DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections

Karren Hazledine
v
Kirk Wakerley and Ben Giddings
(C2016/264)

Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal - whether application prohibited by s.725 - application dismissed.

[1] On 10 February 2016 Ms Karren Hazeldine (the Applicant) made a general protections application under s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) alleging that Mr Kirk Wakerley and Mr Ben Giddings (the Respondents) had contravened ss.362 and 550 of the Act in relation to the termination of her employment on 21 January 2016 by Arthur J. Gallagher Australia & Co (Aus) Pty Ltd (AJG).

[2] AJG in its Form 8A – Response to general protections application raised a jurisdictional objection, contending that in making her general protections application Ms Hazeldine had breached the prohibition against multiple actions or complaints set out in s.725 of the Act as she had also made a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) in relation to her dismissal. AJG further contended that Ms Hazeldine’s application should therefore be dismissed.

[3] AJG’s jurisdictional objection was listed for conference/hearing by the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) on 23 February 2016. However that date was vacated at the request of the parties to enable private mediation to occur in respect of Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application and AHRC complaint. Unfortunately, mediation failed to resolve the issues in dispute and on 10 May 2016 AJG sought a relisting of the matter. A Directions conference was convened by the Commission on 13 May 2016, with Directions and revised Directions issued on 16 May 2016 requiring the parties to file an outline of submissions and any evidentiary material they intended to rely upon.

[4] AJG’s jurisdictional objection was heard on 1 June 2016. At the hearing, Mr Michael Harmer appeared with permission for Ms Hazeldine, while Ms Rebecca Nelson appeared with permission for the Respondent. Following that hearing and as explained below, further Directions were issued on 2 June 2016.

[5] For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application was both made after her AHRC complaint had been made and in relation to her dismissal. As such, s.725 of the Act operated as a bar to Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application being made because her AHRC complaint is a complaint made by her under another law in relation to her dismissal and it had not been withdrawn nor failed for want of jurisdiction within the meaning of s.732. Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application is therefore dismissed because it was prohibited by s.725 of the Act.

Background

[6] As previously noted, Ms Hazeldine lodged her general protections application on 10 February 2016. Ms Hazeldine responded yes at Item 1.5 of her application which asks “Have you made another claim to the Commission or to any other organisation in relation to your dismissal (eg an unfair dismissal claim)?” Ms Hazeldine further stated at Item 1.5 of her application that:

“However, as detailed in the attached Schedule, Ms Hazeldine makes this application in the Fair Work Commission against two individuals, Mr Kirk Wakerley and Mr Ben Giddings. Whereas, Ms Hazeldine’s other complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission is made not against these two individuals but rather is made against after Arthur J. Gallagher Australia & Co (Aus) Limited (“AJG”), her employer. As a result, there is no issue of double jeopardy.” (Emphasis as per original)

[7] The attached Schedule referred to in Ms Hazledine’s response at Item 1.5 of her application states, among other things, that:

“2.1 On 21 January 2016, Harmers received a letter from Sparke Helmore Lawyers terminating Ms Hazeldine’s employment at AJG.

2.2 The letter from AJG to Ms Hazeldine whereby her employment was terminated is authored by Mr Ben Giddings. Given Mr Wakerley’s position within the organisation, our client reasonably anticipates that Mr Wakerley has also been involved in the decision to terminate her employment. Accordingly, Ms Hazeldine also contends that both Mr Giddings and Mr Wakerley have further contravened section 362 and/or section 550 in relation to the termination of Ms Hazeldine’s employment.

…

3.2 … The AHRC complaint is made against AJG, and is not made in respect of Mr Wakerley or Mr Giddings. This general protections application purely contains an accessorial complaint against Mr Wakerley and Mr Giddings, and does not make any claims against AJG. As a result, there is no issue of double jeopardy in making this general protections application in addition to the AHRC complaint.” (Underlining added)

[8] Also attached to Ms Hazeldine’s application is a copy of her complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 1. That complaint is dated 9 February 2016, though the covering letter forwarding the complaint to the AHRC is dated 10 February 2016. The letter attached to Ms Hazeldine’s AHRC complaint states, inter alia, that:

“3.2 In addition, AJG further discriminated against, and victimised, Ms Hazeldine by dismissing her in circumstances surrounding the termination of her employment on 21 January 2016.”

