[2017] FWC 4862 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2017/6100) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 20 December 2017 [[2017] FWCFB 6604] for result of appeal.]
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.394—Unfair dismissal

Amanda Olesen
v
Needlework Tours Pty Ltd
(U2017/3524)

COMMISSIONER RYAN

MELBOURNE, 17 OCTOBER 2017

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy.

[1] On 31 March 2017 Ms Olesen filed in the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) an application pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) seeking a remedy in relation to the termination of her employment on 10 March 2017 from Needlework Tours Pty Ltd (the Respondent).

[2] In its Form F3 – Employer Response to Unfair Dismissal Application, the Respondent identified a jurisdictional objection. It argued that the Applicant had not been dismissed, that she had initiated her own termination.

[3] The Respondent’s Mr Laughlin accessed pro bono legal advice facilitated by the Fair Work Commission and as a result of that advice, the Respondent advised the Commission that it withdrew its jurisdictional objection.

[4] On 19 July 2017 this matter was programmed for arbitration and directions were issued for the Applicant to file material in support of the application by 7 August 2017 and the Respondent to file material in opposition by 28 August 2017. Both parties complied with the directions issued. The hearing of the matter took place on 13 September 2017 and the Applicant was self-represented and the Respondent was represented by its effective owner Mr Simon Laughlin. Ms Olesen was dismissed by text message on Friday 10 March 2017 at 8.09pm when Mr Laughlin sent the following text message to her: “Amanda Your services are no longer required. Regards Simon Laughlin”.

[5] Section 396 of the Act requires that before the Commission is entitled to consider the merits of an unfair dismissal application the Commission must decide 4 specific matters.

“396 Initial matters to be considered before merits

The FWC must decide the following matters relating to an application for an order under Division 4 before considering the merits of the application:

(a) whether the application was made within the period required in subsection 394(2);

(b) whether the person was protected from unfair dismissal;

(c) whether the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code;

(d) whether the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy.”

[6] The Commission considered and decided three of these matters at the conclusion of the hearing, namely the matters raised by paragraphs 396(a), (b) and (d). 1

[7] The Commission is satisfied and so decides that the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code. Relevantly s.388 provides as follows:

“388 The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code

(1) The Minister may, by legislative instrument, declare a Small Business Fair Dismissal Code.

(2) A person’s dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code if:

(a) immediately before the time of the dismissal or at the time the person was given notice of the dismissal (whichever happened first), the person’s employer was a small business employer; and

(b) the employer complied with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code in relation to the dismissal.”

[8] The terms of the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code that are relevant to the present matter are:

“Summary Dismissal

It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee’s conduct is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal.

Serious misconduct includes theft, fraud, violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. For a dismissal to be deemed fair, it is sufficient, though not essential, than an allegation of theft, fraud or violence be reported to the police. Of course, the employer must have reasonable grounds for making the report.

Other Dismissal

In other cases, the small business employer must give the employee a reason why he or she is at risk of being dismissed. The reason must be a valid reason based on the employee’s conduct or capacity to do the job.

The employee must be warned either verbally, or preferably in writing, that he or she risks being dismissed if there is no improvement.

The small business employer must provide the employee with an opportunity to respond to the warning and give the employee a reasonable chance to rectify the problem having regard to the employee’s response.

Rectifying the problem might involve the employer providing additional training and ensuring the employee knows the employer’s job expectations.

Procedural Matters

In discussions with an employee in circumstances where dismissal is possible, the employee can have another person present to assist. However, the other person cannot be a lawyer acting in a professional capacity.

A small business employer may be required to provide evidence of compliance with the Code if the employee makes a claim for unfair dismissal to Fair Work Australia. Evidence may include a completed check list, copies of written warning(s), a statement of termination or signed witness statements.”

[9] In the present matter the dismissal was not consistent with that part of the Code which relates to “Other Dismissal” as the evidence in this matter makes very clear that Mr Laughlin never put to Ms Olesen any reason relating to her conduct or capacity as to why she was at risk of being dismissed.

