of industrial action and in the lead up to this application the TWU has given notice of proposed industrial action to Armaguard.

[11] On 11 April 2014, the TWU gave notice to Armaguard in the following terms:

[12] The terms of the notices reflect the equivalent question endorsed by the members of the TWU in the PAB, but do not provide any further clarification or elaboration. This aspect forms the primary basis of the contentions advanced by Armaguard in support of its application.

[13] Leaving aside the immediate objections relied upon by Armaguard, these notices provided the five or three working days notice respectively, as required by the PAB decision.

[14] On 15 April 2014, the TWU gave notice to Armaguard in the following terms:

[15] The terms of these notices also reflect the equivalent question endorsed by the members of the TWU in the PAB. However, in the case of the work stoppage(s) (notices 5, 6 and 7), these clarify when the proposed stoppage(s) is to take place.

[16] The effect of the work stoppage notices, and whether they should have been given with five working days notice, is also in dispute in this matter.

3. The legislation

[17] Division 4 of Chapter 3 – Part 3 of the Act provides relevantly as follows:

[18] The TWU accepts that industrial action is threatened, impending and probable. In that light and given the facts of the matter, the only issue between the parties was whether the industrial action would be protected industrial action within the meaning of the Act.

[19] Under s.408 of the Act, industrial action is protected industrial action for a proposed enterprise agreement if it is employee claim action as defined by s.409. That action is defined as follows:

“409 Employee claim action

[20] This application relies solely upon the notice requirements as established in relation to protected industrial action by the common requirements, and in particular, s.414 of the Act. That provision is in the following terms:

[21] Of these, the requirements of s.414(6) are critical to the determination of this matter.

4. The basis of the application

[22] Armaguard contended that each of the elements of the notified industrial action were deficient on the basis that in each case the notice did not specify the nature of the industrial action as required by the Act. That is, the notices did not specify the nature of the action with any specificity and whether considered singly or in combination, were ambiguous and misleading. This, it contended, did not satisfy the statutory purpose of the notice.

[23] Armaguard also contended that the notices of the work stoppages (notices 5, 6 and 7) were also deficient for another reason. It argued that they were, in reality, notice of a seven hour work stoppage and the TWU had not given 5 working days notice as required by the PAB decision for stoppages of over 4 hours duration.

[24] As a result, Armaguard contended that none of the notified industrial action was protected and the Commission was obliged by s.418(1) of the Act to make an order preventing that action.

[25] Armaguard led evidence from Mr Rodde, its Regional Manager - Southern Region, in support of its application.

[26] The TWU contended that all of the notified industrial action was protected under the Act and that no orders could or should be made. In particular, it contended that each of the notices provided to Armaguard should be treated individually and in each case they reflected the industrial action authorised by the PAB.

[27] The TWU also contended that as Armaguard had conceded that it could take defensive action to deal with the full extent of the notified action, the notice had achieved its statutory purpose.

[28] In relation to the work stoppages, the TWU contended that there were three separate notices and although this was a technicality, it was entitled to rely upon that basis to only give three days notice of the stoppages. To the extent that the notices might be seen to represent notice of a seven hour stoppage in practice, the TWU further contended that the extent of actual notice provided by the notices on 15 April 2014 should also be taken into account.

5. Did the notices specify the nature of the action as required by the Act?

[29] In approaching this matter I am mindful of the guidance that has been provided by various Full Benches with respect to the application of s.214 of the Act and the related notice requirements concerning protected industrial action. 5

[30] Given the scheme of the Act, it is my view that the scope of the notified industrial action should not be considered in a pedantic or narrow fashion. It is also evident that the Commission may only “interfere” with industrial action that is being taken in the context of what would otherwise be protected action where it is positively satisfied that the action is not protected.

[31] The purpose of the notice required by s.414(6) of the Act has been set out by the Full Bench in Telstra Corporation limited v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia 6 (Telstra) in the following terms:

[32] Consistent with the above approach, it is appropriate to assess the degree of specificity in the notice in the context of the employer’s undertaking and the manner in which it operates. 7

[33] The form of notice provided by the TWU varies. The notices given on 11 and 15 April 2014, with the exception of those relating to work stoppages, refer to “an unlimited number of bans or limitations on the performance of” the various elements of the work cited in each case. The notices do not specify the nature or extent of the bans or limitations, nor do they specify whether they apply to all or only some of the work in question.

[34] Given the nature of the work in question, the practical consequences of the difference between a ban or limitation on some of the work, and a total ban, is very significant. When combined with the fact that the notices do not specify whether the ban and/or limitations are for a specific duration or indefinite, very little is actually revealed about the nature of the proposed industrial action. The uncertainty and the consequences of such arise in particular from the nature of the work undertaken by the TWU members at Armaguard and the factors discussed in the PAB decision leading to the finding of exceptional circumstances.

[35] Notice 4 also refers to an unlimited nature of bans or limitations on the performance of duties not listed in the job description and duty statement. The position description 8 utilised by Armguard is a very high-level and non-specific document and also refers to “all other duties as directed within the scope of employee skill level and training”. The effect of the notice in that context is very problematic and when combined with the deficiencies discussed above, the nature of the proposed industrial action is not specified in a meaningful sense.

[36] In the case of the notices 1, 2, 3 and 4 issued on 11 and 15 April 2014 (all notices other than those relating to work stoppages), there is insufficient detail provided as to the nature of the proposed industrial action to meet the notice requirements of the Act. In the context of this particular workplace and given the nature of the language of the notices, each is too vague and uncertain to communicate the nature of the proposed industrial action.

