Fair Work Act 2009
s.604 - Appeal of decisions

Appeal against decision [2015] FWC 4970 and order (PR572764) of Deputy President Asbury at Brisbane on 12 October 2015 in matter number U2014/16010.

Introduction

[1] Ms Kirsten Dale has appealed a decision issued on 12 October 2015 by Deputy President Asbury 1 in which her application for an unfair dismissal remedy against Hatch Pty Ltd (Hatch) was dismissed (Decision). A formal order dismissing the application was separately made2 (Order). On 27 November 2015 a differently constituted Full Bench (Hatcher VP, Hamilton and Bull DPP) granted Ms Dale permission to appeal. The full hearing of her appeal took place before us on 22 December 2015.

[2] The basic facts concerning Ms Dale’s employment with Hatch were summarised in the Decision as follows:

“[1] … Hatch is a consultancy business that provides engineering, procurement and construction management services to its clients in various industries including mining. Hatch has a contract with Anglo American Metallurgical Coal (AAMC) to provide services in relation to AAMC’s Grosvenor Project. As part of that contract Hatch employs persons to work with AAMC employees in an integrated team, to undertake specific tasks. Ms Dale was employed by Hatch on the Grosvenor Project in the position of Site and Facilities Administration Lead from 3 September 2012 until her employment ended on 10 December 2014.”

[3] Ms Dale’s unfair dismissal remedy application was heard by the Deputy President in relation to all issues. The application was ultimately dismissed by the Deputy President on the basis of a jurisdictional issue raised by Hatch, namely that the termination of Ms Dale’s employment did not fall within the definition of “dismissed” in s.386 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). Section 386 relevantly provides:

386 Meaning of dismissed

(1) A person has been dismissed if:

(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative;...

(2) However, a person has not been dismissed if:

(a) the person was employed under a contract of employment for a specified period of time, for a specified task, or for the duration of a specified season, and the employment has terminated at the end of the period, on completion of the task, or at the end of the season; or 
... 

(3) …

[4] It appears not to have been in contest between the parties that, if the exception in s.386(2)(a) did not apply, then the termination of Ms Dale’s employment fell within that part of the general definition of “dismissed” in s.386(1)(a). It was certainly never argued by Hatch either at first instance or in the appeal that Ms Dale’s employment was not terminated on its initiative. The Decision reflects the basis upon which the proceedings were conducted, in that the Deputy President stated:

“[70] If Ms Dale was not employed under a contract of employment for a specified task, or if she was employed under such a contract and was dismissed for a reason other than that the task had been completed, it will be necessary to consider whether Ms Dale’s dismissal was unfair on the grounds that it was harsh, unjust or unreasonable by applying the criteria in s.387 of the Act …”

[5] The Deputy President determined that Ms Dale had been employed by Hatch under a contract of employment for a specified task and thus fell within the exception in s.386(2)(a). Her conclusion was that Ms Dale was employed “for the specified task of carrying out the administration role of Site and Facilities Administration Lead on the Grosvenor Project” 3, and, in relation to the document that constituted her contract of employment, the Deputy President said:

“[78] … When both documents are read in conjunction, it is apparent that Ms Dale was employed for a specified task. Notwithstanding that the contract of employment states that Ms Dale was employed for a specified period, it is clear that Ms Dale was employed specifically for the Grosvenor Project. It is also clear that she was employed in the position of Site and Facilities Administration Lead and that her employment would terminate on demobilisation from site, when that position was no longer required.”

[6] The Deputy President rejected the propositions that the fact that under the contract Ms Dale could be required to perform tasks other than those required for her role, and that the contract could be terminated by Hatch with notice at any time, derogated from it being a contract for a specified task. 4 The Deputy President went on to find that Ms Dale’s employment had been terminated on completion of the task, in that termination occurred upon Hatch’s client for the Grosvenor Project, AAMC, informing it that Ms Dale’s role had been “demobilised”.5

[7] Ms Dale submits that the Deputy President erred in concluding her contract of employment was for a specified task and in dismissing her unfair dismissal remedy application on that basis, and that she was entitled to have her application determined on its merits.

