| FWC 645 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2021/754) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 23 March 2021 [ FWCFB 1562] for the result of the appeal.]|
|FAIR WORK COMMISSION|
Fair Work Act 2009
s.437 - Application for a protected action ballot order
Transport Workers' Union of Australia
Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd
DEPUTY PRESIDENT DEAN
SYDNEY, 11 FEBRUARY 2021
Proposed protected action ballot of employees of Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd – whether ballot question describes nature of the proposed industrial action to be authorised – whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify the period of notice of industrial action being more than three working days.
 Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (TWU) has made an application for a protected action ballot order pursuant to s.437 of the Fair Work Act 2009 in respect of employees of Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd (Respondent) who are members of the TWU.
 The application seeks to ballot employees in relation to the bargaining between the TWU and the Respondent for a new enterprise agreement to replace the Prosegur Australia Pty Limited Armoured Vehicle and other Operations (Lane Cove, Newcastle, Smithfield, Branches) Enterprise Agreement 2017-2019 which has a nominal expiry date of 16 January 2020.
 The Respondent did not oppose the making of the protected action ballot order, however it opposed one of the ballot questions in the draft order provided by the TWU on the basis that the question does not meet the specificity requirement of s437(3) or s443(3) of the Act. In addition, the Respondent sought to extend the period of written notice required under the ballot order.
 A conference conducted on 9 February 2021 failed to resolve the disputed issues and the matter was listed for a hearing on 10 February 2021. Ms Angharad Owens-Strauss appeared for the TWU and Ms Simone Caylock appeared with permission for the Respondent.
 Evidence was given on behalf of the Respondent by Mr Gavin Lynch, National Workplace Relations Manager. Mr Joel Haldane, TWU delegate employed by the Respondent, and Mr Robert Rasmussen, TWU Lead Official, gave evidence on behalf of the TWU. Both parties filed written submissions.
 Section 437 of the Act deals with applications for a protected action ballot order:
437 Application for a protected action ballot order
Who may apply for a protected action ballot order
(1) A bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by a proposed enterprise agreement, or 2 or more such bargaining representatives (acting jointly), may apply to the FWC for an order (a protected action ballot order) requiring a protected action ballot to be conducted to determine whether employees wish to engage in particular protected industrial action for the agreement.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the proposed enterprise agreement is:
(a) a greenfields agreement; or
(b) a multi-enterprise agreement.
(2A) Subsection (1) does not apply unless there has been a notification time in relation to the proposed enterprise agreement.
Note: For notification time, see subsection 173(2). Protected industrial action cannot be taken until after bargaining has commenced (including where the scope of the proposed enterprise agreement is the only matter in dispute).
Matters to be specified in application
(3) The application must specify:
(a) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted; and
(b) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action.
(4) If the applicant wishes a person other than the Australian Electoral Commission to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot, the application must specify the name of the person.
Note: The protected action ballot agent will be the Australian Electoral Commission unless the FWC specifies another person in the protected action ballot order as the protected action ballot agent (see subsection 443(4)).
(5) A group of employees specified under paragraph (3)(a) is taken to include only employees who:
(a) will be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement; and
(i) are represented by a bargaining representative who is an applicant for the protected action ballot order; or
(ii) are bargaining representatives for themselves but are members of an employee organisation that is an applicant for the protected action ballot order.
Documents to accompany application
(5) The application must be accompanied by any documents and other information prescribed by the regulations.
 Section 443 sets out the circumstances in which a protected action ballot order must be made:
443 When the FWC must make a protected action ballot order
(1) The FWC must make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement if:
(a) an application has been made under section 437; and
(b) the FWC is satisfied that each applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer of the employees who are to be balloted.
(2) The FWC must not make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement except in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1).
(3) A protected action ballot order must specify the following:
(a) the name of each applicant for the order;
(b) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted;
(c) the date by which voting in the protected action ballot closes;
(d) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action.
