[2019] FWC 4618
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION



Fair Work Act 2009

s.773 - Application to deal with an unlawful termination dispute

Ms Shelley Brown
v
Husky Wood Fired Pizza Restaurant T/A Budged Pty Ltd Huskisson Au
(C2019/2111)


DEPUTY PRESIDENT CROSS

SYDNEY, 26 JULY 2019

Application to deal with an unlawful termination dispute.

[1] On 31 March, 2019, Ms Shelley Brown (“the Applicant”) lodged an application pursuant to s.773 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the Act”). The Applicant was employed, she claimed, by Husky Fired Pizza Restaurant T/A Budged Pty Ltd Huskisson Au (“the Respondent”). The commencement date of her employment with the Respondent is not known, however the Applicant submits that her employment was terminated by the Respondent on 27 November, 2018, with the termination taking effect somewhat later on 10 February, 2019.

[2] Applications for unlawful termination applications must be made within twenty-one (21) days after a dismissal took effect, or in such further time as the Fair Work Commission (“the Commission”) may allow.  Taking as the point of calculation the later date when the dismissal allegedly took effect, being 10 February, 2019, an application for a remedy should have been lodged by no later than 3 March, 2019. The application was therefore lodged outside of the time prescribed and was, in effect, lodged 28 days after the last day on which such an application could have been made.

[3] I note however, that it may very well be that the date for the proper calculation of the delay is the date the Applicant submits that her employment was terminated by the Respondent, being 27 November, 2018, resulting in the application being 103 days late. However, as the Respondent has not put in issue the date the termination took effect being 10 February, 2019, I will proceed to determine the matter using that date.

[4] On 3 May, 2019, I issued Directions from my Chambers to the parties to program the manner in which the Applicant’s application to be allowed an additional period within which to lodge her application (“the Application”) would be determined. The Directions provided for a timetable for the filing of Outlines of Submission from both parties addressing the out of time issue, together with any witness statements and other documentary material upon which each party intended to rely. Paragraph 4 of the Directions provided that the Application would be determined upon the materials filed.

[5] The Applicant failed to comply with the Directions of 3 May, 2019, and did not file her Outline of Submissions pursuant to Direction 1 within the timeframe. My Chambers thereafter made several attempts to contact the Applicant to follow up her Outline of Submissions. On 19 May, 2019, the Applicant advised my Chambers that she had been unwell and sought further clarification as to the requirements for compliance with my Directions. My Chambers specifically directed the Applicant to the five (5) factors that must be taken into account outlined in paragraphs (a) to (e) of s.366(2) of the Act, and also directed the Applicant to an online copy of the Commission’s Bench Book for further guidance. I then granted an extension of time for the filing of Submissions for the parties.

[6] Both the Applicant and the Respondent complied with the amended Directions for the filing of evidence. In particular:

[7] On 1 June, 2019, and beyond the amended Directions for the filing of evidence, the Applicant sent an e-mail to my Chambers that detailed allegations against the Respondent. This email was important as it contained the only real statement of the chronology and explanation for the delay, and was as follows:

[8] Based on the materials filed and provided, I have determined that the Applicant should not be granted a further period within which to lodge her application. These are the reasons for that decision.

[9] The matters that I am required to take into account in considering whether or not I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances are contained in s.774(2) of the Act:

[10] It is clear from the structure of s.774(2) of the Act that each of the matters needs to be taken into account in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances. The individual matters might not, viewed in isolation, be particularly significant, so it is necessary to consider the matters collectively, and to ask whether collectively the matters show exceptional circumstances.

[11] Briefly, exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon, but the circumstances themselves do not need to be unique or unprecedented, nor do they need to be very rare. I must be satisfied that, taking into account all the factors in s.774(2) of the Act that there are exceptional circumstances.

THE FACTS

[12] The facts leading up to the Applicant’s termination, if it did occur, are largely disputed. The Applicant lists several incidents which allegedly occurred leading up to her dismissal. These allegations are not corroborated or refuted by the Respondent. The Respondent maintains that it had supported the Applicant and her difficulties with her mental health throughout the course of her employment, until a certain incident arose where the Applicant had allegedly threatened to shoot the Manager, Ms Glasson. The email at [7] above supports the assertion that an incident occurred and police were called.

CONSIDERATION

(a) Reason for the delay

[13] The Applicant, in her Form F9, attributes the delay in lodging her Application with the Commission to her diminished mental health. In her Outline of Submissions, the Applicant attributes her “unstable mental health condition” directly to the “unfair treatment” she received from the Respondent and submits that that her mental health only “got worse” the longer she worked with the Respondent.