[9] That letter also states that Ms Hazeldine “seeks to rely on legal position set out in Parts 7 and 8 of the Letter of Demand.” 2 The Letter of Demand states at Part 7 that:

“7.1 It is clear from the incidents described above that AJG, Mr Wakerley and Mr Giddings have engaged in contraventions of the SD Act [Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)].” 3

The statutory framework

[10] Chapter 6 of the Act contains provisions dealing with multiple actions. Part 6-1, Division 3, Subdivision B of that Chapter contains provisions aimed at preventing multiple actions relating to a dismissal. So far as is relevant to this application, those provisions are as follows:

“725 General rule

A person who has been dismissed must not make an application or complaint of a kind referred to in any one of sections 726 to 732 in relation to the dismissal if any other of those sections applies.

. . .

727 General protections FWC applications

(1) This section applies if:

(a) a general protections FWC application has been made by, or on behalf of, the person in relation to the dismissal; and

(b) the application has not:

(i) been withdrawn by the person who made the application; or
(ii) failed for want of jurisdiction; or
(iii) resulted in the issue of a certificate under paragraph 368(3)(a) (which provides for the FWC to issue a certificate if the FWC is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve a dispute (other than by arbitration) have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful).

(1A) This section also applies if:

(a) a general protections FWC application has been made by, or on behalf of, the person in relation to the dismissal; and

(b) the application has not:

(i) been withdrawn by the person who made the application; or
(ii) failed for want of jurisdiction; and

(c) a certificate in relation to the dispute has been issued by the FWC under paragraph 368(3)(a) (which provides for the FWC to issue a certificate if the FWC is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve a dispute (other than by arbitration) have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful); and
(d) a notification of the parties’ agreement to the FWC arbitrating the dispute has been made as referred to in paragraphs 369(1)(b) and (c).

(2) A general protections FWC application is an application under section 365 for the FWC to deal with a dispute that relates to dismissal.

. . .

732 Applications and complaints under other laws

(1) This section applies if:

(a) an application or complaint under another law has been made by, or on behalf of, the person in relation to the dismissal; and
(b) the application or complaint has not:

(i) been withdrawn by the person who made the application; or
(ii) failed for want of jurisdiction.

(2) An application or complaint under another law is an application or complaint made under:

(a) a law of the Commonwealth (other than this Act); or
(b) a law of a State or Territory.

(3) For the purposes of this Subdivision, if a complaint under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 relates to a dismissal only as a result of an amendment of the complaint, the complaint is taken to be made when the complaint is amended.”

The Respondent’s case

[11] AJG submitted that both Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application and AHRC complaint relate to her dismissal, adding that the relationship was direct and real and not tenuous or remote. In support of that contention, AJG relied on the following:

(i) both Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application and AHRC complaint rely on the same allegations as forming the content of the application/complaint as the Letter of Demand setting out her claims was attached to both documents;
(ii) Ms Hazeldine seeks the same remedies in both her general protections application and her AHRC complaint;
(iii) Ms Hazeldine general protections application was an application involving her dismissal and was made under s.365 of the Act being a “dismissal dispute”;
(iv) at Item 1.5 of her general protections application Ms Hazeldine admitted that she had already made another claim in relation to her dismissal at the time she lodged her general protections application; and
(v) Ms Hazeldine’s AHRC complaint was also a complaint that had been made in relation to her dismissal.

[12] AJG further submitted that in a vain attempt to avoid the intended operation of the provisions of the Act prohibiting double dipping, Ms Hazeldine had proceeded against different respondents in her general protections application and her AHRC complaint, adding that the naming of different parties was irrelevant as the focus was not on the parties to those applications. AJG reiterated that both Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application and AHRC complaint were made in relation to her dismissal. As a result, AJG contended that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application and that the application should therefore be dismissed.

[13] As to Ms Hazeldine’s allegation of accessorial liability against the Respondents, AJG submitted that the cause of action against the Respondents is bound to fail and ought to be dismissed because without joining AJG to the general protections application there can be no finding of a contravention of the civil remedy provision that the Respondents were involved in.