(3A) For the purposes of paragraph (3)(c), the FWC must specify a date that will enable the protected action ballot to be conducted as expeditiously as practicable.
(4) If the FWC decides that a person other than the Australian Electoral Commission is to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot, the protected action ballot order must also specify:
(a) the person that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(1), is to be the protected action ballot agent; and
(b) the person (if any) that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(3), is to be the independent advisor for the ballot.
(5) If the FWC is satisfied, in relation to the proposed industrial action that is the subject of the protected action ballot, that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in paragraph 414(2)(a) being longer than 3 working days, the protected action ballot order may specify a longer period of up to 7 working days.
Note: Under subsection 414(1), before a person engages in employee claim action for a proposed enterprise agreement, a bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by the agreement must give written notice of the action to the employer of the employee.
Issues to be determined
 Based on the material filed, including the statutory declaration of Ms Owens-Strauss setting out the steps taken by the TWU in bargaining with the Respondent and that it has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach agreement with the Respondent, I am satisfied that there is a valid application and the requirements in s.443(1) have been met.
 The issues to be determined are whether the question in issue meets the requirements of ss.437 and 443 (the ballot question), and whether there are exceptional circumstances warranting the period of written notice in s.414(2)(a) being longer than 3 working days (s.443(5)) (the notice period issue).
The ballot question
 The Respondent objects to Question 12 in the draft order on the basis that it lacks the specificity required by s.437(3)(b) and s.443(3)(d) of the Act. The proposed question is in the following terms:
Question 12: An unlimited number of periodic or indefinite partial work bans?
 The Respondent made the following submissions in support of its contention:
“3 Section 437(3) relevantly provides that an application for a PABO must specify “the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action”. Similarly, s.443(3) relevantly provides that a PABO must specify “the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action”.
4 The object of Division 8 is ‘to establish a fair, simple and democratic process to determine whether employees wish to engage in particular protected industrial action for a proposed enterprise agreement’: s436.
5 The ballot questions should be stated with sufficient clarity to enable employees to make an informed choice on the industrial action they are being asked to authorise: see United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Country Fire Authority in which the Full Bench also held:
‘In determining whether to engage in protected action it is reasonable to expect, and in our view a requirement of the Act, that the nature of the proposed industrial action is specified. In our view, this requires employees who will be voting on the questions to understand what work would not be undertaken and what work would remain to be done. The description of the nature of the industrial action in the questions they are asked in the ballot should enable employees to understand the implications for them while at work, and other relevant circumstances’
6 In John Holland Pty Ltd v AMWU, a Full Bench of Fair Work Australia held that ballot questions must describe the industrial action in such a way that the employees are capable of responding to them. In that matter, all of the ballot questions specified a particular type of industrial action, which is in contrast with Question 12.
7 As a matter of statutory construction, it is submitted that both a literal reading of these provisions as well as consideration of the context and purpose of those provisions supports Prosegur’s contention that Question 12 does not meet the requirement to specify the nature of the proposed industrial action for the following reasons:
(a) in clear contrast to Questions 1 to 11 inclusive, the phrase “partial work ban” in Question 12 does not indicate what work would and would not be done but rather describes a general category of unspecified action;
(b) there are a potentially infinite number of types of “partial work bans”, and therefore it is not possible for employees to provide an informed response to the question as they are unable to consider the implications of authorising this generalised category of industrial action (including the income they may lose or implications for their personal safety and security given the nature of the work they perform in the cash in transit industry);
(c) employees therefore cannot make an informed decision about whether to authorise a particular form of industrial action through a secret ballot process which is designed to enable them to vote freely and without any undue pressure or influence that may otherwise exist if they were asked at a yard meeting in front of their co-workers and the union / union delegates to participate in a particular form of partial work ban.