Contract of employment for a specified task

[8] The consideration of Ms Dale’s appeal must start with determining the meaning of the expression “contract of employment … for a specified task” in s.386(2)(a). The ordinary meaning of the word “task” is, as stated in the Decision 6, a piece of work to be performed or undertaken. That was the meaning assigned to the term in the decision of a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) in Qantas Airways Limited v Fetz7. It must be the task of the employee, not the employer, as was pointed out by Wilcox CJ in Drury v BHP Refractories Pty Ltd8 in relation to the same expression then appearing in reg.30B(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Regulations:

“The words "for a specified task" qualify the words "contract of employment". The contract of employment must be for a specified task; it must be a contract under which the employee is to carry out a specified task. The words "for a specified task" have nothing to do with the employer's task, or project. This seems clear as a matter of grammar and it makes sense in policy terms. One can understand a view that the protections provided by Division 3 of Part V1A should not be available to people who undertake only a specified task. Especially after the task is completed, it would be anomalous to restrict the employer's right to terminate the contract of employment. Bearing in mind that many projects undertaken by employers continue for many years, while employees come and go, it would be equally anomalous to exclude relief under Part V1A simply because the employee was engaged in connection with a particular project.”

[9] The task must be “specified” - that is, identified in definite terms. In a written contract of employment, it could usually be expected that the task would be identified in express words, although it is not impossible to conceive of a case whereby the task might be specified as a matter of necessary implication. Further, the relevant contract of employment must be “for” the specified task, meaning that it has been entered into for the purpose of the performance and completion of that task.

[10] A critical element in this part of the exception in s.386(2)(a) is, we consider, that the task be sufficiently definite in its nature and delineation such that identification of when the task is completed is not a matter of doubt or speculation or contingency but is clear and predictable. We draw that inference from the fact that s.386(2)(a) requires the termination of employment to occur at the end of the completion of the task, thus requiring it to be identifiable with certainty. The context supports that inference in that the other exceptions contained in s.386(2)(a) - a contract for a specified period terminating at the end of that period, or for the duration of a specified season terminating at the end of the season - likewise involve the termination of employment occurring at an identifiable time or upon an identifiable event.

[11] In the Decision the Deputy President said “For the purpose of the phrase ‘specified task’ the term ‘task’ has been treated as being synonymous with the terms role, job or project that an employee is employed specifically to perform as distinct from the employer’s undertaking”. 9 We do not accept that “task” in s.386(2)(a) necessarily means the same thing as a role, job or project which the employee is engaged to perform. A “role”, as a matter of the ordinary meaning of the term, usually involves a collection of work duties and functions required to be performed on an ongoing basis for an indefinite period of time. It does not usually involve the completion of a discrete piece of work. A “job”, if the word is used in the narrow sense of “a piece of work; an individual piece of work done in the routine of one's occupation or trade”10, would equate to a task, but not if it is used in its wider sense as “a post of employment”. A project, if it is a project to be undertaken and completed by the employee, may equate to a “task” but not if the project is the broader employer’s project upon which the employee works, for the reasons explained in Drury. In Qantas Airways Limited v Fetz the Full Bench referred to a “task” as normally applying to an “identifiable project or job” able to be described with sufficient particularity. In doing so, we consider that “project” and “job” are to be understood in the narrower senses we have identified.

[12] The Deputy President cited three authorities to support the approach taken by her to the interpretation of “specified task” in the Decision. Two of these authorities are, we consider, entirely consistent with the approach we prefer. In the first, Hewitt v ACTek Custom Engineering Pty Ltd 11, a decision of the AIRC, an employee engaged to personally develop a piece of software for cash registers for an employer with no software expertise was held to have been employed under a contract of employment for a specified task. In that decision the AIRC (Lacy SDP) articulated the meaning of “specified task” in a manner with which we agree as follows (footnotes omitted):

“[22] The phrase "a specified task", as it relates to reg 30B(1)(b), has been defined narrowly in the relevant authorities. In Qantas Airways Limited v Fetz, the Full Bench of this Commission stated that the phrase "a specified task" would "normally apply to an identifiable project or job." The Full Bench cited three dictionary definitions which define "task" as being, "[1] a piece of work imposed on or undertaken by a person ... [2] A definite piece of work assigned or falling to a person; a duty ... [3] any piece of work."

[23] Another definition which may provide assistance in understanding the meaning of the phrase "a specified task" can be found in The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Employment and Industrial Relations. In it, the word "task", relevantly, is defined as being, "an element or group of elements of work by which a specific result is achieved."