The Applicant’s case

[14] Ms Hazeldine contended that her general protections application is not one in relation to her dismissal in the relevant sense. Ms Hazeldine further contended that her application was not brought against her former employer, AJG, but against two individuals neither of whom employed her. To that end, Ms Hazeldine submitted that her general protections application did not fit within the description of an application or complaint in relation to her dismissal and it follows that s.725 of the Act did not prevent her from bringing the application. Ms Hazeldine further submitted that the fact that her general protections application was brought against different respondents to her AHRC complaint was found to preclude a jurisdictional impediment in Krongold v Leibowitz 4 (Krongold) and that her general protections application and AHRC complaint seek different forms of relief.

[15] As to the issue of accessorial liability, Ms Hazeldine relied on a number of authorities submitted that accessorial liability may be found without the primary contravener being party to the action. The authorities relied on by Ms Hazeldine in this regard included Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Ltd 5 and Fair Work Ombudsman v Centennial Financial Services Pty Ltd6.

The hearing and ensuing developments

[16] At the hearing it was contended on behalf of Ms Hazeldine that her general protections application was lodged prior to her AHRC complaint. The following extract from the transcript deals with this aspect of Ms Hazeldine’s submissions.

“MR HARMER: … It is not the applicant’s case, there is no evidence before this Commission as to what came first and what came second and on a proper interpretation of section 725 your Honour vitally must have that evidence. Now I acknowledge, we are derelict because I’ve only looked at it today. I’ve looked at records from the registry and it seems to be unfortunately, as a technicality the Fair Work Commission was lodged first and Human Rights second. That’s the opposite to what is asserted merely in submission by the respondents. I’m happy for there to be a fair process because I acknowledge we have been ourselves derelict, but I make the point, your Honour, we’re not bringing the application, we don’t have to make out the evidence. We’re not relying purely on submissions to assert what was first and what was second, nor assumption and this Commission to be in a fair position to determine - - -

…

MR HARMER: Well, your Honour, all I’m saying is for your Honour to be in a position to deal with our submission as to the meaning; novel or otherwise, it seems your Honour does need some evidence. We acknowledge we haven’t put that evidence forward until now, and we’re just suggesting that there be in fairness to both the Commission and both parties a regime over the next seven or 14 days whereby that material will be properly tested and your Honour may rule as a matter of law that our submission is nonsense and it’s irrelevant. But your Honour needs that material in our respectful submission.” 7

[17] Ms Hazeldine’s contention in this regard generated an exchange of views as to the implications of and how to deal with that contention, the outcome of which, as previously alluded to, was that the Commission issued further Directions on 2 June 2016. Those Directions provided as follows:

“The following directions are issued:

A. Harmers Workplace Lawyers, on behalf of the Applicant, is to provide to Sparke Helmore Lawyers, on behalf of the Respondents, a draft affidavit which sets out the evidence to be relied on in relation to the timing of lodging of applications with the Commission and with the Australian Human Rights Commission by close of business on Wednesday, 8 June 2016.

B. Sparke Helmore Lawyers, is to provide to Harmers Workplace Lawyers an indication of what it might be seeking by way of a costs application by close of business on Wednesday, 8 June 2016.

C. Harmers Workplace Lawyers, after discussion with Sparke Helmore Lawyers, is to advise the Commission if a further hearing is necessary to deal with the abovementioned evidence, with Friday, 17 June 2016 at 2.00pm reserved for any such hearing.”

[18] On 6 June 2016 Ms Hazeldine’s representative, Mr Harmer, emailed the Commission regarding the abovementioned Directions. Among other things, the email stated that:

“We acknowledge that on the day of the jurisdictional hearing we raised, for the first time, the issue of the timing of our clients Fair Work Commission application versus her AHRC complaint. While we certainly regret that this detail was only checked on the day of the hearing, we had genuinely expected that our enquiries about the timing would have been just a mere formality which we had intended to confirm for the benefit of the Deputy President. However, on discovering the slight difference in timing, we felt duty bound to raise it with the Deputy President. Importantly, however, we do note that the difference in timing is very slight and only a matter of a few minutes, and even then, in circumstances such as this we consider that the interplay between the Fair Work Commission Rules and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) is far from certain. Accordingly, in all of the circumstances, we have spoken to our client, and we are instructed not to file and serve any evidence regarding the timing of the lodging of the applications with the Commission and with the Australian Human Rights Commission. This will allow the case to progress on the basis of the material that was known when the Respondents put forward their objection.

…

We are instructed that the Applicant is comfortable to proceed on the basis that the Commission determine the jurisdictional objection raised by the Respondents on the basis of the submissions and materials it has before it.”