8 The phrase ‘nature of the action’ in ss437(3) and 443(3) is the same in substance as s414(6). It is accepted that for a notice to be valid for the purpose of s414(6) it must clearly specify the nature of the type of action to be taken. As a matter of statutory construction, when words are used in one part of an Act they should be given the same meaning as when used in another part unless there is reason to do otherwise. It was accepted in Country Fire Authority that this principle was applicable to the equivalent provisions under the former Act. It is therefore submitted that there is no basis to take the view that a lesser form of specificity is required in a ballot question as would be required in a notice under s.414.
9 For the reasons set out above, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of AMWU v Steel Building Systems Australia, relied upon by the TWU in this matter, is plainly wrong and should not be followed.”
(emphasises and citations omitted)
 Mr Lynch gave evidence for the Respondent in the proceedings. In relation to the ballot question, he said that given the highly regulated and safety sensitive nature of the work performed by employees who would be covered by any proposed agreement, it was necessary to be clear about what might constitute a partial work ban. Using firearms as an example, he said that if the proposed partial work ban was a ban on wearing a firearm when employees were performing their duties, the Respondent would have no choice but to direct the employees not to perform any work because of the safety issues that would arise. This would have consequential implications for employees in relation to their income.
 The TWU submitted that the ballot question satisfies the requirements of s.443(3) because:
a) The phrase ‘partial work bans’ is a well understood phrase and is defined in s.470(3) of the Act;
b) The question is one that is commonly found in protected action ballot orders made by the Commission;
c) Full Bench authority dictates that “all that [s.443(3)(d)] requires is that the questions should describe the industrial action in such a way that employees are capable of responding to them”;
d) In a decision of Deputy President Gostencnik in AMWU v Steel Building Systems Australia Pty Ltd T/A Supaloc 1 (the AMWU Decision), the Deputy President found that the question which comprised the phrase ‘indefinite or periodic partial work bans’ was sufficiently clear to enable it to be answered by the employees who would participate in the ballot and allowed it to be included in the order. The conclusion the Deputy President came to was on the following basis:
(i) The word ‘partial’ implies that the industrial action is not a ban on all work or all duties which an employee is engaged to perform at the same time.
(ii) Rather, the question asks employees to authorise industrial action involving banning parts of their work or duties. For example, a ban may be imposed on one duty while other duties will continue to be performed.
(iii) It is not necessary to specify each duty which may be subject to a partial work ban.
(iv) The purpose of s.443(3) is to enable employees to understand the industrial action they are being asked to authorise. It does not require the same level of specificity as might be required in a notice under s.414 of the Act which requires industrial action to be specified but is issued for a different purpose, begin to alert the employer so it is able to take defensive action.
e) On the basis that the ballot question is identical to the question considered in the AMWU Decision, and for the reasons given by Deputy President Gostencnik in that matter, the question meets the requirements under s 443(3) of the Act.
 The TWU relied on evidence from Mr Haldane, the TWU delegate, to the effect that in his view the meaning of ‘partial work ban’ was ‘obvious’, in that it meant a ban on some work but not other work. Further, he said that representatives of the TWU, including himself, would explain the ballot questions to employees prior to them completing the ballot.
Consideration of the ballot question
 Having considered the evidence and submissions made by the parties, I am not satisfied that the ballot question describes the proposed industrial action in such a way that employees are capable of responding to it, in that it is not expressed with sufficient clarity as to enable employees to make an informed choice as to whether to support particular industrial action.
 The necessary level of specificity required is set out in Country Fire Authority. Relevantly, the Commission held as follows:
“ As noted above, the requirement in s.452(1)(a) is that the application for a protected action ballot must include the question or questions to be put to the relevant employees in the ballot, including the nature of the proposed industrial action. If industrial action is approved by a secret ballot, and all other pre-requisites for protected action are present, a written notice to the employer of intended industrial action is required to state the nature of the intended action and the day when it will begin (see s.441(6)). It was submitted by Mr. Parry SC, who appeared with Mr O’Grady for the CFA, that the use of the same words in s.441(6) and s.452(1) requires a similar approach - albeit that the notices are directed on the one hand to an employer, and on the other, to employees. As a matter of construction we believe this is correct. Further, while the intention of the legislature can only be gleaned from the provisions of the legislation in this case, it appears logical that when employees are asked whether to authorise industrial action in a protected action ballot, the nature of the proposed industrial action is expressed clear enough to enable them to make an informed choice.