[24] I agree that the phrase "a specified task" should be interpreted narrowly so as to cover only situations where an employee has been engaged under a contract to perform a project or job which is distinct or identifiable in its own right. The task to which the original employment contract relates should be self-contained and not leave open the possibility of the employee performing any work outside the realm of the specific task for which the employee is being employed. That is not to say that an employee engaged under a contract for a specified task could not agree, during the performance of the contract, to undertake some other work for the employer that was peripheral to the original contract. In those circumstances, a question might arise as to whether there has been a variation of the terms of the original contract.”

[13] In the second decision (chronologically speaking), Henderson v John Holland Pty Ltd 12, an employee engaged to undertake the concrete finishing work on a specific construction project was held to have been employed under a contract of employment for a specific task. In that case it is reasonably apparent that there was a discrete piece of work on a project which the relevant employee had to complete.

[14] The third decision, Derar v Recruitco Pty Ltd 13, is problematic. That case involved a casual employee of a labour hire company who was assigned to work for a particular client (a retail grocery distributor) and did so, on a regular and systematic basis, for a period of over six years. The employee claimed his employment with the labour hire company terminated when the client informed the labour hire company his assignment was terminated. This occurred after some absences from work by the employee, alleged to be unauthorised, due to the birth of his child. The following conclusion was stated in that decision:

“[39] I have concluded that in this case, where the employment offer is clearly restricted to an engagement by a host organisation, that must define the specific duration of that particular employment arrangement. Accordingly, Mr Derar was engaged for a specified task. That task concluded when IGA terminated the assignment. It follows then that Mr Derar was not dismissed for the purposes of s.386 and accordingly, is not able to pursue this application. Had Mr Derar been dismissed by Recruitco whilst his assignment to IGA continued, a different conclusion relative to s.386 would have resulted. In this instance however, it was the termination of the assignment with IGA which ended the employment with Recruitco.”

[15] We cannot, with respect, accept that an employment contract to perform work of an ongoing and generic nature for a third party client until that client no longer requires the person to perform the work constitutes an employment contract for a specified task. There was no identifiable or distinct piece of work that was required to be performed or any specific result required to be achieved. The facts did not suggest that the employee had completed any particular piece of work or even that the work performed by the employee was no longer required to be performed when the assignment was terminated, but only that the client did not want him to perform it anymore. We do not consider that the employment “task” of an employee can be defined simply by reference to the currency of a commercial labour hire arrangement between the employer and a client without doing violence to the ordinary meaning of the word. Nor do we consider that a task is something which can be regarded as completed for the purpose of s.386(2)(a) when a third party client decides it does not want the employee of the employer to perform the relevant work anymore. A “task”, properly understood, is one which is completed when the employee finishes the work involved in it.

Was Ms Dale employed under a contract of employment for a specified task?

[16] With these observations in mind, it is necessary to analyse the provisions of Ms Dale’s contract of employment with Hatch. The contract was in writing and was entered into on 27 August 2012. It was contained in a document entitled “Kirsten Dale - Contract of Employment: Project Specific - Fixed Term Full Time” (Contract). It contained the following relevant provisions:

[17] Ms Dale was also provided with a letter dated 28 August 2012 which was headed “Re Grosvenor Project - Brisbane Assignment” (Assignment Letter). The Assignment Letter included the following statements:

“We are pleased to confirm your assignment to the Grosvenor Project. The conditions of your assignment are detailed below. These conditions are specific to your Grosvenor Project – Brisbane and Moranbah assignment and are not part of your standard conditions of employment with Hatch. These conditions may be subject to change due to project operational requirements.

BRISBANE ASSIGNMENT

Work Location: 152 Wharf St, Brisbane

Commencement Date: 3 September 2012

Completion Date: The assignment to the Brisbane office will conclude upon your mobilisation to the Moranbah site.

MORANBAH ASSIGNMENT

Work Location: Grosvenor Site, Moranbah

Commencement Date: To be confirmed

Completion Date: This assignment and the project specific conditions contained herein will automatically terminate upon your demobilisation from the Grosvenor Project.