[19] The Respondents’ legal representative, Mr Brendan Charles, emailed the Commission late on 6 June 2016 stating, inter alia, that:

“We refer to Mr Harmer’s email below, and agree that, based on the matters set out in his email, we do not need to proceed with the further hearing scheduled for 2pm on 17 June 2016.

We also note that despite submissions made in Mr Harmer’s email about the timing of the relevant applications, the respondents consent to this course of action on their understanding that the only evidence before the Commission as to the timing of the making of the FWC Application is the evidence set out in the Form F8 application dated 10 February 2016 signed by Mr Harmer. The Form 8 states that the applicant at the time of making the FWC Application had already made the AHRC Complaint. We understand that this point is conceded by Mr Harmer in his email below, and is the basis upon which the jurisdictional objection will be determined.”

[20] Mr Harmer responded on 14 June 2016 stating among other things that:

“We do not agree with the point made by Mr Charles concerning the only evidence before the Commission.

…

We do however concede that the matter is to proceed on the assumption that the AHRC Complaint was filed first.”

Consideration of the issues

[21] In Birch v Wesco Electrics (1966) Pty Ltd 8 (Birch) Federal Magistrate Lucev stated that:

“Section 725 of the FW Act imposes a personal prohibition on a person making a second application or complaint of a kind to which one of ss 726-732 of the FW Act apply when there has already been made an application or complaint of a kind to which one other of ss 726 and 732 of the FW Act apply. That meaning:
a) is plain on the face of the statute;
b) was intended by the Commonwealth Parliament, as confirmed by the extracts from the FW Bill Explanatory Memorandum set out above; and
c) is confirmed by relevant case law.

A dismissed person may therefore make:
a) a general protections court application; or
b) an application under a State or Territory anti-discrimination or equal opportunity law “in relation to” their dismissal,
but not both.

Therefore, s 725 of the FW Act acts as a personal prohibition on Ms Birch making a second complaint of a kind to which s 732 of the FW Act applies, that is, from making the EO Complaint, provided that the EO Complaint is a matter “in relation to” Ms Birch’s dismissal. It is to that issue the Court now turns.” 9

[22] Against that background, there are two threshold issues which the Commission needs to determine in this matter. First, whether Ms Hazeldine made her general protections application after making her AHRC complaint and, second, whether her general protections application was made in relation to her dismissal.

[23] Dealing with the first issue, the material before the Commission is:

• Ms Hazeldine’s application which states at Item 1.5 that she had made a claim to the AHRC in respect of her dismissal, albeit in respect of a different respondent;



• the Outline of the Respondents’ Submissions which states “in section 1.5 of the FWC Application, it is admitted by the applicant that she had already made another claim in relation to her dismissal at the time she lodged the FWC Application (being the AHRC Complaint” 10;

Ms Hazeldine’s submission at the hearing that her general protections application was made prior to her AHRC complaint; and

the email of 6 June 2016 from Ms Hazeldine’s representative which states, inter alia, that “the difference in timing is very slight and only a matter of a few minutes”.

[24] Beyond the above, I note that Ms Hazeldine did not dispute the Respondent’s submission as outlined in the second dot point above in her Applicant’s Submissions in Reply to the Outline of the Respondents’ Submissions. Rather, Ms Hazeldine sought in her submissions to highlight the different respondents cited in her general protections application and AHRC complaint.

[25] Further, with regard to the last two points above, no evidentiary material was led by Ms Hazeldine to support her contention that her general protections application was lodged prior to her AHRC complaint, despite the Commission’s Directions of 2 June 2016 providing her with the opportunity to share with the Respondents in draft form “the evidence to be relied on in relation to the timing of lodging of applications with the Commission and with the Australian Human Rights Commission.” Based on Mr Harmer’s email of 6 June 2016, it appears that for whatever reason Ms Hazeldine instructed him not to file and serve any evidence on this issue. Clearly, had Ms Hazeldine wished to press her submission in this regard she should have filed evidence to support that submission. In the absence of any such evidentiary material her submission amounts to little more than an unsubstantiated assertion to which no weight can be attached in the circumstances. Finally, I also note Mr Harmer’s concession in his email of 14 June 2016 that “the matter is to proceed on the assumption that the AHRC Complaint was filed first.”