[10] Throughout the material and evidence relied on by Mr Laughlin he constantly alleges that Ms Olesen was engaging in fraud. There is simply no substance to that allegation and the specific reason given for the dismissal was not for serious misconduct. In his Form F3 Mr Laughlin describes the dismissal as follows:

“The website was ready on March 9th, however AO reported in sick and then again on the 10th. As the following Monday (13th ) was a public holiday, it meant that she would not be returning until the 14th. Due to her inability to attend work and officially resign in line with her intentions expressed in the meeting of January 5th, I texted her with the message “that her services were no longer required”, thereby releasing her of her obligations to Needlework Tours and allowing her to pursue her new business as per her intentions. AO responded by saying “thankyou”.

[11] It is absolutely clear that the dismissal was not a summary dismissal for serious misconduct and therefore the dismissal was not consistent with that part of the Code which relates to “Summary Dismissal”.

[12] Having decided the initial matters to be considered before considering the merits of the application I now set out the relevant legislative provisions relating to merit considerations.

387 Criteria for considering harshness etc.

In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:

(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and

(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and

(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and

(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and

(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and

(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.”

Was there a valid reason for the dismissal?

[13] What constitutes a valid reason for dismissal has been considered on many occasions. The leading authority remains the decision of Northrop J in Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics P/L2 Whilst that decision related to the predecessor legislation to the Fair Work Act this decision remains the key authority on the meaning of “valid reason”. In that matter Northrop J said:

“Subsection (387(a)) refers to "a valid reason, or valid reasons", but the Act does not give a meaning to those phrases or the adjective "valid". A reference to dictionaries shows that the word "valid" has a number of different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the relevant meaning given is "2 Of an argument, assertion, objection, etc; well founded and applicable, sound, defensible: Effective, having some force, pertinency, or value." In the Macquarie Dictionary the relevant meaning is "sound, just, or well founded; a valid reason."

In its context in subsection (387(a)) the adjective "valid" should be given the meaning of sound, defensible or well founded. A reason which is capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced could never be a valid reason for the purposes of subsection (387(a)).”

[14] Much of the case advanced by Mr Laughlin was that there was a valid reason for the dismissal of Ms Olesen because she was running her own business whist she was supposed to be working for Mr Laughlin and that she never disclosed this to Mr Laughlin. The allegations made by Mr Laughlin against Ms Olesen were the subject of extensive examination during the hearing and much of the evidentiary case of both Mr Laughlin and Ms Olesen was directed respectively at proving or disproving the allegation.

[15] The essence of the allegation made by Mr Laughlin against Ms Olesen was that in January 2017 Ms Olesen had informed Mr Laughlin that she intended to start a new business. In February 2017 Mr Laughlin’s evidence was that he found out through other people that Ms Olesen had started a new business and that her business website was live as at 4 February 2017. Mr Laughlin’s evidence was that at that time Ms Olesen did not advise him that she was now operating her new business. Mr Laughlin’s evidence was that he noticed that Ms Olesen’s work habits changed and that she was continually going outside to have private calls.

[16] Ms Olesen gave detailed evidence about her intention to start a new business and that she had as a preliminary matter registered a name and acquired a web address. However Ms Olesen’s evidence was clear and strong that at no time whilst she was working for Mr Laughlin was she operating her own business. During the hearing of this matter Ms Olesen gave evidence that she only commenced to devote most of her energy into the new business as from 28 June 2017, some 3 months after the dismissal took effect.

[17] In the contest between the evidence of Ms Olesen and Mr Laughlin I prefer the evidence of Ms Olesen over that of Mr Laughlin. There is much information in the LinkedIn page for Mr Olesen which paints a picture of Ms Olesen which is not accurate. Additionally there is information on the Facebook page of Ms Olesen which is not accurate. I accept the evidence of Ms Olesen that as part of marketing herself both on Facebook and on LinkedIn that she was trying “to make my business look like it has been around longer than it has” and that she “might be stretching the truth a bit” about herself and her business.