Hatch will notify you as soon as possible of its reasonable satisfaction that your position on the Grosvenor Project has been completed.
…”

[18] There is nothing in the provisions of the Contract which either specifies a task to be performed or provides that the Contract is coterminous with any such task. Clause 4 of the Contract specified that employment is on a “fixed term basis”, but no fixed period of time is specified anywhere in the Contract and Hatch did not contend that it was a “contract of employment for a specified period of time” for the purpose of s.386(2)(a). Clause 7 referred to the Contract, and the employment, terminating on Ms Dale’s “demobilisation” from the Grosvenor Project, but it is not apparent that this was referrable to the completion of any particular task or piece of work. The same can be said in relation to the reference in clause 7 to Ms Dale being notified of the completion of her position: for the reasons already stated, a “position” is not the same thing as a task. Read in its commercial context, we consider that the Contract is to be read as providing that the purpose of the employment was for Ms Dale to undertake an administrative role on the Grosvenor Project, and that this was to terminate when AAMC decided that it did not require Hatch to provide Ms Dale’s services any further.

[19] There was some debate between the parties about the contractual effect, if any, of the Assignment Letter, and whether it operated to alter the effect of the Contract. We do not think anything turns on this because the nature and purpose of the employment in both the Contract and the Assignment Letter are expressed in consistent terms.

[20] The circumstances in which the employment actually terminated confirm our understanding of the Contract and the employment. The evidence disclosed that as the construction phase of the Grosvenor Project began to wind down, AAMC decided it was no longer necessary to maintain the discrete position of Site & Facilities Administration Lead in its structure, and accordingly that it was no longer necessary for Hatch to supply the services of Ms Dale to fill that position. The facts in this respect were described by the Deputy President in the Decision as follows:

“[84] Hatch contends that Ms Dale’s employment ended in accordance with the terms of her contract of employment when the role she had been employed to perform on the Grosvenor Project was no longer required by its client for that Project - AAMC. In support of this proposition, Hatch tendered organisational charts for the Project demonstrating that the role was no longer being performed by Hatch. There was also evidence that there had been a restructuring on the Project so that roles which had been performed by Hatch were either no longer required or had been taken on by AAMC. Further, there was evidence that such processes are a feature of Hatch’s undertaking of providing engineering, procurement and management services for projects such as the Grosvenor Project.

[85] Ms Dale accepted that during the period of her employment there had been a gradual decrease in Hatch employees and a corresponding increase in AAMC employees and that when Hatch employees were demobilised they were replaced with AAMC employees. Ms Dale also accepted that this is what happened with respect to her role. Further, Ms Dale accepted that her contract of employment would terminate upon her demobilisation from the site and that she understood what demobilisation meant.”

[21] There is no issue that the Deputy President correctly described the facts. However the above passage confirms that Ms Dale’s employment did not end because she had completed any particular task. Although the volume of the duties she performed had diminished, the work which she had been required to perform continued and was performed by AAMC employees. The cause of her termination was the decision by AAMC to restructure its workforce with the result that the role filled by Ms Dale was abolished. For the reasons we have already stated, a “role” as ordinarily understood is not a task, and the abolition of a role does not constitute completion of a task. We do not consider therefore that Ms Dale was employed under a contract of employment for a specified task or that her employment terminated on completion of any specified task.

[22] There is one other aspect of the Contract which requires comment. Clause 27 of the Contract provided, among other things, that Ms Dale’s employment could be terminated by Hatch without cause on one week’s notice during the probation or minimum employment period and on four weeks’ notice thereafter. In relation to employment contracts for a specified time, it was held in Andersen v Umbakumba Community Council 14 (in the context of the termination of employment provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1988) that an employment contract will not be one for a specified period of time if it gives either party an unqualified right to terminate the contract on notice or with payment in lieu of notice within any specified term.15 The basis for this proposition is that a specified period of time is a period of employment that has certainty as to its commencement and time of completion, and where a contract provides a broad or unconditional right of termination during its term, the period of the contract is indeterminate and thus not for a specific period of time.16

[23] We would be inclined to the view that, by parity of reasoning, this proposition would apply to the exception for contracts of employment for a specified task. Employment for a specified task would equally suggest certainty that the period of employment began and ended with the commencement and completion of the task, and that a broad or unconditional right of termination is inconsistent with that certainty. If so, the existence of such a right in clause 27 would provide further support for our conclusion that Ms Dale’s contract of employment was not for a specified task. However we note the following comment made by Hatcher VP in Jin v Sydney Trains 17 as follows (emphasis added):

“[29] Arguably the applicability of Andersen to the proper interpretation of s.386(2)(a) has been called into question as a result of paragraph [1532] of the Explanatory Memorandum for the Fair Work Bill 2009 which said (emphasis added):

[1532] Paragraph 386(2)(a) reflects the common law position that termination in these circumstances would not be a dismissal. The fact that an employment contract may allow for earlier termination would not alter the application of this provision as the employment has terminated at the end of the period, task or season. However, if a person engaged on this sort of contract is terminated prior to the end time specified in the contract, they may seek an unfair dismissal remedy if they satisfy the other requirements.”

