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AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
Workplace Relations Act 1996
s.45 appeal against decision
issued by Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan on 29 October 2004
Australian Nursing Federation
RURAL CITY OF MURRAY BRIDGE NURSING EMPLOYEES, ANF (AGED CARE) - ENTERPRISE AGREEMENT 2004
s.170LS application for certification of agreement
Australian Nursing Federation
Rural City of Murray Bridge
Rural City Of Murray Bridge Nursing Employees, ANF (Aged Care) -
Enterprise Agreement 2004
s.45 appeal against decision
issued by Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan on 28 October 2004
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union
SCHEFENACKER VISION SYSTEMS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD, AWU, AMWU CERTIFIED AGREEMENT 2004
s.170LJ application for certification of agreement
Schefenacker Vision Systems Pty Ltd and Others
Schefenacker Vision Systems Australia Pty Ltd, AWU, AMWU Certified Agreement 2004
s.45 appeal against decision
issued by Commissioner Whelan on 24 November 2004
La Trobe University
LA TROBE UNIVERSITY CHILDREN'S CENTRE ENTERPRISE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2004
s.170LK application for certification of agreement
La Trobe University
La Trobe University Children's Centre Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 2004
JUSTICE GIUDICE, PRESIDENT
VICE PRESIDENT LAWLER
MELBOURNE, 18 MARCH 2005
Appeals - certification of agreements - matters pertaining to the relationship of employers and employees - salary packaging - payroll deductions - employees of labour hire agencies - trade union training leave - union right of entry - union officials and shop stewards - Workplace Relations Act 1996 ss.45, 170LI(1), 170LJ, 170LK, 170LN-170LP
 There are three appeals before the Commission. Each appeal is against a decision of a member of the Commission dismissing an application to certify an agreement pursuant to Part VIB of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the Act). The first decision, made by Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan in Re Schefenacker Vision Systems Australia Pty Ltd, AWU, AMWU Certified Agreement 20041 (Schefenacker), concerned an agreement purportedly made pursuant to s.170LJ of the Act. The second decision, made by Commissioner Whelan in Re La Trobe University Children's Centre Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 20042 (La Trobe), concerned an agreement purportedly made pursuant to s.170LK of the Act. Sections 170LJ and 170LK are in Division 2 of Part VIB of the Act. The third decision, made by Senior Deputy President O'Callagahan in Re Rural City of Murray Bridge Nursing Employees, ANF (Aged Care) - Enterprise Agreement 20043 (Murray Bridge), concerned an agreement purportedly made pursuant to Division 3 of Part VIB of the Act.
 In each decision the member of the Commission refused to grant the application on the basis that one or more terms of the agreement did not pertain to the relationship between employers and employees and that the application was accordingly invalid. The clauses in question dealt with the following matters:
· salary packaging
· payroll deductions
· employees of labour hire agencies
· shop steward training leave
· union right of entry
· union officials and shop stewards
· salary packaging
· salary packaging
· union right of entry
· recognition of worksite representatives
 The appellants challenged all of these findings. They submitted that each clause, properly characterised, pertains to the relationship between employers and employees as that expression has been interpreted by the High Court and that the agreements should have been certified. We were asked to quash the decision in each case and to certify the agreements.
Leave to Appeal
 In the first two appeals, Schefenacker and La Trobe, certification was sought pursuant to Division 2 of Part VIB of the Act. The principal question which arises is whether the agreements were of the kind described in s.170LI(1) of the Act. Section 170LI(1) provides:
"170LI Nature of agreement
(1) For an application to be made to the Commission under this Division, there must be an agreement, in writing, about matters pertaining to the relationship between:
(a) an employer who is a constitutional corporation or the Commonwealth; and
(b) all persons who, at any time when the agreement is in operation, are employed in a single business, or a part of a single business, of the employer and whose employment is subject to the agreement. (Emphasis added)
 In the third appeal, Murray Bridge, certification was sought pursuant to Division 3 of Part VIB of the Act. The question which arises in that appeal is whether the agreement is an agreement of the kind described in s.170LO. Section 170LO reads:
"170LO Agreement about industrial dispute
If an employer who is carrying on a single business is or was a party to an industrial dispute, the employer may agree with one or more organisations of employees with whom the employer is or was in dispute on terms for:
(a) settling or further settling all or any of the matters that are in dispute; or
(b) maintaining a settlement of all or any of the matters that were in dispute, whether the settlement was made by an award, a certified agreement or otherwise; or
(c) preventing further industrial disputes between them."
 In our opinion the matters are of such importance that in the public interest leave should be granted to appeal in each case. Each of the decisions under appeal raises for consideration the application of the decision of the High Court in Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union4 (Electrolux). The question before the Court in Electrolux was whether an agreement that contained provision for a bargaining agent's fee was an agreement coming within the description in s.170LI and thus the subject of a valid application for certification under Part VIB of the Act. Since the decision was handed down in September 2004 widespread concern has arisen as to the validity of a large number of existing certified agreements. Legislation has been enacted to ensure the validity of agreements certified by the Commission before Electrolux was decided.5 Considerable doubt remains as to whether a range of matters can be included in a certified agreement. Collectively the appeals deal with a number of matters commonly sought to be included in certified agreements. Given the central importance of certified agreements in contemporary workplace relations and the uncertainty surrounding what may validly be included in a certified agreement it is in the public interest that a Full Bench of the Commission give consideration to the issues raised in the appeals. Pursuant to s.45(2) we grant leave to appeal in each case.
The decision in Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union
 This litigation concerned industrial action taken by unions in support of claims made in connection with negotiations for a certified agreement with Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd (Electrolux). It was envisaged that the agreement would be one pursuant to Division 2 of Part VIB and would be the subject of an application pursuant to s.170LI(1). The critical claim was for a $500 "bargaining agent's fee" to be deducted by Electrolux from the wages of employees who were not union members and to pay the fee to the relevant union. The claim required Electrolux to advise new employees that a bargaining agent's fee would be payable by the employee if he or she was not a union member and to require them to provide a direct debit facility to enable payment of the fee. The claim was rejected by Electrolux. The unions took industrial action claiming that it was protected action within the meaning of s.170ML of the Act.
 Section 170ML authorises industrial action for the purpose of supporting or advancing claims in respect of a proposed agreement. The proposed agreement is identified in s.170MI(1) as that which the initiating party wants to negotiate being an agreement under Division 2 or 3 of Part VIB of the Act. Electrolux commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in relation to the industrial action. Merkel J held that the bargaining agent's fee claim was not about a matter that pertained to the relationship between Electrolux and its employees and that an agreement containing provision for a bargaining agent's fee would not be an agreement for the purpose of s.170LI6. Accordingly he made a declaration that the industrial action was not protected action. On appeal, a Full Court of the Federal Court overturned the decision. The High Court (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; Kirby J dissenting) upheld a further appeal and restored the orders of Merkel J. A central issue before the High Court was whether an agreement providing for a bargaining agent's fee could be an agreement of the kind described in s.170LI(1). The Court decided that question in the negative by a majority of six to one.
 Electrolux can be said to be authority for at least two propositions relevant to this case. The first is that earlier cases dealing with the construction of the term "pertaining to the relationship of employers and employees" apply to the construction of s.170LI(1). The Chief Justice put it this way:
"Reference has already been made . . . to authorities on the meaning of the concept of an industrial dispute with respect to matters pertaining to the relationship of employers and employees. Here we are concerned with the concept of an industrial agreement about matters pertaining to that relationship. The context is not materially different." 7
 Justice McHugh reached the same conclusion, as the following passage from his judgment makes clear:
"The analytical framework that the Court adopted in Re Alcan [Re Alcan Australia Ltd; Ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees (1994) 181 CLR 96, 54 IR 475] and Portus [R v Portus; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd, (1972) 127 CLR 353] to determine what is a matter that pertains to the relationship between an employer and its employees is whether the matter affects the relationship of employers and employees in their capacity as such. Such an approach applies both to employers and employees generally and to particular employers and the persons employed in their business.