[18] The following exchange between Ms Olesen and Mr Laughlin is relevant.

“MR LAUGHLIN:  I want to draw your attention to a more recent LinkedIn page of yours, Amanda.  This is take on 22 August, this is in my submission too, Commissioner.  It refers to the business which you've started which is called Lifestyle Angels and it clearly says that you're the personal concierge and lifestyle manager.  I want to draw your attention to - because we've heard all about how you hadn't started a business and had no intention - we'll go into that in some more detail, but here it is stated on your LinkedIn page, that you started the business - or sorry, you were actively involved in the business in December?---MS OLESEN: That was the date I registered the business.

MR LAUGHLIN:  Well, no, it doesn't say that, it gives a clear impression to the reader that you are a personal concierge and lifestyle manager in December 2016.  You've just told us how you hadn't started a business - anybody reading that, Amanda, would say, Amanda Olesen had a business, is currently in a business that started in 2016 and she has been a personal concierge and lifestyle manager.  We've just heard a whole lot of stuff from you about how you didn't start a business.

THE COMMISSIONER:  Why does it say under experience personal concierge and lifestyle manager, Lifestyle Angels December 2016 - present (nine months) Melbourne, Australia?--- MS OLESEN: At the open brackets, I didn't put dates in there.  I didn't put those in there.  That's a LinkedIn automatic thing.  Same as with the months that were calculated previous months.

Even if that part is sort of automatic information that is just dropped in because of the software system, there has to be a start and finish date and you've got a start date December 2016 and you've got a finish date which is present.  Are they things that you control?--- MS OLESEN: Yes, the date that I put in there, and I put down the registration date.  I wasn't actually running the business, but the business was registered and when I did decide to start running the business, other than saying that I had just started, I had actually had experience doing what I'm doing, previously but I've put in the date that the business was registered, basically I suppose to make my business look like it has been around longer than it has.  But it was registered.

MR LAUGHLIN:  I put it to you, is it a snow job of prospective employers or people who might contract with you?--- MS OLESEN: Yes, but not a complete snow job because the role that I was doing, even though I wasn't doing that business but under that consulting business that I was doing, I've basically been doing these sorts of jobs since 2002.  I might be stretching the truth a bit, but I'm - - -

THE COMMISSIONER:  Gilding the lily?--- MS OLESEN: Yes, but I'm not.

THE COMMISSIONER:  You'd make a fortune, you've gilded the lily so much.  Continue.

MR LAUGHLIN:  Commissioner, I think gilding a lily is a little bit kind.  I would suggest again it's fraudulent because you are deliberately misleading people in terms of employing you for financial gain.  That's fraud, it's simple as that, Amanda.  Your dates are wrong, you're claiming that your titles are wrong and when your business has started.  You are clearly misleading people into employing you or taking you on face value of what your employment record is.  That is fraud, okay.

THE COMMISSIONER:  Do you agree with that proposition?--- MS OLESEN: No.” 3

[19] Not only does Mr Laughlin consider that Ms Olesen is committing a fraud on prospective employers or clients but Mr Laughlin also characterises Ms Olesen’s conduct towards himself and the Respondent as fraudulent.

[20] The conclusions drawn by Mr Laughlin concerning Ms Olesen registering a business and website and putting certain information in her LinkedIn page are unwarranted. There is nothing in the evidence of Mr Laughlin or of Ms Olesen which would support the allegation that Ms Olesen was operating her own business whilst working for Mr Laughlin and that she was not working as directed by Mr Laughlin. This is very much the case where the reason for dismissal, insofar as it relates to Ms Olesen’s conduct is both capricious and fanciful. The reason lacks a logical or evidentiary basis. To the extent that Mr Laughlin has used the reason of redundancy as a reason for dismissal that reason must be considered to be nothing more than an attempt to try and hide the real reason, namely the alleged misconduct of Ms Olesen. Whilst Mr Laughlin’s evidence is that he was clearly outraged by Ms Olesen’s alleged misconduct he made it very clear that he had no intention of acting on that misconduct whilst the database/website project was being completed. The following question and answer is relevant:

[21] Having regard to all of the evidence in this matter there is no reason advanced by Mr Laughlin which could or would or did constitute a valid reason for dismissal relating to the conduct or capacity of M Olesen.