[14] Following her dismissal, the Applicant submitted that she “couldn’t function” and was “unable to shower myself hardly able to work i was on the brink of admitting myself into hospital because i just couldnt cope with life or anything really i was having thoughts of suicide constantly i felt worthless and that i was a failure they took everything i have worked so hard the last 10 years to become more attuned to my illness and keep myself well and turned my life into hell.”

[15] While the Applicant submitted in her Form F9 that she was not entirely back to normal, she was “well enough” to proceed with her Application at the time of lodgement.

[16] However, the Applicant, in her correspondence of 1 June, 2019, to my Chambers curiously, and probably inadvertently, provided a somewhat different reason for the delay. That is that she was prompted twice by a “Constable Burrell”, the second time while he was apparently attending her new workplace, to lodge an Application with the Commission. After the second prompt, the Applicant alleges that she “went home that night thinking he’s right they shouldn’t be able to get away with wat they have done to me so i did some reading decided to put my complaint through not really thinking it would go anywhere because it’s my word versus theirs…”.

[17] Regrettably, I do not find the Applicant’s reason to be acceptable to explain the whole of the delay. While it is clear that the Applicant was suffering from mental health issues at the time of her dismissal, that illness does not explain the totality of the delay. The Applicant does not submit that she lacked knowledge of the 21 day statutory requirement for which such an application is to be lodged, and it seems that the Applicant had never intended to lodge her Application until she was prompted, when she was apparently subsequently employed. I am not persuaded that the Applicant’s mental health issues were the sole reason for the late lodgement of her Application. As such, this consideration weighs against the Applicant.

(b) Action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal

[18] Neither the Applicant nor the Respondent made any submissions in respect of this consideration. As such, this consideration is neutral in my determination.

(c) Prejudice to the employer

[19] Neither the Applicant nor the Respondent made any submissions in respect of this consideration. As such, this consideration is neutral in my determination.

(d) Merits of the application

[20] Again, neither the Applicant nor the Respondent made any submissions in respect of the merits of the application. I am satisfied that based on the material, and again, accepting that the material has not been tested by way of cross-examination, the Application is without merit.

[21] The Applicant submits that she was dismissed due to a temporary absence from work because of illness or injury and discrimination based on a physical or mental disability. The Applicant believed that she was terminated when she had attempted to make contact with Ms Glasson via Facebook Messenger to inquire about her shifts.

[22] This is an unlawful termination dispute. In order for the Applicant to maintain such a claim, the Applicant must show that her employment was, in fact, terminated by the Respondent. Section 773 of the Act provides the following:

[23] Neither the Applicant nor the Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s employment was terminated. The Applicant, in her Form F9, submits that she “didn’t get officially fired.” This is a claim also maintained by the Respondent, who submits that it “did not try to dismiss Shelly as I tried to work with her and as I am not a qualified mental health expert I did not know if her behaviour was from her mental illness or not”. It was simply the belief of the Applicant that her employment was terminated when she attempted to make contact with Ms Glasson via Facebook Messenger to inquire about her shifts. I therefore cannot be satisfied that there was ever a termination of the Applicant’s employment by the Respondent.

[24] It is not apparent to me as to why the Applicant had assumed her employment was terminated simply because she was not able to contact Ms Glasson via Facebook Messenger, particularly as the Applicant concedes that she was never “friends” with Ms Glasson on Facebook in the first place. It is also not apparent as to why the Applicant, had she thought she had been dismissed, did not make further inquiries with the Respondent in person, by telephone or e-mail, or any other such means, to confirm whether she had indeed been dismissed.

[25] In these circumstances, it simply cannot be said that the Application is of merit if a termination had not occurred. There will be considerable difficulty for the Applicant to establish the elements of the contravention had she not been dismissed. For this reason, the merits of the Application weigh against the Applicant.

[26] A further factor that may weigh against the merits of the Application, but on which I have placed no weight due to the uncertainty of the evidence, is the nature of the Respondent. The Applicant names the Respondent as “Husky Wood Fired Pizza Restaurant T/A Budged Pty Ltd Huskisson Au”. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission database records a company named “Budged Pty Ltd” with an ACN of 145 020 471.

[27] The Respondent has not challenged its characterisation by the Applicant, but if it is incorporated, then s.723 of the Act would seem, on the case alleged, to preclude the Applicant proceeding by way of s.773. Section 723 limits s.773 applications to non-national system employers, and provides:

(e) Fairness as between the person and another persons in a like position

[28] Neither the Applicant nor the Respondent made any submissions in respect of this consideration. As such, this consideration is neutral in my determination.

CONCLUSION

[29] It is clear to me that the absence of an acceptable reason for the whole of the delay, and consideration of merits of the Application, substantially weigh against the conclusion of exceptional circumstances.

[30] I am therefore not persuaded that there are exceptional circumstances. I order that the Application be dismissed.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

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