Nothing in the Act suggests that this approach is no longer applicable. The Act still defines "industrial dispute" in s 4(1) as a dispute "about matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees". Division 3 agreements operate in respect of "industrial disputes" [See, eg, s 170LN]. These provisions give rise to the inference that Div 2 and Div 3 agreements have a common element, namely, that for such an agreement to be certifiable, it must be about matters pertaining to the requisite relationship or to "the relationship between employers and employees" in their capacity as such. Because the Federal Parliament enacted the Act two years after the Re Alcan decision, the drafters of the Act almost certainly knew of the decision and the interpretation applied by this Court to the expression "about matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees". The principle that the re-enactment of a rule after judicial consideration is to be regarded as an endorsement of its judicial interpretation has been criticised, and the principle may not apply to provisions re-enacted in "replacement" legislation [See, eg, Flaherty v Girgis (1987) 162 CLR 574 at 594 per Mason ACJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ; Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 310 at 329 per Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ]. However, industrial relations is a specialised and politically sensitive field with a designated Minister and Department of State. It is no fiction to attribute to the Minister and his or her Department and, through them, the Parliament, knowledge of court decisions -- or at all events decisions of this Court − dealing with that portfolio. Indeed, it would be astonishing if the Department, its officers and those advising on the drafting of the Act would have been unaware of Re Alcan." 8
 In their joint judgment Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ also reached the same conclusion9 and Callinan J's decision is to the same effect. 10
 It follows from this proposition that authorities concerning the meaning of the term "pertaining to the relationship of employers and employees" are to be applied in considering the construction of s.170LI(1) and that the decisions in Re v Portus; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd11 (Portus) and Re Alcan Australia Ltd; Ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees12 (Alcan) are directly applicable. As the Chief Justice put it: "There is no occasion to depart from those authorities, and every reason to follow them."13
 The second important proposition to emerge from the case is that an agreement which contains a matter which does not pertain to the relationship of employers and employees, subject to a qualification which we shall come to, cannot be the subject of a valid application for certification pursuant to s.170LI. The Chief Justice expressed his conclusion in the following terms:
"The contention of the appellant, and of the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, is that, for an agreement to be of the nature described in s 170LI, it must be wholly about matters pertaining to the relationship referred to. This contention, which was accepted by Merkel J at first instance, is consistent with the context, and, in particular, the purpose and effect of certification of an agreement. It is also consistent with the legislative history reflected in decisions such as Portus and Alcan. Part VIB does not provide for certification of part of an agreement. The focus of the legislative provisions about the certification procedure, and the consequences of certification, is upon matters pertaining to the employment relationship. If an agreement contains terms about matters extraneous to that relationship it is difficult to accommodate that agreement to the scheme of Pt VIB.
Counsel for the union respondents . . . submitted that an agreement which contains a term or terms about matters pertaining to the employment relationship, and a term or terms about other matters, must be subjected to a process of characterisation, by which its real or essential nature can be determined, and, in some cases, the requirements of s. 170LI can be satisfied. There are at least two difficulties with this argument. The first is that it leaves unanswered the problem of what is to be done, in relation to the certification procedure, and in relation to the legal effect of a certified agreement, about those parts of the agreement which, by hypothesis, are not about matters pertaining to the employment relationship. The second is that it gives no guidance as to how the process of characterisation is to proceed. There may be cases in which a matter extraneous to the employment relationship may be so trivial that it should be disregarded as insignificant. Putting such cases to one side, all the terms of an agreement ordinarily constitute part of the consideration flowing from one side or the other, and there is no way of knowing whether, or what, the parties would have agreed about the other terms if one term were excluded from the legal operation of the agreement. The argument appears to amount to the proposition that, if an agreement is mainly about the matters referred to in s 170LI, then the fact that it is partly about other matters as well is immaterial. In many cases, it will be impossible to say what an agreement is mainly about, but, in any event, there is no support, either in the text, or in the scheme of Pt VIB, for a conclusion that an agreement that is, in part, about matters other than the matters referred to in s 170LI may be a certified agreement. If it were otherwise, it is difficult to see any logical stopping place short of a proposition that an agreement would fall within the section if it contained even one term about the relevant matters." 14
 Justice McHugh agreed. His view is encapsulated in the following extract from his judgment:
"Critical to the operation of s 170LI is that, for the purposes of certification under Div 2 of Pt VIB, there must be
an agreement, in writing, about matters pertaining to the relationship between an employer . . . and all persons who, at any time when the agreement is in operation, are employed in a single business . . . of the employer.
Nothing in Pt VIB nor in the rest of the Act suggests that s 170LI should not be given its plain and literal meaning. The statutory context in which s 170LI appears, the purpose of certification, the powers and procedures of the Commission in respect of certification and the legal consequences of certification suggest that s 170LI only permits the certification of an agreement where all the terms of the agreement are about matters pertaining to the requisite relationship or about matters ancillary or incidental to those matters or machinery provisions with respect to those matters."15
 Justices Gummow, Hayne and Heydon dealt with the issue in these terms:
"[T]he phrase in question contains no words of severance to permit a distributive operation. The text does not read "including or containing matters pertaining". Yet, to succeed, the submissions for the Unions must have it so and displace the qualifier "about" by such an explanation. The word "about" by itself does not perform that work."16
 Before leaving this issue it is necessary to deal with the exception we referred to earlier. It is clear that an agreement may contain some matters which do not pertain to the relevant relationship and yet still be the subject of a valid application under s.170LI. What is the nature and breadth of that exception? In order to answer this question it is necessary to start with the decision of Merkel J in Electrolux. His Honour there held:
"50 Section 170LI does not require that all of the terms of the proposed agreement must pertain to the requisite relationship. As explained above, s 170LI requires that the agreement be characterised as one that is about matters pertaining to the relationship. If a term of the agreement does not pertain to that relationship it does not follow that the agreement is not about matters pertaining to the relationship. For example, the term may be ancillary or incidental to, or a machinery provision relating to, a matter pertaining to the employment relationship. . .
51 If one of the substantive matters provided for in the agreement is not within the required description and that matter is discrete and significant then the proposed agreement may properly be characterised as about matters that are within the relationship and a matter that is not. While it is arguable that s 170LI only requires that the agreement in question be characterised as one that is "substantially" or "primarily" about the requisite matters it would be inappropriate to add those words absent a clear legislative purpose in favour of that construction: see Saraswati v The Queen (1991)172 CLR 1 at 22 per McHugh J.
52 I doubt that the legislature intended that protected action was able to be taken to advance or support claims in respect of a substantive, discrete, and significant matter that does not pertain to the requisite relationship, or that an agreement about such a matter is to be capable of certification. . .
53 . . .
54 My decision in the present case is on the basis that the claim in question relates to a substantive, discrete, and significant matter that does not pertain to the employment relationship. While I entertain some doubt as to whether a proper characterisation of an agreement for the purposes of s 170LI involves questions of degree, I leave for another case the question of whether a claim in respect of a matter that does not pertain to the employment relationship, but is not of significance, may be included in a certified agreement."17
 It can be seen that His Honour approached the issue from two different perspectives. First, he decided that an agreement containing a term which is ancillary or incidental to, or a machinery provision relating to, a matter pertaining to the employment relationship might still be capable of certification. Secondly, he decided that an agreement containing a term which deals with a substantive, discrete, and significant matter that does not pertain to the employment relationship would not be capable of certification. Although it might be said that these formulations received implied approval from the High Court, in fact they were the subject of direct comment only by Justice McHugh. His Honour, after expressing the view that Merkel J's formulations were consistent with earlier decisions of the High Court18, later said:
". . . s 170LI only permits the certification of an agreement where all the terms of the agreement are about matters pertaining to the requisite relationship or about matters ancillary or incidental to those matters or machinery provisions with respect to those matters."19
[W]hen characterized as a whole, the agreement must be about matters pertaining to the requisite relationship. It may not include discrete and substantive matters that do not so pertain." 20
 The Chief Justice dealt with the issue on the basis that if an agreement contains a term about a matter extraneous to the relevant relationship, unless the matter is "so trivial that it should be disregarded as insignificant," the agreement is not capable of certification.21 No other member of the majority expressed a view on the formulations.