Was Ms Olesen notified of the reason for dismissal before the dismissal?

[22] The requirement to notify an employee of the reason for dismissal was best described by the Full Bench in Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd5 Whilst that decision related to predecessor legislation to the fair Work Act it remains good authority in relation to s.387(b).The Full Bench said:

“As a matter of logic procedural fairness would require that an employee be notified of a valid reason for their termination before any decision is taken to terminate their employment in order to provide them with an opportunity to respond to the reason identified. Section (s.387(b) and (c)) would have very little (if any) practical effect if it was sufficient to notify employees and give them an opportunity to respond after a decision had been taken to terminate their employment. Much like shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted.”

[23] In the present matter the reason for the dismissal was notified to Ms Olesen after she had been informed by text message that she had been dismissed.

Was Mr Olesen given an opportunity to respond to the reason for dismissal?

[24] The evidence in this matter makes very clear that Ms Olesen was not given an opportunity to respond to any reason for dismissal whether it was in relation to a redundancy decision or whether it was in relation to the alleged conduct engaged in by Ms Olesen.

The dismissal process

[25] I have taken into account that Mr Laughlin is effectively the manager of the Respondent’s business and that apart from his wife and Ms Olesen there were no other regular employees of the business at the time of the dismissal. The Respondent clearly has no internal HR or IR expertise and there is nothing to suggest that Mr Laughlin sought any external advice before embarking on the process to dismiss Ms Olesen. The provisions of paragraphs 387(f) and (g) reflect a clear intention of Parliament that the Commission must take into account the reality that small businesses usually won’t have the HR/IR resources available to larger employers and that small businesses will not necessarily operate with the same level of sophistication as larger employers when considering and implementing a dismissal of an employee. Quite clearly the Commission must give regard to “the degree” to which small size and lack of internal HR/IR expertise impacts on the dismissal process. However, having regard to “the degree” to which small size and lack of internal HR/IR expertise impacts on the dismissal process does not mean that the Commission should excuse inexcusable conduct of an employer. I agree with the observation of Grainger C in Sykes v Heatley P/L6 in relation to the predecessor provisions to s.387(f) and (g):

“No employer should ever consider that the provisions of (s.387(f)) could be used as a shield behind which to hide when they had engaged in conduct which is improper, belligerent and bullying. Commonsense courtesies of conduct ought to exist in any workplace, whatever the size of the employer's undertaking, establishment or service, and the respondent in this case has clearly not complied with those courtesies.”

and

“Once again as I have said in relation to (s.387(f)), no employer should ever consider that the provisions of (s.387(g)) could be used as a shield behind which to hide when they had engaged in conduct which is improper, belligerent and bullying. Whether a company employs dedicated human resource management specialists or not, any person who employs others to work for their undertaking, establishment or service should extend to those employees an appropriate degree of courtesy even when implementing something as difficult and unpleasant as the termination of a person's employment.”

[26] The most obvious courtesy which Mr Laughlin didn’t give, but should have given, Ms Olesen was to put his concerns to her and to give her an opportunity to offer an explanation in relation to the existence of Facebook pages and websites. The process adopted by Mr Laughlin was inexcusable.