[24] We were not addressed in relation to this issue, and it is not necessary for us to express a final view about it in order to determine this appeal. Accordingly it can be left for another day.

[25] We conclude therefore that the “specified task” exception in s.386(2)(a) was not applicable, and that the Decision was in error to the extent that the contrary conclusion was reached. As earlier stated, it was not in dispute that the termination of employment otherwise fell within the general definition of “dismissed” in s.386(1)(a). We note, having regard to the terms of the Contract, that there might have been available an argument that the Contract, and the employment, terminated not at the initiative of Hatch but according to its terms upon Hatch being notified by AAMC that Ms Dale’s position was no longer required. However, that was not argued before us, and we propose to proceed on the basis that Ms Dale was dismissed by Hatch. It is therefore now necessary for there to be a determination as to whether Ms Dale’s dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable (there being no other jurisdictional objection raised by Hatch).

Was Ms Dale’s dismissal unfair?

[26] In the hearing before the Deputy President, Ms Dale ran her case substantially on the basis that the real reason for her dismissal was not the abolition of her position but rather that she had made a complaint about certain conduct by the AAMC Site Manager at the Grosvenor Project. In the course of her consideration of Hatch’s jurisdictional objection to Ms Dale’s unfair dismissal remedy application, the Deputy President rejected this contention:

“[86] In light of Ms Dale’s complaint about the AAMC Site Manager and her assertion that this was the reason for her dismissal, I have considered the sequence of events and the evidence about the complaint in some detail to determine whether this was in fact the case. On the basis of the evidence before me, I consider that the complaint made by Ms Dale about the AAMC Site Manager, was appropriately dealt with by Hatch. In this regard, I note that notwithstanding Ms Dale’s stated desire to Hatch HR representatives that she did not wish to formalise the complaint and the advice that she received to the effect that Hatch would support her should she wish to do so, Ms Dale made a formal complaint to management of AAMC.

[87] There is no evidence upon which I could be reasonably satisfied that AAMC determined to require Hatch to terminate Ms Dale’s employment for any other reason than that the role for which she had been employed was no longer required to be filled by a Hatch employee. The role was removed from the Project organisational chart along with other roles which had also been filled by Hatch employees…”

[27] The other aspect of Ms Dale’s case at first instance was that there were other roles she could have filled, and therefore that her dismissal was not required by the abolition of her existing position. The Deputy President also rejected this contention in the course of her consideration of the jurisdictional objection in the following terms:

“[89] Once the dismissal was excluded, the question of whether some alternative position should have been offered to Ms Dale could not arise and her dismissal could not be found to be unfair on that basis. In any event the roles Ms Dale asserts she could have performed were filled by other employees, one of whom was employed by a labour hire contractor to AAMC and not by Hatch. That Hatch did not place Ms Dale into one of those roles does not alter the fact that Ms Dale is excluded from making an unfair dismissal application.”

[28] Importantly, at the hearing of the appeal counsel for Ms Dale submitted that, for the purpose of the determination of her unfair dismissal remedy application, he did not challenge the above findings, and was content to have the application determined on the basis of those findings. His submission was that, should his appeal succeed, this Full Bench should determine Ms Dale’s application on the material before it rather than remit the matter to a single member for a re-hearing. Hatch did not oppose this course being taken.

[29] Accordingly we will determine Ms Dale’s unfair dismissal remedy application ourselves on the basis of the evidence as it currently stands and the findings of the Deputy President to which we have referred.

[30] Section 387 of the FW Act requires the Commission, in considering whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, to take into account a number of matters specified in paragraphs (a) to (h) of the section. We will deal with each of these matters in relation to Ms Dale’s application in turn below.

Paragraph 387(a)

[31] Ms Dale was not dismissed for a reason relating to her capacity or conduct, so the question as to whether any such reason was a valid one does not arise.

Paragraph 387(b)

[32] Ms Dale was not dismissed for a reason relating to her capacity or conduct, so no issue arises as to the notification of such a reason.