 We think that while Merkel J's formulations are a source of guidance, the terms of the section are the overriding consideration. They require that an agreement must be about matters that pertain to the requisite relationship. No doubt machinery and administrative provisions may be included, as well as matters which do not pertain but which are trivial. While ancillary and incidental matters may be included, in our view care should be taken in applying those descriptions.
 Justice McHugh made some additional observations about the construction of s.170LI(1) which should be mentioned. His Honour observed:
"Unlike the provisions considered in Re Alcan and Portus, s 170LI is not concerned with the meaning of "industrial dispute" or "industrial matter". The expression "matters pertaining to the relationship between an employer . . . and . . . all persons who, at any time when the agreement is in operation, are employed in a single business . . . of the employer and whose employment is subject to the agreement" differs from the expressions considered in those cases. In those cases, the relevant expressions were "matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees" and "matters pertaining to the relations of employers and employees". Hence, the matters being assessed fell to be determined by reference to a more generalised notion of the relationship between employers and employees.
Section 170LI, however, does not refer to the relationship between employers and employees generally, but rather to the relationship between the employer bound by the agreement and all persons employed in a single business of that employer. As the Full Bench of the Commission (Giudice J, McIntyre VP and Whelan C) observed in Re Atlas Steels Metals Distribution Certified Agreement 2001-2003: [(2002) 114 IR 62 at 66.]
The terms of s 170LI(1) indicate that the nature of the matters is to be assessed by reference to the relationship between the employer and the employees to whom the agreement applies rather than by reference to a generalised notion of the relationship between employers and employees.
For example, there may be matters particular to the relationship between an individual employer and the persons employed in a single business of that employer. Those matters may not pertain to the relationship between employers and employees generally in their capacity as such. But they may pertain to the requisite relationship in that workplace and require an examination of the issue or issues between the parties that give rise to the claims. [See Re Printing and Kindred Industries Union; Ex parte Vista Paper Products Pty Ltd (1993) 67 ALJR 604 at 609, 612, 48 IR 221 at 227, 231 per Gaudron J (Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ agreeing), at ALJR 617-618; IR 238-239]." 22
 McHugh J was the only member of the Court who referred to the distinction between the relationship of employers and employees generally and the relationship of a particular employer and its employees and the fact that s.170LI(1) refers to the latter.23 It should be noted, however, that this passage contains no suggestion that a relevant distinction can be made between a disputed claim on a particular subject and an agreed provision on the same subject - a distinction adopted by a Full Bench of the Commission in Re Atlas Steels Metals Distribution Certified Agreement 2001-2003 (Atlas Steels)24. Such an approach would allow that while a particular claim does not pertain to the relevant relationship, an agreement on the same subject might so pertain. In our view the approach in Atlas Steels is inconsistent with the conclusion that the cases dealing with the construction of the term "pertaining to the relationship of employers and employees" apply to (and govern) the construction of s.170LI(1). The decision in Electrolux has in any event exposed a fatal flaw in the distinction. If adopted it might lead to a situation in which a particular matter could not be the subject of a claim in relation to which protected action could be taken but the same matter could be the subject of an agreement in relation to which certification could be sought. It is unlikely that the legislature intended such a result. For these reasons the distinction in Atlas Steels should not be followed.
 Two members of the Court in Electrolux indicated that demands of a managerial or other nature do not create a dispute about matters pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee. McHugh J stated:
"This Court has consistently held that the rejection of demands of an academic, political, social or managerial nature does not create a dispute about matters pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee. [See, eg, Australian Tramway Employes Association v Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust (Union Badge Case) (1913) 17 CLR 680 at 705 per Higgins J, 718 per Powers J; R v Portus; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 353 at 371 per Stephen J; R v Coldham; Ex parte Fitzsimons (1976) 137 CLR 153 at 163-164 per Stephen J]." 25
 Callinan J said:
"The conclusion that I have reached is consistent with other cases in which the Court has held that the rejection of demands of an academic, political, social or managerial nature will not generate an industrial dispute capable of being settled by the making of an award. [Australian Tramway Employes Association v Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust (Union Badge Case) (1913) 17 CLR 680 at 705 per Higgins J and 718 per Powers J; R v Portus; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 353 at 371 per Stephen J; R v Coldham; Ex parte Fitzsimons (1976) 137 CLR 153 at 164 per Stephen J]"26
 We do not think that by these references their Honours intended to disturb the accepted construction of the statutory definition of an industrial dispute. In this connection we note that in Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors' Association Ltd 27 (Cram) a Full Court rejected the suggestion that because a demand touches upon an area of management decision-making it cannot be a matter which pertains to the relevant relationship. The following passage is sufficient to indicate the Court's approach:
"[W]e reject the suggestion, based on the remarks of Barwick CJ in Melbourne & Metropolitan Tramways Board [(1966) 115 CLR, at pp 451-452], that managerial decisions stand wholly outside the area of industrial disputes and industrial matters. There is no basis for making such an implication. It is an implication which is so imprecise as to be incapable of yielding any satisfactory criterion of jurisdiction: see Federated Clerks Union [(1984) 154 CLR, at pp 490-491]. Indeed, the difficulty of making such an implication is accentuated by the fact that the extended definition of "industrial matters" proceeds on the footing that many management decisions are capable of generating an industrial dispute.
These considerations indicate that the objection voiced by O'Connor J in Clancy to the regulation and control of business enterprises by industrial tribunals is not a matter that goes to the jurisdiction of the tribunals. Rather it is an argument why an industrial tribunal should exercise caution before it makes an award in settlement of a dispute where that award amounts to a substantial interference with the autonomy of management to decide how the business enterprise shall be efficiently conducted. The evident importance of arming such tribunals with power to settle industrial disputes capable of disrupting industry is a powerful reason for refusing to read down the wide and general definition of `industrial matters' in the Commonwealth and State Acts by reference to any notion of managerial prerogatives as such."28
 In our view, our task is to characterise each of the provisions in question in these proceedings by reference to the cases concerning the definition of an industrial dispute. The cases show that the question to be asked is whether the provision is one which pertains to the relationship of employers and employees. If the provision cannot be so characterised, but rather is of an academic, political, social, managerial or any other nature, the agreement cannot be the subject of a valid application for certification.
 Before leaving Electrolux we should also note that McHugh J expressed the view that s.170LV undertakings may be available to cure an agreement that contained "non-compliant" terms. His Honour said:
"To the extent that the parties agree that non-compliant terms of an agreement are to have legal effect, the efficacy of those provisions depends on the general law, [CFMEU v AIRC (2001) 203 CLR 645, 103 IR 473] not the Act. The Commission may certify such an agreement only if the non-compliant terms may be made the subject of undertakings under s 170LV(1) or if the non-compliant terms are deleted." 29
 McHugh J was the only member of the Court to advert to this possibility. A majority of the Court clearly regarded the existence of an agreement meeting the description in s.170LI as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid application. Accordingly, the better view is that unless there is an agreement that meets the description in s.170LI the Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for certification of the agreement and the occasion for the taking of an undertaking pursuant to s.170LV cannot arise.30
Division 3 Agreements
 Electrolux was primarily concerned with the provisions of Division 2 of Part VIB of the Act and in particular the proper construction of s.170LI. The reasoning is therefore directly relevant to the first two appeals before us. The third appeal, Murray Bridge, concerns the provisions of Division 3 of Part VIB. Section 170LN describes what Division 3 covers. It reads:
"170LN What this Division covers
This Division sets out requirements that must be satisfied for an application to be made to the Commission to certify certain agreements:
(a) to settle, further settle or maintain the settlement of, or to prevent, industrial disputes; or
(b) to prevent industrial situations from giving rise to industrial disputes."
 Division 3 agreements, as is clear from s.170LN are concerned with agreements made in relation to industrial disputes or industrial situations. This is confirmed by ss.170LO and 170LP which are as follows:
"170LO Agreement about industrial dispute
If an employer who is carrying on a single business is or was a party to an industrial dispute, the employer may agree with one or more organisations of employees with whom the employer is or was in dispute on terms for:
(a) settling or further settling all or any of the matters that are in dispute; or
(b) maintaining a settlement of all or any of the matters that were in dispute, whether the settlement was made by an award, a certified agreement or otherwise; or
(c) preventing further industrial disputes between them.