[37] Armaguard conceded that it could take precautions to deal with the industrial action, if certain assumption were made, and that some measures were already foreshadowed. 9 However, these would require it to assume the worst case scenario (a full and extended ban in each case) and to take what might be described as extreme measures. That is, it is evident that it may be able to take response action, but given the nature of the notice and the circumstances of the business, only by planning for all eventualities, locking out all of the TWU members taking the action, and effectively bringing in a “flying squad” to replace them all. This is the kind of scenario that the Full Bench in Telstra was contemplating and the notices provided do not enable the employer in this case to take relevant defensive preparations as contemplated by the authorities.

[38] In terms of the notices issued on 15 April 2014 relating to work stoppages, these are in a different form. Although they repeat the broad scope of the PAB approved action, in each case the actual nature of the action, being the stoppage of work for a nominated duration, is then specified. This would be sufficient detail of the nature of the action to meet the notice requirements of the Act. Indeed, this has the effect of demonstrating the deficiency with the other notices. It is however unnecessary to finally determine this aspect for reasons set out below.

6. Did the notice of the work stoppages require five days notice?

[39] The PAB decision required that five working days notice be provided for stoppages of work over four hours. The notices provided for the work stoppages (notices 5, 6 and 7) did not provide five working days notice to Armaguard. 10 The question that arises is whether, what on face value appears to be three separate notices, should be considered having regard to the combined effect of the notices.

[40] In reality, the three notices mean that a stoppage of greater than four hours was to be conducted by members of the TWU. The notices provide, in effect, that a work stoppage was to be undertaken by the same group of employees and over a period running from 5.00 am to 12.00 pm on the same day; being Wednesday 23 April 2014. There is a period of one minute between the work stoppages notified by notices 5 and 6, and between notices 6 and 7. This is however completely academic given the nature of the work performed by the employees.

[41] There is no prescribed form of notice under the Act, they were all provided to Armaguard on the same day, and it is in any event appropriate to have regard to the combined effect of notices given by bargaining representatives in this context. 11

[42] In that light, the fact that the TWU used three separate letters to provide notice does not deny the fact that they gave notice of, in effect, a seven hour stoppage of work. The notices involve the same employees and in reality three continuous periods of stoppages. This practical effect of the notices was conceded by the TWU 12 and the Commission should understand and consider the real world impact of the notices. The use of the three separate letters in this context may be a device to attempt to avoid the impact of the PAB decision, but whatever the motive, it would make a nonsense of the requirements of that decision to overlook the effective application of the notices.

[43] Further, the fact that the industrial action approved following the PAB decision contemplated industrial action being taken “consecutively” does not provide a basis for protection in this case. I have not found that the action would be unprotected on the basis that it was not approved by the questions endorsed by the PAB. Rather, I have found that the notice was not the five working days required by that decision in the case of a stoppage of the duration as proposed by the relevant notices.

7. The form of the orders

[44] Having found that each of the elements of the notified industrial action did not meet the notice requirements of the Act, it would not be employee claim action within the meaning of s.409 of the Act. As a result, the impending industrial action would not have been protected within the meaning of s.408. Section 418(1) of the Act requires the Commission to make orders preventing industrial action in these circumstances.

[45] Consistent with the approach required by the decision of the Full Bench in E. Allen and Ors v Fluor Construction Services Pty Ltd13 the Order defined the (unprotected) industrial action in a manner consistent with s.19 of the Act and made some consequential orders,14 but only to the extent necessary to give effect to the substantive order to stop organising and not engage in the unprotected industrial action.

[46] Section 418(1) of the Act requires that such an order must be made for a defined period, the “Stop period”. In the circumstances, I determined that the stop period for the Order should be that period commencing from the time of the Order and ending at 5.00pm on Friday 25 April 2014; being a period to cover the lead up to, and immediately after, the notified industrial action.

[47] Section 418(4) provides that where the Commission makes an order in circumstances which include where a protected action ballot order has authorised the industrial action, it may state that the industrial action may be engaged in after the end of the stop period without another protected action ballot. These are the circumstances applying in this case.

[48] The TWU could give notice of industrial action authorised by the PAB, and provided that the notice complied with the minimum notice period in each case and specified the nature of the action that was to be taken, this would become protected under the Act. In the circumstances, and given the basis upon which the present notices were found to be defective, it would not be reasonable to require the TWU to seek a further PAB. It was therefore appropriate to make an order contemplated by s.418(4) of the Act in this case.

Appearances:

R West (of counsel) with K Lehane (of Minter Ellison), with permission, with V McEvoy and J Roode for Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd.

E Lawrie with I Smith for the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia.

Hearing details:

2014

Adelaide (with a video link to Melbourne)

April 17.

 1   PR549850.

 2   Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 1753.

 3   Ibid.

 4   Ibid at par [30].

 5   These include Boral Resources (NSW) Pty Ltd [2010] FWAFB 1771 per Boulton J, Hamberger SDP and Deegan C; and Telstra Corporation Limited v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2009] FWAFB 1698 per Giudice J, Acton SDP and Whelan C.

 6   [2009] FWAFB 1698.

 7   See also Adelaide Brighton Cement v The Australian Workers’ Union and Others [2002] FCA 601.

 8   Exhibit A2.

 9   The evidence of Mr Rodde - transcript PN85 - PN160, PN215 - PN219.

 10   See the discussion of the meaning of working days in this context in the PAB decision.

 11   Adelaide Brighton Cement v The Australian Workers’ Union and Others [2002] FCA 601 at par 23.

 12   Transcript PN312 - PN317, PN337.

 13   [2014] FWCFB 174.

 14   See Alice Springs Town Council v Mpweteyerre Aboriginal Corporation (1997) 115 NTR 25.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<Price code C, PR549874>