[26] The only probative material therefore before the Commission regarding this issue is Ms Hazeldine’s application, which as noted above states at Item 1.5 that at the time she made her general protections application she had made a claim to the AHRC in respect of her dismissal.

[27] This supports a finding that Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application was made after her AHRC complaint had been made.

[28] I turn now to the second threshold issue referred to above, i.e. whether Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application was made in relation to her dismissal. Ms Hazeldine’s submission on this issue is best reflected in the following extract from the transcript of the hearing on 1 June 2016:

“The key points are different respondents, different causes of action and different remedies. So with different respondents, different causes of action and different remedies, does one have a sufficient nexus of the kind intended by the scheme of the legislation, which in context section 725 appears, and for the purpose for which it appears, which is to stop a double dip against the dismissing employer. We say by definition you don’t get there because the dismissal is a conduct of the employer.” 11

[29] In short, Ms Hazeldine argues that because only AJG could have dismissed her, her general protections application is not “in relation to the dismissal” as required by s.725 because the Respondents could not have dismissed her as they were not her employer. Ms Hazeldine relied on the decision of Commissioner Ryan in David Jobson v JB Hi Fi Group Pty Ltd & Ors 12 (Jobson) in support of her submission in the regard. However, I note that in Jobson the existence of the jurisdictional fact of dismissal was in issue13 whereas in this case it was not disputed that Ms Hazeldine had been dismissed.

[30] Lucev FM also considered the meaning of “in relation to” in Birch and observed that:

“The phrase “in relation to” does not extend to tenuous or remote relationships. Rather, a statutory test of relationship requires that the relationship “must lie within the bounds of relevance to the statutory purpose”.

The statutory purpose for which s 725 of the FW Act was enacted was to prevent an applicant, having filed an application or complaint of one type in relation to their dismissal, from filing an application or complaint of another type in relation to their dismissal. Applied to the present context, it is to prevent an applicant having filed a general protections court application in relation to their dismissal in this Court, from lodging an equal opportunity complaint in relation to their dismissal under a State equal opportunity law. The statutory purpose, put simply, is to limit an applicant to a single remedy.” 14 (Citations not included)

[31] Lucev FM went on to determine as follows:

“… In any event, the use of the phrase “in relation to” does not require exclusivity or predominance, but rather a relationship, other than a tenuous or remote relationship.

The relationship between the Application and the EO Complaint is far from tenuous or remote. Indeed, the relationship here is direct, both as to:
a) the general nature of the matters alleged, that is discrimination on the grounds of sex (including sexual harassment) and age; and
b) the supporting particulars and evidence to the EO Complaint and the Application.

The EO Complaint is therefore a matter “in relation to” Ms Birch’s dismissal. The EO Complaint is therefore a complaint of a kind referred to in s 725 of the FW Act, and, therefore, a complaint which Ms Birch is statutorily prohibited from making.” 15

[32] Applying the approach adopted by Lucev FM in Birch, the material before the Commission indicates that both Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application and AHRC complaint rely on the background facts and particulars set out in her Letter of Demand of 21 December 2015 16.

[33] I note also that the resolution (or remedies) sought by Ms Hazeldine in respect of her general protections application and her AHRC are almost identical as indicated by the following table:

General Protections Application – Resolution Sought 17

AHRC complaint – Resolution sought 18

4.1. Without being exhaustive, the Applicant seeks the following: (a) compensation including: (i) payment for past economic loss; (ii) payment for future economic loss; (iii) payment of general damages for pain and suffering, stress, anxiety and dislocation of life; (iv) payment of all past and future medical expenses incurred as a result of the conduct outlined above; (v) payment of all reasonably incurred legal costs in this matter; and (b) civil penalty orders against the respondents.

4.2 Ms Hazeldine seeks the following without limitation: (a) payment for any past economic loss; (b) payment for future economic loss; (c) payment of general damages for pain, suffering, humiliation and dislocation of life; (d) payment of medical expenses; (e) payment of legal expenses; and (f) orders for reform at AJG in the area of human rights and employment.