 The predecessor to s.441(6) was s.170MO(5). The latter section was considered by a Full Court of a Federal Court in Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 91 FCR 463. At paragraph 88 the Court said:
‘ It will be apparent we think it necessary, and sufficient, for parties to describe the intended action in ordinary industrial English; for example, ‘an indefinite strike of all employees’, ‘a lockout of all employees employed in the AB fabrication plant’, ‘a ban on overtime’, ‘a ban of the use of MN equipment’, ‘rolling stoppages throughout the mine’, ‘a ban on the servicing of delivery vehicles’.’”
 In determining whether to engage in protected action it is reasonable to expect, and in our view a requirement of the Act, that the nature of the proposed industrial action is specified. In our view, this requires employees who will be voting on the questions to understand what work would not be undertaken and what work would remain to be done. The description of the nature of the industrial action in the questions they are asked in the ballot should enable employees to understand the implications for them while at work, and other relevant circumstances” 2
 The decision in Country Fire Authority, while expressed differently, is broadly consistent with the Full Bench decision in John Holland Pty Ltd v AMWU 3. (John Holland) as follows:
“ Moving now to the construction of s.437 itself, seen in its statutory context, all that the section requires is that the questions should describe the industrial action in such a way that employees are capable of responding to them. If the questions are ambiguous or lack clarity there may be consequences for the bargaining representative and the employees if reliance is placed on the result of the ballot in taking industrial action. If the question or questions give rise to ambiguity, the conclusion may be reached that the industrial action specified in a notice under s.414 was not authorised by the ballot and that the action is not protected for the purposes of s.409(2). It is true that ambiguity or lack of clarity in the description of the industrial action is undesirable, but these are matters more appropriate for consideration under other provisions. It follows that in most cases the drafting of the questions will be a matter for the applicant.”
 I note the Full Bench in John Holland was not asked to consider ballot questions involving partial work bans, which is the issue for consideration here.
 Further, a Full Bench in National Tertiary Education Industry Union v RMIT University 4 (RMIT) stated:
“ It is commonly accepted that in order to obtain a PABO, and accordingly undertake protected industrial action, the party seeking to obtain the PABO must specify in the application the nature of the proposed industrial action …
 Once a PABO is issued by the Commission and industrial action gains support from the employees eligible to vote, the action is an “employee claim action” - assuming the other prerequisites are met. Once proper notice is given in accordance with s.414 of the Act, the industrial action which is supported by the PABO and notified will be protected under the Act, subject of course to any application made pursuant to Part 3-3, Division 6 of the Act to suspend or terminate the protected industrial action.
 It is not the case that the nature of the action as identified in the PABO requires a high level of specificity. The Act clearly provides that the PABO must include ‘the nature of the proposed industrial action’ and the Full Bench guidance in John Holland makes clear that the questions should be specific enough such that “employees are capable of responding to them.”
 While a high level of specificity is not required, the ballot questions cannot be so unspecific as to be vague and meaningless. The level of specificity required is one which enables employees who will be voting on the questions to understand what work would not be undertaken and what work would remain to be done. It requires employees to be able to understand the implications for them while at work. The balance to be struck is that employees must be able to understand what it is they are being asked to support in terms of the proposed industrial action and enable them to make an informed choice in that regard.
 A partial work ban can encompass a myriad of possibilities. Given the myriad of possibilities, employees could not reasonably be expected to understand what work would or would not be undertaken.
 In terms of the TWU’s argument that the ballot question is commonly found in protected action ballot orders made by the Commission, I simply note that this is not the relevant test that I need to apply in the application before me.