Conclusion

[27] Having taken into account each of the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (g) of s.387 and being satisfied that there are no other relevant matters needing to be considered under s.387(h) the Commission decides that the dismissal of Ms Olesen from her employment with the Respondent was harsh and unjust and unreasonable. It was harsh because Ms Olesen had not engaged in the alleged misconduct. It was unjust because Ms Olesen was denied procedural fairness by Mr Laughlin and was given no opportunity to defend herself. It was unreasonable because it was the result of a significant exercise of prejudging an outcome without making any reasonable attempt to apply the principals of a fair go all round.

Remedy

[28] I now turn to the issue of remedy. The relevant legislative provisions are as follows:

390 When the FWC may order remedy for unfair dismissal

(1) Subject to subsection (3), the FWC may order a person’s reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to a person, if:

(a) the FWC is satisfied that the person was protected from unfair dismissal (see Division 2) at the time of being dismissed; and

(b) the person has been unfairly dismissed (see Division 3).

(2) The FWC may make the order only if the person has made an application under section 394.

(3) The FWC must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:

(a) the FWC is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and

(b) the FWC considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

Note: Division 5 deals with procedural matters such as applications for remedies.”

392 Remedy—compensation

Compensation

(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person’s employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.

Criteria for deciding amounts

(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:

(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer’s enterprise; and

(b) the length of the person’s service with the employer; and

(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and

(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and

(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and

(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and

(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.

Misconduct reduces amount

(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer’s decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.

Shock, distress etc. disregarded

(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person’s dismissal.

Compensation cap

(5) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not exceed the lesser of:

(a) the amount worked out under subsection (6); and

(b) half the amount of the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal.

(6) The amount is the total of the following amounts:

(a) the total amount of remuneration:

(i) received by the person; or

(ii) to which the person was entitled;

(whichever is higher) for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal; and

(b) if the employee was on leave without pay or without full pay while so employed during any part of that period—the amount of remuneration taken to have been received by the employee for the period of leave in accordance with the regulations.”

To avoid doubt, an order by the FWC under subsection 391(3) or 392(1) may permit the employer concerned to pay the amount required in instalments specified in the order.”

[29] In the present matter having regard to all of the circumstances of this matter the Commission is satisfied ha a remedy should be granted to Ms Olesen for her unfair dismissal.

[30] The Commission does not consider that reinstatement is an appropriate remedy. Whilst reinstatement is the primary remedy provided by the Act in the circumstances of the present matter reinstatement is a singularly inappropriate remedy. Given that Mr Laughlin would be Ms Olesen’s direct supervisor if reinstatement occurred the level of hostility that Mr Laughlin has against Ms Olesen would make any continuing employment relationship untenable. The Commission does consider that the remedy of compensation is appropriate as it will address the unfairness of the dismissal. The Commission, in calculating an amount of compensation must have regard to the criteria set out in s.392.

[31] The approach to calculating an amount of compensation is often referred to as the Sprigg formula, named after the case in which it was described. 7 The Sprigg formula has been refined by later Full Bench decisions.8

[32] The first step is to calculate the amount of remuneration which Ms Olesen would have received if she had not been dismissed. An amount is calculated by the Commission estimating how long Ms Olesen would have remained in employment if she had not been dismissed when she was and in this matter estimating the number of hours likely to be worked by Ms Olesen in that period.