170LP Agreement about industrial situation
If the parties to an industrial situation are, or include, an employer carrying on a single business and one or more organisations of employees, the employer and any of the organisations may agree on terms for preventing the situation from giving rise to an industrial dispute involving them."
 The definition of the term "industrial situation" in s.4 of the Act is relevantly as follows:
"industrial situation means a situation that, if preventive action is not taken, may give rise to:
(a) an industrial dispute of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) of the definition of industrial dispute; or
. . ."
 It can be seen that the definition of "industrial situation" refers back to the definition of "industrial dispute". Whether an agreement is of the kind referred to in s.170LO or the kind referred to in s.170LP, the touchstone is the definition of industrial dispute. It follows that authorities such as Alcan and Portus are directly relevant when considering whether an agreement is of the kind provided for in either of those sections. This conclusion is reinforced, if reinforcement is needed, by the following passage from the joint judgment in Electrolux:
"The phrase "about matters pertaining to the relationship" appears not only in s 170LI and with respect to Div 2 agreements. The provisions respecting Div 3 agreements (in particular s 170LN) draw in the definition of "industrial dispute" in s 4(1). This still contains the phrase "about matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees". The inference that, in this respect, Div 2 and Div 3 share a basic precept is very strong, and the weight of authority construing the definition of industrial dispute is considerable. The field of industrial relations legislation in Australia is not one where the Parliament may readily be taken to have legislated without awareness of the interpretation placed by this Court on pivotal definitions [cf Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 310 at 328 - 329]. Nor can it be said that to apply to the terms of Div 2 (and Div 3) the reasoning in Portus and Alcan is merely to perpetuate an erroneous construction. [cf Flaherty v Girgis (1987) 162 CLR 574 at 594]"31
 The question remaining is whether the second proposition in Electrolux also applies to Division 3 agreements. In other words, must each of the terms of a Division 3 agreement pertain to the relationship between employers and employees. Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan answered this question in the affirmative. That conclusion was controverted by the Australian Nursing Federation in the appeal.
 It might be said that as a matter of logic the terms of ss.170LO and 170LP do not exclude the possibility that an agreement might contain terms that do not pertain to the relevant relationship provided those terms are in settlement, etc of a claim in an industrial dispute or for preventing an industrial situation from giving rise to an industrial dispute. A problem with this approach is that it might result in s.170LN being deprived of any substantive restriction upon the matters to be included in an agreement. It would allow, for example, that an agreement could be made requiring an employer to make ongoing contributions to a political party in exchange for withdrawal of a claim for time off for employees to attend political rallies or, indeed, for withdrawal of a claim or claims which were completely unrelated in subject matter to the question of political contributions. We think that this is unlikely to reflect the intention of the legislature.
 The approach would also sit uncomfortably with the scope of the Commission's power to make an award in settlement of an industrial dispute. The Commission has power, now subject to s.89A, to include in an award made in settlement of an industrial dispute anything which the Commission considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of preventing or settling the industrial dispute or preventing further industrial disputes. This power is now found in s.120 of the Act. It has never been held, however, that the Commission has power to include in an award a matter which does not pertain to the relevant relationship. In R v Galvin; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section32 the High Court considered the limits of the Commission's award-making power. The Court was required to decide whether a particular award provision was within the ambit of a claim in the relevant industrial dispute. In doing so four members of the Court applied the following principle:
"An award cannot give a form of relief that is not relevant to a matter in dispute, that is not reasonably incidental or appropriate to the settlement of that part of the dispute and that has no natural or rational tendency to settle the particular question in dispute. But the award need not adhere to the remedy or relief proposed or claimed in the course of the dispute or in a demand forming a source of the dispute, so long as the provision in the award is related to the dispute or its settlement in the manner stated."33
 The significance of this passage in the current context is that each term of an award made in settlement of an industrial dispute must be related in subject matter to a claim in the dispute. If it were otherwise there would be no limits upon what might be included in an award. It might be thought inconsistent if a different situation applied in relation to an agreement in settlement of an industrial dispute or an agreement for preventing further industrial disputes.
 Furthermore, if a provision about a matter which did not pertain were permissible in Division 3 agreements, it is likely that protected industrial action could be taken in support of the inclusion of such a provision in a proposed agreement pursuant to s.170ML. This would create a substantial inconsistency between Division 2 and Division 3 agreements. We think the better view is that all of the terms of a Division 3 agreement must pertain and that if there is a provision which does not pertain the application for certification is itself invalid.
Matters Pertaining to the Relationship Between Employers and Employees
 Before turning to the disputed matters in these appeals, it is important to refer to the authorities governing the construction of the expression "matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees". For present purposes we shall refer to three authorities only. The first two cases seem to us to provide an accurate and comprehensive statement of the correct legal approach. Both cases were concerned with a slightly different definition of the term "industrial dispute", but the differences are not relevant.34 The third case concerns the jurisdiction of a state industrial authority.
 We refer first to what was said by the High Court in its unanimous judgment in Re Manufacturing Grocers' Employees Federation of Australia; Ex Parte Australian Chamber of Manufacturers (Manufacturing Grocers):
"For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that a matter must be connected with the relationship between an employer in his capacity as an employer and an employee in his capacity as an employee in a way which is direct and not merely consequential for it to be an industrial matter capable of being the subject of an industrial dispute."35
 Next we refer to a passage from another unanimous judgment of the Court, that in Cram:
"Before dealing with the various strands of thought embedded in this argument, we should mention some aspects of the general words of the definition of "industrial matters" as established in the context of s.4 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). The words "pertaining to" mean "belonging to" or "within the sphere of" and the expression "the relations of employers and employees" refers to the relation of an employer as employer with an employee as employee: Kelly [(1950) 81 CLR, at p 84] And, as Dixon C.J. noted in Reg v. Findlay; Ex parte Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association [(1953) 90 CLR 621, at pp 629-630], although the possibility of an indirect and consequential effect is not enough, the conception of what arises out of or is connected with the relations of employers and employees includes much that is outside the contract of service, its incidents and the work done under it."36
 The last sentence of this passage indicates that the concept of matters falling within the relevant relationship is not to be artificially limited by reference to the contract of service, its incidents and the work performed pursuant to the contract. This point can be illustrated by reference to The Federated Clerks' Union of Australia and Another v The Victorian Employers' Federation and Others37. The subject of the proceedings was a clause in an award made by the Industrial Relations Commission of Victoria. The effect of the clause was described by Mason J as follows:
". . . The provisions of cl.39 prescribe procedures for the provision of notification and information by employers to the Union and to employees who may be materially affected when technological change having that effect is contemplated and for consultation between the employers, the Union and the employees materially affected."38
 Although that case did not concern the jurisdiction of the Federal Commission, the conclusions of the majority are instructive. Mason J held, relevantly, that the provisions were specifically authorised by paragraph (e) of s.34(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (Vic). That paragraph reads:
"Every Board shall have power to . . . make an award determining all matters relating to . . .
. . .
(e) the relations of employers and employĕs."
 Murphy J's judgment is to the same effect.39 Wilson J said:
"What the award recognizes is that while the responsibility for making decisions falls on the employer alone, he must allow for some participation by the Union and employees in the planning process. That process must be shared. This is why the machinery of notifying and supplying information is important; it is the essential prerequisite to appropriate consultation. Such consultation is a natural expression of the industrial relationship of employer and employee in the face of technological change."40
 Deane J's judgment includes a similar finding.41
 It is to be noted that of the four judges in the majority all accepted without question the role of the union in the obtaining of the information and in participating in negotiations about technological and other material change along with the employees affected.
 Following Electrolux it is clear that cases dealing with the construction of the term "pertaining to the relationship of employers and employees" apply to the construction of s.170LI(1). The High Court did not alter the developed law in relation to the meaning of that expression and the majority gave effect to decisions on the meaning of the expression in connection with the deduction of union dues, namely Portus and Alcan.
 In deciding whether a provision in an agreement pertains to the relevant relationship there is no distinction to be made between a disputed claim on a particular subject and an agreed provision on the same subject. While such a distinction was drawn by the Full Bench in Atlas Steels, the distinction was implicitly rejected by a majority of the Court in Electrolux.