 In relation to the TWU’s argument that the meaning of ‘partial work ban’ is well understood by industrial parties, that is likely to be the case, but it is not an industrial party that is being asked to complete the ballot – it is a group of employees. In any event, the question is not whether an employee understands the meaning of the phrase ‘partial work ban’, it is whether the employee understands what work will not be undertaken and what work will remain to be done.
 The TWU said it would explain the ballot questions to employees. If it is necessary to explain the ballot questions to employees, then in my view the questions lack sufficient clarity. It should be evident on reading the ballot questions what it is that employees are being asked to authorise.
 Finally, I accept the submissions of the Respondent that the phrase ‘nature of the action’ in ss.437(3) and 443(3) is the same in substance as s.414(6). As a matter of statutory construction, when words are used in one part of an Act they should be given the same meaning when used in another part unless there is reason to do otherwise.
 For these reasons, the ballot question will not be included in the order made.
Extension of notice period for proposed industrial action
 The Respondent sought an extension of the notice period for proposed industrial action from 3 working days to 7 working days.
 Section 443(5) of the Act provides in effect that if there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in s.414(2)(a) being longer than 3 working days, the protected action ballot order may specify a longer period of up to 7 working days.
 The TWU accepted that there may be exceptional circumstances which exist in relation to the Respondent, however it argued that the exceptional circumstances did not justify an extension to the notice period. Alternatively, it argued, if the Commission was minded to exercise its discretion to extend the notice period in this matter, the TWU relied on a decision involving Armaguard to support a finding that it should not be extended beyond 5 working days, and that it should apply to certain types of industrial action only, being stoppages of work over four hours.
 There have been a number of decisions of the Commission in which exceptional circumstances justifying a longer notice period has been considered, including in the cash in transit industry.
 In Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Postal Corporation 5, Vice President Lawler held:
“ In summary, the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
 However, it is important to note that when considering whether to make an order pursuant to s.463(5) the Commission is not simply concerned with determining whether there are exceptional circumstances. There must be exceptional circumstances ‘justifying’ the specification of a longer notice period. The notion of justification is critical and calls for a consideration of the purpose of the notice required by s.441.”
 The Commission has, in a number of cases, found that exceptional circumstances exist in the cash in transit industry, justifying an extended notice period. 6
 While these decisions do not set a precedent, they have usefully considered similar issues in the same industry and in similar circumstances. Common amongst these decisions is a broad acceptance as to the potential increased security risks for employees as well as the employers’ clients and the public that may result from a disruption to cash collections and distribution.
 In support of its application for an extended notice period, the Respondent relied on two witness statements and oral evidence given by Mr Lynch. Additionally, he was cross examined by the TWU.
 Given the constraints of time that go with the determination of these applications, I have not summarised all of the evidence given by the witnesses. To the extent there are differing views about the nature of the Respondent’s business and the existence of circumstances justifying an extension to the notice period, I prefer the evidence of Mr Lynch. As the Workplace Relations Manager and having had a relatively lengthy period of employment in the cash transit industry, he is in a better position than the TWU organiser and delegate to accurately outline the business structure, the numbers of employees performing particular work, the safety and security requirements of the role, its use of contractors and constraints in accessing labour from other states given COVID boarder issues, licensing and training requirements for employees (including in relation to firearms), and the issues that arise in areas such as the mandatory use of personal body armour which is individually fitted to each employee.
