DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Scott Ciantar
v
UGL Operations & Maintenance Pty Ltd
(U2016/7532)

Application for relief from unfair dismissal - extension of time - second application - first application discontinued by representative without authorisation.

[1] Mr Ciantar was dismissed from his employment with UGL Operations & Maintenance Pty Ltd (UGL) on 21 March 2016. Mr Ciantar filed the application in this matter on 8 June 2016 some 8 weeks outside the 21 day time limit provided for in s.394(2) of the Act.

Legislation

[2] Section 394(2) permits the Fair Work Commission to extend the 21 day time period in in the Act subject to the Commission being satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances taking into account each of the relevant matters enumerated in s.394(3).

“(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”

[3] The meaning of "exceptional circumstances" was considered in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd  1  where the Full Bench said:

"[13] In summary, the expression 'exceptional circumstances' has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe 'exceptional circumstances' as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural 'circumstances' as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of 'exceptional circumstances' includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.” [Endnotes removed]

[4] Directions were issued for parties to file and serve their respective cases in relation to an extension of time and the matter. Mr Ciantar alleged that the reason for the delay was due to the conduct of the “Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU), who were representing him in relation to his dismissal. However, Mr Ciantar did not seek to call any official of the AMWU. The Commission sought evidence from the AMWU. The hearing of this matter occurred over two days. The first day, 17 August 2016, was devoted solely to taking evidence from Mr Webb, Queensland Branch Secretary of the AMWU. On the second day, 1 September 2016 evidence was given by Mr Ciantar and by Ms Maxwell, Employee Relations Manager for the joint venture project in which UGL is involved and for which Mr Ciantar worked.

Timeline of Events

[5] Before turning to a consideration of the matters raised by s.394(3) it is appropriate to set out a timeline of events which emerges from the evidence in this matter. Mr Ciantar was dismissed from his employment on Monday 21 March 2016 and on the same day Mr Ciantar spoke to Mr Brian Wilkins, Northern Territory Organiser for the AMWU and advised Mr Wilkinson that he was considering lodging an unfair dismissal application. The Friday immediately following the dismissal was Good Friday (25 March 2016) which commenced the Easter holiday period. Mr Ciantar travelled to Queensland to be with his family over the Easter period. Mr Ciantar met with Mr Wilkinson on Friday 1 April 2016 at the Darwin office of the AMWU and instructed the AMWU to lodge an unfair dismissal application.

[6] On 11 Apri1 2016 Mr Ciantar contacted Mr Brian Wilkins Northern Territory Organiser for the AMWU and enquired whether his unfair dismissal application had been lodged. He was advised that it had not been lodged and that the Brisbane office of the AMWU would be doing that and Mr Wilkins undertook to get the industrial officer from that office to ring him.

[7] Mr Joshua Blundell-Thornton from the AMWU’s Brisbane union office did so on 11 April 2016 and, after discussing the details of the dismissal with Mr Ciantar, advised him that that he would now lodge the unfair dismissal application. The 11 April 2016 was the 21^st day after the dismissal and the unfair dismissal application would have to have been filed on that day in order to meet the requirements of s.394(2)(a).

[8] On 12 April 2016 the AMWU lodged an application pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) for relief from unfair dismissal (U2016/6139) (the First Application). That application was lodged one day outside the 21 day time limit provided for in s.394(2)(a) of the Act and was programmed for a jurisdictional hearing in on 5 May 2016 before me. The Notice of Listing for that hearing was issued by the Commission on 20 April 2016. Also on 20 April 2016 directions were issued by the Commission to both parties advising them of the requirement to file and serve their respective materials. The Applicant was given until noon 27 April 2016 to file and serve its material.

[9] On 26 April 2016 the AMWU filed a form F50 Notice of Discontinuance and the jurisdictional hearing listed for 5 May 2016 was vacated and the file subsequently closed. The Notice cancelling the listing for 5 May 2016 was sent to the parties including to Mr Ciantar. On 26 April Mr Ciantar spoke to Mr Wilkins who referred him to Mr Blundell-Thornton who told Mr Ciantar that “the Fair Work Commission had thrown it out, based on the time constraints.” I note that Mr Webb had been told by Mr Blundell-Thornton that he did not say this to Mr Ciantar. However, I accept the and prefer the evidence of Mr Ciantar on this point.