 When dealing with applications to certify agreements pursuant to Division 2 of Part VIB of the Act, the following considerations are relevant:
(a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to certify an agreement made pursuant to ss.170LJ, 170LK or 170LL unless the agreement answers the description in s.170LI(1).
(b) To answer that description each discrete, substantive and significant provision must be about a matter that pertains to the relationship between the particular employer, in its capacity as employer, and its employees, in their capacity as employees.
(c) For a matter to pertain to the requisite relationship it must be connected with the relationship between the employer in its capacity as an employer, and its employees, in their capacity as employees, in a way which is direct and not merely consequential.
(d) The agreement may also contain:
(i) machinery provisions - indexes, tables of contents and the like;
(ii) provisions that are incidental or ancillary to a matter that pertains to the relationship;
(iii) provisions that do not pertain to the relationship but they are so trivial they can be disregarded - some aspirational provisions which do not impose any enforceable legal obligations on a party to the agreement might fall into this category.
(e) When examining a provision to see whether it pertains in the relevant sense, regard must be had to the words of the clause in the context of the agreement as a whole and to any relevant evidence.
(f) The mere fact that a clause confers some rights on a union does not, of itself, lead to the conclusion that the clause does not pertain.
 When dealing with applications to certify agreements pursuant to Division 3 of Part VIB the same considerations apply, with one exception. Whether a provision pertains to the relevant relationship is to be decided in the context of the relations between employers and employees generally, rather than the relations between a particular employer and its employees covered by the agreement. Whether this distinction has any significant practical implications remains to be seen.
 In having regard to these considerations reference will often be necessary to cases dealing with the same or similar issues. It is worth noting that the fact that a given matter has been held to be capable of giving rise to an industrial dispute or a matter the Commission could make an award about is not necessarily the end of the inquiry. Some older decisions may be incompatible with subsequent authority. In the same way, the fact that a clause about a particular matter can be found in an award is not necessarily a reliable guide to whether a provision about that matter may properly be included in an agreement.
 It is clear that the Commission's decisions on these issues are very important ones. It follows from Electrolux that if an agreement contains a provision which does not pertain to the relationship the application for certification is invalid. It would seem to follow that if the Commission purports to certify an agreement containing a provision of that kind the agreement will have no legal effect under the Act.42 Given the difficulties in characterisation which have arisen, and the likelihood that similar difficulties will arise in the future, the Parliament may think it appropriate to give consideration to a legislative amendment which might give a greater degree of certainty to the legal operation of an agreement once it has been certified.
The Provisions in Dispute
 Since we take the view that the relevant test is almost the same whether certification is sought pursuant to Division 2 or Division 3 of Part VIB we shall group the disputed matters by subject for the purpose of dealing with each of them.
 The agreement in Schefenacker contains the following clause:
"26.0 SALARY SACRIFICE
Employees may choose to salary sacrifice part of their wage for pre-tax benefits, in accordance with the rules of the Australian Taxation Office. The amount of salary sacrifice will be deducted from the employee's gross wage.
Salary sacrifice does not reduce the employee's hourly gross rate of pay for the purposes of award entitlements (including accrued entitlements and the application of penalty rates).
The amount of salary sacrifice nominated by the employee must not reduce the employee's ordinary time earnings below the award rate for the employee's classification as stated in the Metal, Engineering & Associated Industries Award 1998.
In the event that the law governing taxation changes in such a way as to make the objective of this clause ineffective, unattainable or illegal, the company will advise the employees concerned and the salary sacrifice contribution arrangement will be amended or terminated."
 The agreement in La Trobe contains two clauses, cl.19 and cl. 64, which are identical in terms and which deal with salary packaging. Clause 19 provides:
"19. SALARY PACKAGING
19.1 The parties acknowledge that salary sacrifice of motor vehicle leases, child care costs and superannuation contributions have been offered to employees at La Trobe University since 1995, and the salary sacrifice scheme has proven to be popular with employees and it is considered beneficial to maintain salary sacrifice schemes to provide greater flexibility to better meet the needs of individuals.
19.2 The parties agree that notwithstanding the salary rates specified in Schedule 2 Section A of this Agreement, an employee will have the option to request that part of the salary as prescribed by this Agreement be used to provide benefits as follows; subject to the limits set out in sub-Clause 19.9 below:
(a) lease of motor vehicle through a novation or operating lease arrangement approved by the University Council;
(b) payment of costs of child care;
(c) additional contributions to any complying Superannuation Scheme which is legally available to staff of the University pursuant to relevant legislation and for which the Trust Deeds of such relevant Schemes allow additional contributions to be made;
(d) pre-tax member contributions from gross salary which may be paid to UniSuper or the successor superannuation fund by the University on behalf of any member who so elects in writing to the Manager (Human Resources);
(e) compulsory employee contributions to UniSuper, Defined Benefit Plan or Investment Choice Plan; and
(f) any other permitted benefits as requested by the employee.
19.3 Any net savings in costs will be passed on to the individual staff member concerned. The employee will pay any Fringe Benefit Tax payable in respect of any benefit.
19.4 Notwithstanding the rates specified in Schedule 2 Section A of this Agreement, an employee will be able to request an individual remuneration package which may result in his or her salary being reduced in order to receive employer provided non-cash benefits.
19.5 Notwithstanding anything contained within this Clause, the employee's salary rate as specified in Schedule 2 Section A of this Agreement will be used as the basis for calculation of all other entitlements and deductions which derive from the salary rate and such examples include but are not limited to:
(a) termination payments, including superannuation, Recreation Leave and Long Service Leave entitlements;
(b) calculation of redundancy benefits;
(c) calculation of early retirement benefits; and
(d) calculation of overtime and shift payments.
19.6 The University shall provide, on request by an employee, details of his or her salary, with or without the options facilitated by this Clause, including the effect of such options upon retirement benefits.
19.7 For the purposes of this Clause "proper notice" shall be deemed to be one months notice in writing to the Manager ( Human Resources) provided that the University may accept a lesser period of notice in exceptional circumstances.
19.8 The amount which may be sacrificed in respect of the items set out in this Clause is as follows:
(a) payments of a vehicle lease and associated costs including fringe benefits tax to a maximum of $25,000 per annum per staff member;
(b) additional contributions to UniSuper, Award Plus Plan or other employee nominated superannuation fund in accordance with the age-based limits of the taxation legislation;
(c) compulsory employee contributions to UniSuper, Defined Benefit Plan or Investment Choice Plan in accordance with the rule of the relevant Trust Deed; and
(d) such other benefits as the employee requests which shall not amount to more than 30% of salary as set out in Schedule 2 Section A of this Agreement.
19.9 The parties acknowledge that effective salary sacrifice arrangements require the employee to request the University to provide a benefit in lieu of part of cash salary, and that La Trobe University has absolute discretion in deciding whether to accede to this request. If laws change or Superannuation Trust Deeds changes, La Trobe University will have the right to vary these agreements in accordance with the changes to relevant laws or Superannuation Trust Deeds."
 The agreement in Murray Bridge contains a clause providing for salary packaging as follows:
"CLAUSE 23. SALARY SACRIFICE ARRANGEMENTS
23.1 Salary Sacrificing under this Agreement allows the employee to voluntarily elect to receive a component, which will not exceed the gross figure of $15,450 (which when grossed up equals $30,000 as prescribed by the ATO) of their remuneration in a form other than take home pay.
23.2 Where an employee enters into a salary sacrifice arrangement with the Rural City of Murray Bridge the employee will indemnify the Rural City of Murray Bridge against any taxation liability arising from that arrangement.
23.3 The Rural City of Murray Bridge will nominate a provider of salary sacrificing services to manage these arrangements. The employee will be responsible for the costs of managing these arrangements by the provider.
23.4 The Rural City of Murray Bridge shall meet the cost of implementing the administrative and payroll arrangements necessary for the introduction of salary sacrifice to the employees under this agreement.