 The significant aspects of Mr Lynch’s evidence were as follows:
a. The potential implications for the Respondent if employees were to take protected industrial action go well beyond mere inconvenience and additional costs, because of the nature of the work performed and the highly regulated and security sensitive nature of the cash in transit industry;
b. It was important, for safety reasons, that large amounts of cash were able to be removed from their client’s sites, and that cash was able to be delivered to major financial and retail institutions along with thousands of ATM’s;
c. If no deliveries or collections of cash were able to be performed, cash may not be available to members of the public either through ATMs, banks or EFTPOS cash outs;
d. The Respondent is heavily relied on to service remote and regional bank branches and ATMs, and the general public would be adversely affected by any disruptions to this service;
e. Small businesses may be at risk, particularly regional businesses, if the Respondent was unable to deliver cash, particularly where notes and coins are necessary to complete a financial transaction;
f. The inability to collect cash from bank branches poses a significant risk to bank staff and members of the public as the risk of armed robbery is increased in this situation;
g. The Respondent is unable to implement its Business Continuity Plan (BCP) until it is notified of what industrial action is to be taken and its duration. The BCP is necessary to ensure that any contingency arrangements are carried out safely and in a way that meets its regulatory obligations. It is unable to implement its contingency arrangements until it knows of the action taken and duration because it is unable to estimate how many employees will be required to continue operations in a safe manner;
h. Employees need to be appropriately trained, licenced and experienced. This includes the vast majority of employees holding firearms and security licences;
i. Many businesses require coins to trade, such as vending machine operators, state transport services, large retailers who need coins for floats such as Aldi, McDonalds and the like;
j. The Respondent uses a small number of contractors in NSW which may equate to up to 6 out of around 103 employees on any one day, and a large number of contract employees are not available at short notice;
k. The Respondent’s insurance policies require that the amount of cash stored at a client’s premises is limited;
l. Unlike its major competitor, Armaguard, the Respondent’s OHS risk management policy mandates the use of personal body armour for all relevant employees, which must be obtained for and fitted to each individual employee;
m. State boarder closures due to COVID affect the Respondent’s ability to source labour from outside NSW; and
n. Three days’ notice is insufficient in all of these circumstances to implement its BCP.
 The TWU argued that of the Respondent was smaller than its competitor Armaguard, it has access to contractors, and its BCP would not require the same level of planning and therefore did not justify an extension to the notice period.
Consideration as to extension of notice period
 I accept the evidence of Mr Lynch set out above. There is nothing in the evidence of Mr Haldane and Mr Rasmussen, nor in the cross examination of Mr Lynch, that would cause me not to accept his evidence in full. Mr Lynch’s evidence read as a whole sets out a clear basis for a finding there are exceptional circumstances. In particular, the potential for increased safety risks to employees, clients and the public, the potential economic impact on regional businesses as well as to members of the public unable to access cash as a result of disruptions to cash delivery and collection, constitute exceptional circumstances. The impact is in my view out of the ordinary, unusual and uncommon.
 Further, I am satisfied that Mr Lynch’s evidence sets out a clear basis for a finding that the exceptional circumstances justify a longer notice period. I accept his evidence that the Respondent will require longer than three days to put its contingency plans into place in a manner that does not increase the safety risks to employees and others. It cannot reasonably implement these plans until it knows the nature and duration of the proposed industrial action because it will not be able to estimate the number of employees necessary to perform the work in a safe manner until that information is known to it.
 Having considered the submissions and the evidence, I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which justify an extension of the notice period to five working days. This period is consistent with a number of other decisions of the Commission in similar circumstances.
 Finally, having accepted the evidence of Mr Lynch and for the same reasons that I have found exceptional circumstances justifying the longer notice period, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the notice period to five working days for all types of proposed industrial action and not only stoppages over 4 hours in duration, as contended by the TWU.
 Having made the above findings, I am satisfied that the order sought by the TWU, as modified to reflect this decision, must be made.
 An order has been separately issued in PR726784.
A Owen-Strauss for the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia.
S Caylock for Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd.
Sydney (By telephone):
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
1  FWC 4755.
2 (2006) 158 IR 120.
3  FWAFB 526.
4  FWCFB 9549.
5  AIRC 848.
6 These matters include: TWU v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd  FWC 1275; TWU v Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd (PR579196); TWU v Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd (PR587602); TWU v Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd (PR586961); TWU v Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd (PR579196) and TWU v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd  FWC 1753.