[10] On 28 April 2016 Mr Blundell-Thornton advised Mr Ciantar by email that the unfair dismissal application had not been lodged on time and apologised for not doing so. Neither official of the AMWU told Mr Ciantar that the AMWU had filed a notice of Discontinuance.

[11] On Monday 2 May 2016 (the Labour Day public holiday) Mr Ciantar met with Mr Terry Bradley, Assistant Secretary of the Queensland and NT Branch of the AMWU at the AMWU’s Darwin office. Mr Ciantar discussed ideas in going forward in relation to how the AMWU handled his application and Mr Ciantar asked Mr Bradley if the decision to throw out his application could be appealed. Mr Bradley told Mr Ciantar that the prospects of an appeal would be unsuccessful because the matter was lodged outside of the 21 days statutory limit and only in exceptional circumstances for example if you were in a car crash and or other similar types of circumstances would the Fair Work Commission grant an extension of time to my application.

[12] On 12 May 2016 Mr Ciantar telephoned Mr Rohan Webb the Secretary of the QLD/ NT Branch of the AMWU and told him that he (Mr Ciantar) was not happy was dissatisfied with the response he received from Mr Bradley in Darwin. As Mr Ciantar described the conversation:

“11. I expressed my disappointment on 12 May 2016 to Rohan Webb the Secretary of the QLD/ NT Branch of the AMWU and Rohan Webb apologised to me as to the fact that the AMWU had lodged the application outside of the 21 days statutory limitations.

12. Rohan Webb further said to me that the union is working on this internally so it does not happen again. I said to Rohan Webb, the union have cost me an opportunity to have my case heard and dealt with in the Fair Work Commission and I asked him what the union was going to do about this to rectify this unsatisfactory situation.

13. Rohan Webb offered me one year's free membership because of what had happened. I declined this offer and I continue to pay my union membership and I remain a financial member of the AMWU QLD NT Branch.”

[13] Sometime during May 2016 Mr Ciantar was referred by Mr Wilkins to Maurice Blacburn Solicitors and Mr Ciantar had a telephone conference with a solicitor from Maurice Blackburn which Mr Cinatar described in the following terms:

“I attended an appointment with the law firm Maurice Blackburn Lawyers via a telephone conference with a lawyer called Patrick Turner from interstate to discuss all options open to me in relation to my employment including possibly now lodging a general protections adverse action claim. Mr Patrick Turner advised me that regrettably even for a general protections adverse action claim, I was now outside the 21 days statutory limitation.”

[14] On 25 May 2016, Mr Ciantar telephoned the National Office of the AMWU in Sydney to lodge a formal complaint about the way his unfair dismissal application was lodged outside of the 21 day time limit. On the same day Mr Ciantar telephoned nand then corresponded by email with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) about the conduct of the AMWU in relation to his unfair dismissal application.

[15] At the end of May 2016 Mr Ciantar attended the premises of the Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission to seek legal advice in relation to his dismissal but was told that they could not assist him. However, they gave Mr Ciantar a list of Lawyers in Darwin who he could contact for assistance. Mr Ciantar contacted a number of law firms who could not help him, some advising him of a conflict of interest because he wanted to take action against UGL. One of the names on that list was Davison Legal and when Mr Ciantar contacted that firm he spoke to the Principal at Davison Legal, Ms Judith Davison and “gave her a basic rundown” and made an appointment to meet with her.

[16] Mr Ciantar met with Ms Davison on 1 or 2 June 2016. Ms Davison advised Mr Ciantar to contact my chambers. As Mr Ciantar described it: “Ms Davison wanted written proof that you guys had actually thrown the matter out based on the time constraints.”