[34] Further, the Schedule to Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application states:

• at paragraph 2.2 “The letter from AJG to Ms Hazeldine whereby her employment was terminated is authored by Mr Ben Giddings. Given Mr Wakerley’s position within the organisation, our client reasonably anticipates that Mr Wakerley has also been involved in the decision to terminate her employment. Accordingly, Ms Hazeldine also contends that both Mr Giddings and Mr Wakerley have further contravened section 362 and/or section 550 in relation to the termination of Ms Hazelton’s employment” (underlining added); and



• at paragraph 3.1 that “Ms Hazeldine seeks to rely on the legal position set out in Part 6 of the Letter of Demand”. Part 6 of the Letter of Demand, which pre-dates Ms Hazeldine’s dismissal, states among other things that:

“6.3 AJG has taken adverse action against Ms Hazeldine because Ms Hazeldine has exercised a workplace right, in contravention of section 340(1) of the FW Act.

Section 351 discrimination

6.4 AJG also took adverse action against Ms Hazeldine because of Ms Hazeldine’s disability in contravention of section 351 of the FW Act.”

[35] In essence paragraph 2.2 of the Schedule characterises both Mr Wakerley and Mr Giddings as accessories to AJG’s decision to terminate Ms Hazeldine’s employment, i.e. dismiss her, while Part 6 of the Letter of Demand points to Ms Hazeldine alleging in her general protections application that AJG contravened the general protections provisions of the Act.

[36] While Ms Hazeldine correctly referred in her submissions to the decision in Krongold, I would note that Deputy President Gooley found in Krongold that:

• there was no complaint to the AHRC in respect of the employer in that case and as such there was no jurisdictional impediment to a certificate being issued under s.369 of the Act (as it then was) naming the employer; and



• when the AHRC complaint was made in that case it was not a complaint in relation to the dismissal and that she was therefore unable to conclude that the applicant had made a complaint in relation to the dismissal under a law of the Commonwealth prior to her lodging her general protections application.

[37] However, what differentiates this matter from the circumstances in Krongold is that, as previously noted, the Letter of Demand attached to Ms Hazeldine’s AHRC complaint alleges at Part 7.1 that “Mr Wakerley and Mr Giddings have engaged in contraventions of the SD Act”. The Letter of Demand points to both Mr Wakerley and Mr Giddings being captured by Ms Hazeldine’s AHRC complaint regarding her dismissal.

[38] Taken together, the above analysis supports a finding that the relationship between Ms Hazeldene’s general protections application and AHRC complaint is direct and real and, drawing on the language in Birch, not tenuous or remote. In other words, Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application was an application “in relation to the dismissal” as per s.725 of the Act.

[39] Against that background, I find that Ms Hazelton had made a complaint in relation to her dismissal under a law of the Commonwealth prior to lodging her general protections application. Accordingly, the Respondents jurisdictional objection is upheld.

[40] In those circumstances and as agreed at the hearing 19, it is not necessary for the Commission to determine the accessorial liability issue.

Conclusion

[41] For all the above reasons, I have concluded that Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application was both made after her AHRC complaint had been made and in relation to her dismissal. As such, s.725 of the Act operated as a bar to Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application being made because her AHRC complaint is a complaint made by her under another law in relation to her dismissal and it had not been withdrawn nor failed for want of jurisdiction within the meaning of s.732. Ms Hazeldine’s general protections application is therefore dismissed because it was prohibited by s.725 of the Act. An order dismissing Ms Hazeldine’s application will issued in conjunction with this decision.

Appearances:

M. Harmer for the Applicant.

R. Nelson for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

2016.

Melbourne:

June 1.

 1   Form F8 – General Protections Application Involving Dismissal at Attachment B to Schedule to General Protections Application

 2   Ibid at 3.1of the attached letter

 3   Ibid at Part 7.1 of Attachment B to Schedule to General Protections Application

 4   [2013] FWC 3738

 5   (2001) 110 FCR 1 at [51]

 6   (2010) 245 FLR 242

 7   Transcript at PN135-137

 8   (2012) 218 IR 67

 9   Ibid at 61-63

 10   Outline of the Respondents’ Submissions at paragraph 28.d.

 11   Transcript at PN169

 12   [2014] FWC 1155

 13   Ibid at [36]

 14   (2012) 218 IR 67 at 74-75

 15   Ibid at 84-86

 16   See Schedule to General Protections Application at paragraph 1.2 and paragraph 1.2 of the covering letter of 10 February 2016 to Ms Hazeldine’s AHRC complaint

 17   Schedule to General Protections Application at paragraph 4.1

 18   Covering letter of 10 February 2016 to Ms Hazeldine’s AHRC complaint at paragraph 4.2

 19   Transcript at PN 48 and PN61

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