Paragraph 387(c)

[33] Ms Dale was not dismissed for a reason relating to her capacity or conduct, so the issue of whether she was given an opportunity to respond to any such reason does not arise.

Paragraph 387(d)

[34] There was no evidence that suggested that Hatch denied Ms Dale the assistance of a support person at any discussion which may have occurred concerning her dismissal.

Paragraph 387(e)

[35] The dismissal was not related to any unsatisfactory performance on the part of Ms Dale, so no issue arises as to whether she had previously been warned about unsatisfactory performance.

Paragraphs 387(f) and (g)

[36] Hatch is a large employer with a dedicated human resources team, and accordingly there was no adverse impact on its capacity to follow appropriate procedures in effecting the dismissal.

Paragraph 387(h)

[37] We consider that the following matters are relevant and weigh against the proposition that Ms Dale’s dismissal was unfair:

(1) Ms Dale was employed, and understood that she was employed, on the basis that her employment with Hatch would come to an end when AAMC decided that it no longer required Hatch to provide her services.

(2) This eventuality came to pass when AAMC, in the context of the winding down in the construction phase of the Grosvenor Project, decided to abolish the position filled by Ms Dale as part of a broader restructuring which involved a number of roles being removed.

(3) The decision to abolish Ms Dale’s role was not in Hatch’s control, and the termination of her employment as a result of this accorded with the expectations of both parties.

(4) Hatch did not have another role to which it was able to transfer Ms Dale.

(5) Hatch paid Ms Dale two weeks’ salary upon the termination of her employment.

(6) Ms Dale was able to find alternative employment approximately six weeks after her dismissal, so that the financial consequences of the dismissal were not significant.

[38] The only contention advanced before us as to why the dismissal was unfair was that Ms Dale was not afforded her entitlements under “the Act and the Award”, and that she should be compensated for this. It appears that this is a reference to notice payments and redundancy pay benefits. The requirement for a payment in lieu of notice (since the dismissal had immediate effect) would appear to have been satisfied by the payment of two weeks’ salary (see s.117 of the FW Act). Ms Dale was not dismissed on the basis of redundancy, which explains why Hatch did not pay her any redundancy pay benefits under s.119 of the FW Act or under any applicable modern award, if any. We do not propose to express a view as to whether the circumstances of Ms Dale’s dismissal gave rise to any entitlement to redundancy pay benefits because we do not consider that the unfair dismissal provisions of the FW Act are properly to be used as a substitute mechanism for the recovery of monetary entitlements under the FW Act or a modern award. If Ms Dale believes she has an entitlement to redundancy pay, then she should make an appropriate application to a relevant court for the recovery of this entitlement. We do not regard this as a matter relevant to whether Ms Dale’s dismissal was unfair in circumstances where her dismissal is not now alleged to be unfair on any other basis.

Conclusion

[39] Having regard to the above matters, we are not satisfied that Ms Dale’s dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. There is therefore no reason to disturb the Deputy President’s Order dismissing Ms Dale’s unfair dismissal remedy application.

Orders

[40] Having regard to the above conclusions, we make the following orders (in addition to the order we have already made granting permission to appeal):

(1) The appeal is upheld.

(2) The Order (dismissing Ms Dale’s unfair dismissal remedy application) is confirmed.

[41] Finally we note that Ms Dale was represented in this appeal by Mr Shepley of counsel pro bono. We express our gratitude to him for appearing and providing us with appropriate assistance on this basis.

VICE PRESIDENT

Appearances:

J. Shepley of counsel for Kirsten Dale.

L. Copley of counsel for Hatch Pty Ltd.

Hearing details:

2015.

Brisbane:

22 December.

 1   [2015] FWC 4970

 2   PR572764

 3   Decision at [76]

 4   Decision at [80]-[81]

 5   Decision at [83]-[87]

 6   Decision at [76]

 7   (1998) 84 IR 52 at 66

 8   [1995] IRCA 293

 9   Decision at [76]

 10   Macquarie Online Dictionary

 11   PR904665, [2001] AIRC 500

 12   PR917230, [2002] AIRC 475

 13   [2013] FWC 9791

 14   (1994) 126 ALR 121

 15   (1994) 126 ALR 121 at 125-6; see also Cooper v Darwin Rugby League Inc. (1994) 57 IR 238 and Ledington v University of Sunshine Coast (2003) 127 IR 152

 16   Ledington at [34]

 17   [2015] FWC 4248

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