[17] On 2 June 2016 Mr Ciantar made enquiries of my chambers as to what was the status of his application. He was informed by my Associate of the Notice of Discontinuance being filed by the AMWU on his behalf. A copy of the Notice of Discontinuance was emailed to
Mr Ciantar on 2 June 2016. Ms Davison contacted Mr Matarazzo to see if he would assist
Mr Ciantar as Ms Davison was of the view that Mr Matarazzo was “in a better position to handle” Mr Ciantar’s case.

[18] Mr Ciantar subsequently contacted Mr Matarazzo and had an appointment with him on 7 June 2016 and Mr Matarazzo assisted Mr Ciantar to prepare a lengthy statutory declaration. On 7 and 8 June 2016 Mr Matarazzo also prepared a new unfair dismissal application for Mr Ciantar and both the new application and the statutory declaration were filed with the Commission on 8 June 2016.

Consideration

[19] The current application has been filed some 8 weeks outside the 21 day time limit provided for in s.394(2) of the Act.

[20] This decision is about whether the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) should allow Mr Ciantar a further period for lodgement of his application for an unfair dismissal remedy.

Section 394(3)(a) - The reason for the delay

[21] Mr Ciantar must provide credible reasons for the whole of the period that the application was delayed. The Commission is required to consider the explanation of the total period of the delay, not just part of it. The delay for the purposes of s.394(3) of the Act, is the delay from the expiry of the 21 day period, 11 April 2016, until lodgement of the application, 8 June 2016. The reasons provided must be considered in order to determine whether those reasons constitute exceptional circumstances. The need for Mr Ciantar to provide a reason or reasons which explain the whole of the period from 11 April 2016 to 8 June 2016 was well explained by a Full Bench of the Commission in Cheval Properties P/L (t/as Penrith Hotel Motel) v Smithers:

“We are not satisfied our findings in respect of the matters in s 394(3)(a) to (f) of the FW Act constitute exceptional circumstances. Ms Smithers’ reasons for her delay in making her unfair dismissal remedy application cannot be regarded as unusual or extraordinary in circumstances where she advanced no credible reason for her failure to make her unfair dismissal remedy application to FWA between 8 and 21 January 2010. Nor is there anything in our findings in respect of the matters in s 394(3)(b)-(f) that is unusual or extraordinary.” 2

[22] It is clear from the decision in Cheval Poperties v Smithers that the Commission does not require an applicant to provide credible reasons for every single day of the period of delay. Rather the applicant cannot leave a significant part of the period of delay unexplained.

Representative error as a credible reason for the delay

[23] Much of the case advanced by Mr Ciantar in support of his application for an extension of time relied on the conduct of the AMWU which was acting as his representative in relation to the unfair dismissal for part of the period of the delay.

[24] UGL contended in relation to representative error that:

“30. A number of key principles relating to representative error can be distilled from the authorities on this issue. These include:

(a) Representative error is simply one of a number of factors to be taken into account when determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, and 'the mere existence of representative error cannot form the basis for an extension of time.'9 It is given weight depending on the facts and circumstances. 10

(b) Similarly, representative error does not provide an inviolable reason amounting to exceptional circumstances. 11

(c) The circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered, as well as the conduct relating to the delay subsequent to the 21 day period. 12

(d) The focus of representative error is in respect of the Applicant's conduct, and in particular the extent to which the delay was occasioned by that conduct. 13 It is proper for the Commission to have regard to the Applicant's actions in challenging the dismissal and what steps the Applicant took to ensure a representative executed the Applicant's instructions within the totality of the
period of the delay. 14

(e) A delay proven to be entirely attributable to the representative error will weigh in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances. 15

(f) It may be more readily accepted that representative error provides an acceptable reason for the delay where the Applicant relies on an officer or employee of an organisation of employers or employees, 16 and such would not normally weigh against an employee.1

(g) However, despite paragraphs 30(e) and (f) above, care must be exercised where there is too strong a focus on the conduct of the representative committing the alleged error(s) as opposed to that of the Applicant, particularly where the representative in question is not present in the proceedings and unable to defend themselves in terms of their conduct. 18

31 . Fundamentally, it is the consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances on which the Commission must determine whether exceptional circumstances exist.”