[33] In the present matter it is clear that the job performed by Ms Olesen would have changed with the completion of the database/website project. However as Ms Olesen’s evidence suggests, there were a number of tasks that would have been undertaken by her if her employment had continued and which had not yet commenced whilst the database/website project was underway. Similarly the evidence of Mr Laughlin concedes that there would have been continuing work that Ms Olesen could have done if she had not been dismissed although Mr Laughlin puts it no more than about 12 hours per week. Mr Laughlin gave evidence that he has employed a new employee since Ms Olesen was dismissed and that that new employee was working about 15 hours per week. Some of the work of the new employee is work that according to Mr Laughlin’s evidence is work that Ms Olesen could not do. The Commission has had regard to this competing evidence in calculating the amount that Ms Olesen would have earned if she had not been dismissed. The Commission considers that it is appropriate to base any calculation on Ms Olesen working a minimum of 15 hours per week at her hourly rate of $30.00. If she had not been dismissed the Commission considers that Ms Olesen would have continued working for the Respondent for at least another 9 months. The evidence is clear that whilst Ms Olesen had registered a business she was not intending to operate that business at the time she was dismissed or at any time in the near term as related to the dismissal date. Post her dismissal Ms Olesen has commenced to operate her new business but she commenced to do so some 3 months after her dismissal. From her own evidence it is clear that Ms Olesen did not consider her employment with the Respondent to be full time employment. Mr Laughlin certainly did not consider it to be full time employment. If both the parties accepted that Ms Olesen was a part time employee then obviously she was entitled to seek other work outside her part time employment with the Respondent. Thus even if Ms Olesen’s hours of work were reduced to a minimum of 15 hours per week the evidence suggests that Ms Olesen would have continued working for the Respondent on that basis. The Commission is satisfied that its best guestimate for the amount of remuneration that Ms Olesen would have received if she had not been dismissed would be $17,550.00 (15 hours x $30 per hour x 39 weeks).

[34] The amount calculated above must be reduced by the amount of remuneration that Ms Olesen has earnt between the date of dismissal and the time when any compensation is ordered. Ms Olesen provided information at the conclusion of the hearing in relation to amounts that had been paid to her as part of the operation of her new business. The gross amounts paid to her between the beginning of June 2017 and 10 August 2017 totalled $3053.00. Ms Olesen did not provide any information about the costs incurred in earning that amount so the Commission is unaware of the net remuneration received by Ms Olesen in that period. The Commission is also unaware of the amount of income reasonably likely to be earned by Ms Olesen during the period between the making of an order for compensation and the actual compensation. The Commission must guess a figure. The Commission is prepared to assume that the total amount earnt or likely to be earnt by Ms Olesen between the date of dismissal and the date of compensation is $5,000.00. In calculating the amount of income that must be taken into account for the purpose of s.392 the Commission should not include all of the income that Ms Olesen has earnt or might have earnt between the date of dismissal and the date of compensation. This is so because as Ms Olesen was a part–time employee she would have been entitled to have earnt some portion of this income even if she had remained employed with Mr Laughlin. 9

[35] The appropriate amount of compensation to be awarded in this matter is $12,550.00.

[36] Nothing has been put to the Commission that an order for compensation in the amount of $12,550.00 would have any effect on the viability of the Respondent’s enterprise.

[37] The Commission is not satisfied that misconduct of Ms Olesen contributed to Mr Laughlin’s decision to dismiss Ms Olesen and therefore no reduction can or will be made to the amount of compensation pursuant to s.392(3).

[38] The amount of compensation does not include any component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt caused to Ms Olesen by the manner of her dismissal.

[39] The amount of compensation is below the compensation cap specified by s.392(5) and (6).

[40] An order to this effect will be issued separately. The order will require payment within 21 days.

The seal of the Fair Work Commission and the Member's signature

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Ms A Olesen on her own behalf

Mr S Laughlin for Needlework Tours Pty Ltd

Hearing details:

2017.

Melbourne:

September 13.

 1   Transcript of proceedings at PN654 – PN677.

 2   [1995] IRCA 333.

 3   Transcript at PN206 – PN214.

 4   Ibid at PN460 – PN464.

 5   Print S5897.

 6   PR914149.

 7   Sprigg v Paul’s Licensed Festival Supermarket (1998) 88 IR 21.

 8   See Ellawala v Australian Postal Corporation (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Williams SDP, Gay C, 17 April 2000) Print S5109 [24] and McCulloch v Calvary Health Care Adelaide [2015] FWCFB 873 at [27] – [30].

 9   See Bowden v Ottrey Homes Cobram and District Retirement Villages Inc. T/A Ottrey Lodge, [2013] FWCFB 431.

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