23.5 The employees will be offered the opportunity to choose from the list of benefits at 23.7.3 of this Clause, which will be paid by the employer, through the provider of the service, instead of receiving gross salary. Gross salary is reduced by the amount of the benefits paid by the Rural City of Murray Bridge. The new gross salary is then subject to PAYE tax.
23.6 All existing entitlements such as superannuation, leave loading, penalties and overtime etc., will be based on the pre-packaged salary.
23.7 The employees covered under this Agreement will have access to salary sacrifice arrangements subject to the following provisions:
23.7.1 Accessing a salary sacrifice arrangement is a voluntary decision to be made by the individual employee.
23.7.2 The employee wishing to enter into a salary sacrifice arrangement will be required to sign a document, which indicates that:
188.8.131.52 they have sought expert advice in relation to entering into such an arrangement and;
184.108.40.206 they understand that in the event that Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) becomes payable on the benefit items which are selected, the salary sacrifice arrangement shall lapse and a new arrangement be put in place whereby the total cost of salary sacrificing to the Rural City of Murray Bridge does not increase.
220.127.116.11 If the employee elects to continue with sacrificing, the cost of the payment of the FBT will be passed back to the employee, or benefit items can be converted back to the agreed salary as per the Award or specified schedule identified in Clause 21 of this Agreement;
18.104.22.168 that upon resignation or termination of employment the Rural City of Murray Bridge shall be, by deduction from final payments or upon demand, reimbursed any amounts of over-expenditure.
23.7.3 Benefits available to be packaged are as defined in this Clause.
Subject to the terms and conditions contained in this Enterprise Agreement, the Rural City of Murray Bridge shall pay to an employee who requests this option during the duration of this Agreement an optional remuneration package equivalent to the weekly ordinary time wages otherwise payable under the relevant Award consisting of:
22.214.171.124 a cash component within the limits (as described in paragraph 1) of the employee's ordinary time wages under the relevant award (paid monthly one fortnight in arrears) and;
126.96.36.199 a benefit component of not more than the allowable amount of the employee's ordinary time wages under the relevant award payable for the following as defined by the policy and procedures of the Rural City of Murray Bridge. These include: -
motor vehicle payments and running costs;
mortgage and personal loan repayments;
health, life and disability insurance;
utility expenses (eg. Electricity, gas, water, rates, etc)
child minding expenses;
subscriptions and memberships;
car parking; and
credit card expenses (other than cash advances).
23.8 Any agreement made pursuant to this Clause is terminable by either party providing at least 14 days notice of withdrawal from such agreement.
23.9 The cost of the administration of the salary package arrangement is to be borne by the employee and deducted from the employee's account each fortnight. These fees are fixed for a period of three (3) years under contract with the administrative provider.
23.10 These arrangements are subject to the current legislation affecting salary packaging for Public Benevolent Institutions (PBI's) and may be negotiated accordingly."
 In each of Schefenacker, Murray Bridge and La Trobe the member at first instance held that Portus, endorsed in Electrolux, precluded a finding that the salary packaging clause at issue was about a matter that pertained to the requisite relationship.
 In Schenefacker Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan set out his understanding of the operation of the salary packaging arrangement in these terms:
" On its plain words, the clause provides that the difference between the award rate and the agreement rate may be allocated as a benefit by the employee other than wages, with the cost of this benefit, together with any consequent tax implications, being deducted from the employee's gross wages.
 The Australian Taxation Office Tax Ruling 2001/10 defines a salary sacrifice arrangement in the following terms:
"19. `Salary sacrifice arrangement' - in this Ruling, the term salary sacrifice arrangement means an arrangement under which an employee agrees to forego part of his or her total remuneration, that he or she would otherwise expect to receive as salary or wages, in return for the employer or someone associated with the employer providing benefits of a similar value. The main assumption made by the parties is that the employee is then taxed under income tax laws only on the reduced salary or wages and that the employer is liable to pay FBT, if any, on the benefits provided.
20. The type of benefits provided in SSAs by employers to employees includes superannuation contributions, the provision of motor vehicles and expense payment fringe benefits, such as payment of school fees, childcare costs or loan repayments.
21. `Effective SSA' - an effective SSA involves the employee agreeing to receive part of his or her total amount of remuneration as benefits before the employee has earned the entitlement to receive that amount as salary or wages.
22. `Ineffective SSA' - an ineffective SSA involves the employee directing that an entitlement to receive salary or wages that has been earned (see paragraph 23 of this Ruling) is to be paid in a form other than as salary or wages."
 In this respect, I have taken clause 26 as providing for what the Australian Taxation Office refers to as an "Ineffective SSA". The Tax Ruling provides that:
27. Payments made under an ineffective SSA to, or on account of, an employee are ordinary or statutory income derived by the employee at the time of payment for the reasons stated in paragraph 25 above. Benefits provided under an ineffective SSA are assessable income of the employee under section 6-5 or 6-10 of the ITAA 1997 and they are not exempt income under section 23L of the ITAA 1936. Remuneration related to a leave entitlement that has accrued before the issue of the SSA cannot be the subject of an effective SSA."
 The Australian Taxation Office Tax Ruling sets out the obligations on the employer to recognise various arrangements which might be regarded as salary sacrifice benefits for the purposes of Fringe Benefits Tax and other taxation obligations. It is clear that legislation treats salary sacrifice contributions to superannuation differently to other employee benefits.
 The effect of the salary sacrifice arrangements envisaged in clause 26 is that the employee may arrange for a limited portion of their remuneration to be paid into either superannuation or in another form which then provides a taxation benefit to the employee." 43
 The Senior Deputy President went on to find that while salary sacrifice arrangements relating to contributions to a superannuation fund are permissible, as found in Manufacturing Grocers, salary sacrifice arrangements relating to other items were not relevantly distinguishable in subject matter from a demand for deduction by the employer and payment to a union of union subscriptions. It followed that the situation was governed by Portus and Alcan and the clause did not pertain to the relevant relationship.
 In Murray Bridge the Senior Deputy President, after referring to Manufacturing Grocers44, said:
" In the context of the matters that may be the subject of a salary sacrifice arrangement detailed in clause 23, the distinction between this treatment of superannuation and other means of disbursing salary is not easily determined. Indeed, given the current approach to taxation arrangements applicable to Public Benevolent Institutions, salary packaging might be capable of consideration as a matter pertaining on the basis that it represents a significant "benefit" available to particular employees of particular institutions.
 However, clause 23 introduces a third party as a provider of salary sacrifice arrangements. Whilst the specific functions to be undertaken by the provider are not detailed, I have taken it that the provider actually arranges the salary sacrifice details with the employee and then advises the employer of the amount of any reduced payment due to the employee.
 I am unable to conclude that such an arrangement pertains to the employment relationship. It appears to involve an arrangement between the employee and the provider and then an arrangement between the provider and the employer. The introduction of the provider establishes a third party arrangement which precludes the clause from being described as pertaining to the employment relationship. It follows that this clause cannot be said to prevent an industrial dispute or to be a term for preventing an industrial situation from giving rise to an industrial dispute."45
 In La Trobe Commissioner Whelan observed that the salary packaging provision in question envisaged payments by the employer to third parties out of pre-tax income rather than post-tax income, but went on to find that this was not a valid basis for distinguishing Portus and Alcan. The Commissioner also considered whether the fact that the obligation on the employer to pay the relevant monies to the third parties concerned arose in advance of the wages being payable altered the situation. She found that it did not. The Commissioner also found that payments made by the employer for the lease of a private motor vehicle or to discharge an employee's obligation to a childcare centre were not of the same character as payments to a superannuation fund and therefore the decision in Manufacturing Grocers did not apply. She concluded that the salary sacrifice arrangements envisaged by the provision were not relevantly distinguishable from the payments considered in Portus, Alcan and Electrolux.
 With respect, in our opinion each of the salary packaging provisions pertains to the relationship between an employer, in its capacity as employer, and its employees, in their capacity as employees. Salary packaging, which, because of its beneficial tax effects, is a ubiquitous feature of modern employment relationships, is concerned with the mode of remuneration of an employee. Leaving aside any questions arising from Truck Act legislation, an employer and employee are free to agree that the employee's remuneration will consist of both cash and non-cash benefits.