[25] For the purposes of the present matter the decisions relied upon by UGL provide an appropriate guide for the Commission.

[26] I consider that representative error can only explain part of the delay in the second application. However the conduct of the AMWU, which goes beyond simple representative error, explains much more of the period of delay.

[27] It is appropriate to consider the whole of the period of the delay as comprising several discrete periods and each discrete period needs to be examined to ascertain whether
Mr Ciantar has provided a credible reason for the delay in making his unfair dismissal application.

Period 1 – Date of Dismissal to 12 April 2016.

[28] It is clear that Mr Ciantar was actively pushing the AMWU to file an unfair dismissal on his behalf within the 21 day time limit specified by s.394(2)(a). Within the 21 day period was the Easter holiday period and Mr Ciantar explained that he travelled from Darwin to Queensland to be with his family over the Easter break. The evidence is clear that Mr Ciantar actively followed up with the AMWU on the progress of his application and that the contact from Mr Blundell-Thornton on 11 April 2016 was as a result of Mr Ciantar pushing the AMWU. Even though Mr Blundell-Thornton of the AMWU only took detailed instructions from Mr Ciantar on 11 April 2016, it was within the 21 day time limit and there appears to be no reason why the AMWU could not have lodged the application within time. The application was in fact filed with the Commission on 12 April 2016, one day outside the 21 day time limit. The AMWU admits that the failure to file the unfair dismissal application on 11 April 2016 was theirs and theirs alone. The reason for the delay in filing an unfair dismissal application on 12 April 2016 was very clearly due to representative error and applying the “principles” relied on by UGL it is clear that Mr Ciantar would likely to have been granted an extension of time due to exceptional circumstances in relation to that application.

Period 2 – 12 April 2016 to 28 April 2016

[29] The application filed by the AMWU on 12 April 2016 was clearly out of time and it was necessary for the Commission to deal with that issue, thus the Notice of Listing for a hearing on 5 May 2016 was issued and sent to all parties including Mr Ciantar on 20 April 2016. Separately but on the same day directions were issued to the parties relating to the timeframe for the filing and serving of the parties’ materials in relation to the out of time hearing. The directions required the Applicant to file and serve his materials by noon on 27 April 2016. Mr Ciantar received a copy of the directions.

[30] Certainly by 20 April 2016 Mr Ciantar is aware that his unfair dismissal application has been filed with the Commission and that it was filed out of time and that a hearing is scheduled for 5 May 2016 to deal with his out of time application and that the AMWU has received directions from the Commission about filing material in support of an extension of time. Mr Ciantar’s inactivity during this period is reasonable and is explained by the processes in play to deal with the unfair dismissal application filed on 12 April 2016.

[31] On 26 April 2016, the day before the AMWU is file and serve materials in support of an extension of time, the AMWU filed a Notice of Discontinuance in relation to the unfair dismissal application filed on 12 April 2016 and was signed by Mr Blundell-Thornton. As the evidence of both Mr Cintar and Mr Webb make very clear, the Notice of Discontinuance was not authorised by either Mr Ciantar or by Mr Webb. Nor was either Mr Ciantar or Mr Webb told that a Notice of Discontinuance had been filed with the Commission by Mr Blundell-Thornton. On receipt of the Notice of Discontinuance the Commission issued a Notice to the parties, including Mr Ciantar, cancelling the hearing for 5 May 2016. The Notice to the parties indicated that “This application is discontinued.”.

[32] Mr Ciantar responded to the notice cancelling the hearing by contacting both
Mr Wilkins and Mr Blundell-Thornton at the AMWU. The evidence of Mr Ciantar is clear that Mr Blundell-Thornton told Mr Ciantar that the Commission had dismissed the application because it was out of time. The evidence of Mr Ciantar is clear that Mr Blundell-Thornton did not at any time admit that he had filed a Notice of Discontinuance in the matter. Mr Blundell-Thornton apologised to Mr Ciantar for the late filing of his application, as is clear from the email from Mr Blundell-Thornton to Mr Ciantar on 28 April 2016. The actual events from 12 April 2016 through to 28 April 2016 provide a credible reason why Mr Ciantar did not file an unfair dismissal application during this period. UGL contended that Mr Ciantar must have been aware that the application had been discontinued because of the words contained in the notice cancelling the 5 May 2016 hearing. The difficulty with this contention is that it presumes, without any supporting evidence, that Mr Ciantar understood the notion of discontinuance which underpins s.588 of the Act. The contention of UGL fails to address the specific evidence of Mr Ciantar that he was told by Mr Blundell-Thornton that the Commission had dismissed the application because it was out of time.

Period 3 – 28 April 2016 to 25 May 2016

[33] The conduct of Mr Blundell-Thornton is not a matter of representative error as it is absolutely clear that Mr Blundell-Thornton was not acting in Mr Ciantar’s interest when he filed a Notice of Discontinuance and when he lied to Mr Ciantar as to the reason why the hearing for 5 May 2016 had been cancelled. By telling Mr Ciantar that the Commission had dismissed his unfair dismissal application because it was filed out of time Mr Blundell-Thornton misled Mr Ciantar and caused Mr Ciantar to act on a false premise. It is clear on the evidence of Mr Ciantar that he was actively pursuing his unfair dismissal when he met with Mr Bradley on 2 May 2016 and in his conversation with Mr Webb on 12 May 2016 and in his seeking legal advice from Maurice Blackburn during May 2016. That Mr Ciantar took no action to file an unfair dismissal application during this time is consistent with the misinformation given to him by Mr Blundell-Thornton as to the reason why his first application had ended, namely that it was the Commission who had dismissed his first application due to being out of time. The misinformation from Mr Blundell-Thornton was compounded by Mr Bradley advising Mr Ciantar that an appeal against the decision of the Commission to dismiss his first application would be unsuccessful. No appeal could have been lodged by Mr Ciantar as there was no decision of the Commission dismissing the first application. It is not surprising that when Mr Ciantar sought legal advice from Maurice Blackburn it was not to instruct them to file a new unfair dismissal application but rather to explore other options including a general protections claim. Whilst Mr Cinatar’s complaints on 25 May 2016 to the National Office of the AMWU and to the ACTU had nothing to do with making a new unfair dismissal application, they are nevertheless consistent with
Mr Ciantar’s desire to do something about his unfair dismissal but in the context where he had been misled about the reason his first application had ended. Mr Ciantar’s conduct throughout this period is consistent with him wanting to take action in relation to his unfair dismissal. The evidence of Mr Ciantar provides a credible reason as to why he did not make an unfair dismissal application within this period.

Period 4 - 25 May 2016 to 8 June 2016

[34] It is clear that after having made his complaints to the National Office of the AMWU and to the ACTU that Mr Ciantar adopted a different approach to pursuing action in relation to his unfair dismissal, namely seeking external legal advice, including external to the AMWU’s preferred law firm Maurice Blackburn.

[35] Mr Ciantar’s approach to the NT Legal Aid Commission, his making contact with a number of law firms and finally his contact with Davison Legal who agreed to meet with him on 2 June 2016 show that Mr Ciantar was actively pursuing action in relation to his dismissal.

[36] It is relevant that Ms Davison raised with Mr Ciantar a matter which should have been identified by Mr Bradley and which should have been raised by Maurice Blackburn: If the Commission dismissed the first unfair dismissal application for being out of time a copy of the decision would be needed to consider what options were available to Mr Ciantar. The evidence before the Commission is clear that Mr Ciantar only became aware that the AMWU had discontinued his first unfair dismissal application and that the Commission had not dismissed his application when he contacted my chambers on 2 June 2016 and was given a copy of the Notice of Discontinuance. The delay between Mr Ciantar meeting with
Ms Davison on 2 June 2016 and meeting with Mr Matarazzo on 7 June 2016 is reasonable. The fact that Mr Matarazzo met with Mr Ciantar on 7 June 2016 and prepared a statutory declaration and again on 8 June 2016 to finalize a new unfair dismissal application says more about the way in which Mr Matarazzo works than it does about Mr Ciantar. The conduct of Mr Ciantar and the conduct of Ms Davison and Mr Matarazzo provide a credible reason as to why the application in this matter was filed on 8 June 2016 and not any earlier.