 Portus concerned a claim by a union against a number of banks that the banks deduct union dues from the salary of their employees and remit those dues to the union, provided the employees had authorised such deduction. The High Court held that this was not a claim that pertained to the relationship between the banks in their capacity as employers and the banks' employees in their capacity as employees. For present purposes, the decision in Portus is properly distinguished on the basis that the claim in that case was for the deduction and payment of union dues out of earned wages, that is, wages to which the employee had become presently entitled. It was this feature that rendered the capacity in which an employer would make such payments that of debtor or financial agent of the employee.
 Barwick CJ agreed with the judgment of Menzies J but made additional observations, including the following:
"The argument that consensual practices can expand the jurisdiction of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act is in my opinion, unacceptable. No doubt there may be occasions on which knowledge of what is done in industry will be of assistance in determining whether what is in dispute really affects the relations of employers and employees, but I find no assistance myself in this case from the knowledge that some employers, whether in Australia or abroad, are prepared with or without remuneration to agree to act as bankers or financial agents for their employees in a wide variety of circumstances. In my opinion, the demand that the employer should pay out of earned wages some amounts to persons nominated by the employee is not a matter affecting the relations of employer and employee."46 (Emphasis added)
 The position is even clearer in the judgment of Walsh J:
"It was contended that whatever be the particular purpose to which an employer is asked to apply part of the wages earned by an employee, a claim made by the association on behalf of its members, or of some of them, that payments be made by the employers to discharge obligations of an employee, is of an industrial character and a dispute about such a claim is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. One reason advanced in support of that contention was that the matter was one which concerned the salary or remuneration of the employees. If a demand that part of the remuneration to which an employee becomes entitled from time to time in accordance with the terms of his employment should be paid out at his request to meet any obligation he may wish to discharge, for example, in payment of rent to his landlord, in payment for goods supplied by shopkeepers, or in payment to his wife of money for her maintenance, could properly be described as a demand concerning the mode in which his salary is to be paid, no doubt it would follow that this would be an industrial matter. But, in my opinion, such a demand cannot be so described. Payments of the kind that I have mentioned have the character of payments made by the employee himself, out of funds to which he has become entitled. They are akin to payments made by a banker on behalf of a customer or by a friend who, at the request of a man to whom he owes money, pays it to a third party instead of paying it directly to his creditor. In my opinion, it is outside the scope of "matters pertaining to the relations of employers and employees" that an employer should be required to discharge the personal obligations of those whom he employs. (Emphasis added)
. . .
It may be convenient for an employee to be saved the trouble of paying his debts and to have them paid on his behalf by his employer from money that has become due to the employee. But, in my opinion, this is not a benefit or privilege of a kind which has any relevant connexion with the relationship of employer and employee. It would be unreal, in my opinion, to treat the benefit of such an arrangement, however convenient it may be to an employee, as being part of the remuneration which he receives for his services."47 (Emphasis added)
 Menzies J (with whom Barwick CJ and McTiernan J agreed) observed:
"Each contention [on behalf of the union], it seems to me, involves the same critical question, namely, whether the imposition upon an employer of an obligation to make deductions and payments from salary in accordance with the authority of the employee to whom the salary has become due and payable affects the industrial relationship of employers and employees. The identity of the payee does not seem to me to be significant in determining the character of such a dispute, unless, of course, the payment relates to an incident of the employment such as a deduction for and payment to a superannuation fund. In my opinion, the relationship that would be affected by such an obligation is a financial relationship of debtor and creditor arising from the earning of salary, not the industrial relationship in which the salary has been earned and has become payable. What is sought, in reality, is to make the employer the financial agent of the employee for the benefit of the association. (Emphasis added)
. . .
In my opinion, the facts before the Court disclose a dispute which is not an industrial dispute. It is, in truth, a dispute between the association and the banks about whether or not the banks should perform for the association a dues-collecting service. Indeed, as an indication that this is so, it is pertinent to observe that in places where what is called the "check-off" system does operate, unions who have members' dues so deducted and paid not infrequently pay the employers a commission for those services." 48
 Furthermore Portus provides some support for the proposition that where a payment by an employer to a third party for the benefit of an employee forms part of the actual remuneration of that employee, the arrangement will be a matter that pertains to the relationship between the employer, in its capacity as employer, and the employee, in his or her capacity as employee. Thus, implicitly, Walsh J would have regarded the claim in Portus as pertaining to the requisite relationship if the payments could have been viewed "as being part of the remuneration which [the employee] receives for his services". More generally, however, Portus is to be distinguished on the basis that it concerned payments out of earned wages whereas the salary packaging provisions we are concerned with govern the nature of the remuneration employees are to receive. This is sufficient to dispose of the objection to the salary sacrifice provisions based on the decision in Portus.
 An additional question arose in the Murray Bridge appeal as to whether the provision in question had a sufficient connection with a relevant industrial dispute in the terms required by s.170LO of the Act. We are satisfied that the salary sacrifice provision is reasonably incidental or appropriate to the settlement of, or has a natural or rational tendency to settle, a particular question in dispute.49 The claim as to the manner of payment of salaries (cl.27) and the salaries claim itself (cl.28) in the log of claims relied upon provide sufficient ambit for the agreed provision. These clauses read:
"27 - PAYMENT OF SALARIES
(a) All monies due to an employee shall be paid weekly and shall be paid in cash or, at the request of the employee by cheque or into an account nominated by the employee, and all associated fees and charges shall be borne by the Respondent.
(b) Salaries shall be paid on the same day of each week during working time. If an employee has not received pay by that employee's normal ceasing time on such day, the employee shall be paid at relevant duty and overtime rates for all time whether worked or not between that cessation of all outstanding payments being made.
(c) For the purpose of calculating the amount payable weekly, the annual salaries prescribed shall be divided by fifty-two.
(d) Each employee shall with her/his pay be provided, in writing, with all and full details regarding the composition of her/his pay and deductions therefrom.
(e) Each employee shall be granted two hours paid banking time per week.
28 - SALARIES
(a) The minimum ordinary salaries payable to an employee of a Respondent shall be as follows:
(i) employees in clinical nursing $3,000 per week or $156,000 per annum;
(ii) employees in education/staff development $3,000 per week or $156,000 per annum;
(iii) employees in administration/management $3,000 per week or $156,000 per annum;
(iv) employees in research $3,000 per week or $156,000 per annum;
(v) employees in an area not provided for in paragraphs (i) to (iv) above $3,000 per week or $156,000 per annum.
(b) All employees shall receive an annual salary increase excluding allowances of $15,000."
 For these reasons in none of the appeals is the salary sacrifice provision an obstacle to the application for certification.
 The agreement in Schefenacker contains the following clause:
"43.0 PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS
The company will continue to support deductions of union dues through payroll deductions."
 On one view this provision may not create a binding legal obligation. Nevertheless we have dealt with the clause on the basis that the parties intended that Schefenacker would be bound to continue to make payroll deductions of union dues and remit them to the union.
 Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan correctly held that this clause was not about a matter that pertained to the requisite relationship. That outcome is required by the decisions in Portus and Alcan. In these appeals some reliance was placed on the decision of the Full Bench in Atlas Steels.50 As we have already noted, in that case the Full Bench, relying upon a distinction between a claim and a matter which had been agreed, held that an agreement containing a union payroll deduction provision was capable of certification pursuant to s.170LI.51 We have already indicated that in our view this reasoning has not survived Electrolux. Accordingly the position is governed by Portus and Alcan and the submission based on Atlas Steels must be rejected.
Employees of Labour Hire Agencies
 This question arose in Schefenacker only. The relevant provision is as follows:
"17.0 EMPLOYEES OF LABOUR HIRE AGENCIES
17.1 The employer and unions confirm commitment to permanent direct employment, but also recognise that labour flexibility is an ongoing requirement to achieve job security and productivity requirements. The parties agree to the following criteria regarding the engagement of employees of labour hire agencies.
17.2 The agreed maximum level of employees of labour hire agencies will be 20% of total weekly paid employees. The company agrees to consult with shop stewards when the percentage is in excess of 20% as to the reasons the additional labour hire agency employees are required.