Conclusion as to the reason for the delay

[37] Having regard to the above analysis of the conduct of Mr Ciantar and those he interacted with in relation to his unfair dismissal claim, the Commission is satisfied that
Mr Ciantar has provided a credible reason for the delay in filing his application in this matter on 8 June 2016. The above analysis clearly shows that exceptionable circumstances were present which were not of Mr Cinatar’s making but which significantly impacted on him and caused him to not make the current unfair dismissal application until 8 June 2016.

S.394(3)(b) – whether Mr Ciantar first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect

[38] It is conceded by Mr Ciantar that he became aware of the dismissal at the time of the dismissal.

S.394(3)(c) – any action taken by Mr Ciantar to dispute the dismissal

[39] The lengthy discussion concerning the reason for the delay in filing the unfair dismissal application on 8 June 2016 has traversed the actions taken by Mr Ciantar to dispute his dismissal.

S.394(3)(d) – prejudice to UGL (including prejudice caused by the delay)

[40] UGL contended that it would suffer prejudice if an extension of time was granted to Mr Ciantar. UGL in its written submissions in Exhibit R3 contended as follows:

“99. The Respondent submits that any defence required to an application filed out of time results in unnecessary costs accruing to it.

100 To extend the time limit and allow the Applicant further time to file his application will cause prejudice to the Respondent.

101. In the alternative, the Respondent contends that the best position the Applicant could be afforded in this respect would be neutral.”

[41] Apart from the broad contentions of UGL no evidence or even more substantive arguments were put to the Commission by UGL in relation to s.394(3)(d). In the present matter this element of s.394(3) has neutral value in any consideration as to existence of exceptional circumstances.

S.394(3)(e) – the merits of the unfair dismissal application

[42] UGL in its written submissions, Exhibit R3, contended as follows:

“102. Whilst appreciating that there are competing versions of events and therefore evidence from both parties in this matter, the Respondent says that the Commission can be satisfied that the matter lacks merit.

103 In the alternative, the Respondent submits that at its very highest, the merits viz. the application could be described as a neutral consideration.
104. The Respondent submits this consideration lies against a finding of exceptional circumstances.”

[43] As the authorities make clear, the merits of the substantive application are seldom dealt with in an extension of time hearing and that has certainly been the case in the present matter. In the circumstances of the present matter this element of s.394(3) has neutral value in any consideration as to the existence of exceptional circumstances.

S.394(3)(f) – fairness as between Mr Ciantar and other persons in a similar position

[44] This element of s.394(3) is not relevant in the present matter as there are not other persons in a similar position to Mr Ciantar.

Conclusion

[45] Having considered each of the relevant matters in s.394(3)(a) to (e), including those of neutral value the Commission is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which would permit the Commission to exercise its discretion to allow Mr Ciantar until 8 June 2016 to file his unfair dismissal application. In particular the reason for the delay in filing the unfair dismissal application on 8 June 2016 was clearly because of exceptional circumstances and the matter required to be taken into account under s.394(3)(a) strongly favours a finding that exceptional circumstances existed. There was nothing in the matters under s.394(3)(b) to (e) which would against a finding that exceptional circumstances were present in the present matter. The Commission is satisfied that in all of the circumstances of this matter that the Commission should exercise its discretion and allow Mr Ciantar until 8 June 2016 to file his unfair dismissal application.

[46] As the unfair dismissal application was filed on 8 June 2016 which is within the further period allowed by the Commission under s.394(3) then the application has been filed within time and the application can be dealt with in the usual manner by the Commission.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

L. Matarazzo for Mr Ciantar.

M. Zadow for UGL Operations & Maintenance Pty Ltd.

 1   Cheyne Leanne Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975.

 2   [2010] FWAFB 7251.

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