17.3 There will be a formal quarterly review of labour hire agency employees through the consultative committee. This meeting will review both the total number of labour hire agency employees and their length of service.
17.4 Employees of labour hire agencies will not be considered for permanent employment until the total percentage of labour hire agency employees exceeds 20% of total weekly paid employees. When the 20% threshold is exceeded, employees of labour hire agencies will be offered permanent employment based on specific positions and shifts identified as being needed by the company.
17.5 Employees of labour hire agencies who are offered permanent employment will be required to serve a maximum of 3 months probationary period before permanency is confirmed. Offers of employment will be prioritised based on length of service.
17.6 The company will instruct the labour hire agencies to increase the wage rate of their employees working at Schefenacker Vision Systems Australia by the same percentage that is listed in this Agreement."
 The Senior Deputy President analysed the clause as follows:
" Clause 17 has three principal components. Sub-clauses 17.1, 17.2 and 17.3 deal with the circumstances under which labour hire employees may be utilised. I accept that the use of labour hire employees has the potential to be a matter of interest to Schefenacker employees and hence the circumstances under which labour hire employees will be engaged may be a matter which pertains to the employment relationship. In the circumstances of this agreement, I am satisfied that these three subclauses do pertain in that they described the work situation under which Schefenacker employees will be supplemented by other persons. They do not usurp management functions and fundamentally are about issues associated with direct employment opportunities. I have taken the obligation in clause 17.2 as simply an obligation to consult because to take it further may raise issues associated with the Freedom of association provisions in the Act.
 Subclauses 17.4 and 17.5 deal with the employment by Schefenacker of employees of labour hire companies. These provisions define when employment will be considered by Schefenacker and upon what basis.
 Subsection 17.6 requires Schefenacker to instruct the labour hire companies to increase the wage rate for their employees working at Schefenacker by the same percentage increases set out in the agreement. The agreement does not establish the basis upon which Schefenacker are entitled to issue such instruction, but I have presumed that the labour hire companies provide labour to Schefenacker under some form of contractual arrangement. Further there is no information before me that goes to the current employment benefits for employees of labour hire companies working for Schefenacker.
 The plain words of this subclause establish an obligation on Schefenacker relative to its labour hire contracting companies. In practical terms, the clause establishes that for a labour hire contractor to provide its employees to Schefenacker, these employees must receive wage increases consistent with the agreement. The clause does not establish that the wages or conditions of employment of employees of these labour hire contracting companies are consistent with those set out in the agreement."52
 It can be seen that the Senior Deputy President took the view that while the first five sub-clauses pertained to the requisite relationship the last was in a different category. He went on to discuss relevant authority and concluded that the sub-clause was not about the relationship of the company and its employees because its effect on the employees was indirect and in fact the sub-clause went to a contractual relationship between the company and its contractors which was outside the scope of s.170LI. In the course of his reasons he said :
" Notwithstanding its plain words, to the extent that clause 17.6 is to be read as establishing an obligation on Schefenacker to ensure that labour hire contracting companies pay equivalent rates of pay, I am unable to conclude that such a provision is about the relationship of Schefenacker and its employees.
 To the extent that the clause requires Schefenacker to instruct its labour hire contracting companies to grant wage increases consistent with the agreement, I am unable to conclude that this is other than a contractual matter. Given the structure of clause 17 and the remainder of the agreement, I can draw no conclusions over the extent to which there is uniformity of wage rates and conditions."53
 He found in addition that the sub-clause was not ancillary to the first five sub-clauses. On the hearing of the appeal the Senior Deputy President's conclusions on all six sub-clauses were in issue.
 In characterising these provisions it is necessary to have regard to two High Court decisions. The first is R v The Judges of the Commonwealth Industrial Court and Others; Ex parte Cocks and Others54 (Cocks). The second is R v Moore and Others; Ex parte Federated Miscellaneous Workers' Union of Australia55 (Moore). In Cocks the Court considered whether the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission had power to make an award prohibiting employers from having work done by independent contractors outside their factory or workshop. The Court answered that question in the negative. It did so on the basis that a dispute about such a matter was not an industrial dispute as defined in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904. In Moore the Court considered whether a claim that no employer should permit any of the relevant work to be done by a contractor except in accordance with the terms of the award, and that no employer should enter into the contract for the doing of any work unless the contract contained a clause binding the contractor to observe the award, gave rise to an industrial dispute. Two members of the court, Gibbs and Jacobs JJ, took the view that the claim was capable of giving rise to a dispute. Gibbs J said:
"The evidence has failed to show that in the circumstances prevailing in the industry in question such a clause could not be capable of being regarded as merely incidental to the settlement of the dispute as to the conditions of employment of workers in or in connexion with metaliferous mining. I agree with Jacobs J. that this question should not be finally determined until the facts are fully explored."56
 Jacobs J, with whom Stephen J agreed, said:
"But it cannot be assumed that under no circumstances could the insertion of such a clause in an award settle a dispute as to an industrial matter. Here the evidence shows that the construction works will be large and extensive. It cannot be assumed that the respondent companies − both the mining and the project companies − will not be exercising continued supervision and co-ordination. It may well be that if the Commission considered it proper in order to achieve a settlement of existing or threatened disputes between the companies and their employees that the same award conditions should apply throughout the work of constructing the mines and their associated installations, it would be open to it to achieve that result by the insertion in the award of a clause along the lines of cl 5. If the Commission could not do so, it would mean that the respondent companies could largely avoid the effective imposition on what will be in substance their activities of award conditions considered appropriate to construction work in or in connexion with the uranium mining and processing industry. The question should not be determined until the facts are fully explored and the basis of the Commission's decision (if it should be its decision) is known." 57
 The provision in question evidences a detailed agreement with the company requiring consultation about the usage of labour hire employees, a specific limitation on the proportion of total weekly paid employees made up by labour hire employees, a requirement that labour hire employees be offered permanent employment in certain circumstances, subject to a probationary period, and a requirement that the company instruct labour hire agencies to pass the increases in the agreement on to their own employees.
 We admit to some difficulty in characterising this provision, comprised as it is of a series of sub-clauses with a number of legal effects. On the one hand, it may be accepted that Schefenacker's employees have a legitimate interest in the engagement of labour hire employees because of the effect of such engagement on their own employment. For that reason it may be that the engagement of labour hire employees is a matter pertaining to the relationship between Schefenacker and its own employees. On the other hand, the extent to which the agreement can regulate the contractual relationship between Schefenacker and labour hire agencies, yet still pertain to the relevant relationship, is obviously a question of degree.
 We agree with the Senior Deputy President, for the reasons he gave, that the first four sub-clauses pertain to the relationship between Schefenacker and its employees. The number of labour hire employees engaged, it is to be inferred, is likely to have a direct effect upon the amount of work available to Schefenacker's employees and, ultimately, upon the number of employees Schefenacker engages directly. While it is true that cl.17.2 and cl.17.4 may be construed as a partial prohibition on the use of labour hire employees, they are also designed to increase permanent employment by placing obligations upon the employer to engage more permanent employees in the circumstances specified.
 Clause 17.5 imposes obligations on Schefenacker in relation to its own employees and clearly pertains to the relevant relationship.
 This leaves for consideration cl.17.6. The effect of the clause is to oblige the employer to instruct the labour hire agencies with whom it contracts to increase the wages they pay to their employees working at Schefenacker by the same percentage listed in the agreement.
 In Re National Transport Operations Pty Ltd Certified Agreement 200258 a Full Bench decided that a term in an agreement expressing the agreement to be binding on "all contract carriers engaged by the company whose engagement is subject to this agreement at any time during the period of operation" did not pertain to the relevant relationship. The following passage explains the Full Bench's reasons:
"We are not persuaded by Mr Murdoch's submission that the contract carrier provisions are justified by the interest employees of National Transport have about job security and accordingly an interest in the terms upon which contractors are engaged. There is nothing in the contract carrier provisions that suggest any linkage with the provisions regulating the wages or conditions of employment of the employees of National Transport. The contract carrier provisions are entirely discrete. The wages appendix for employees is expressed by reference to six grades and a weekly or cents per kilometre scale. The rates for contract carriers, provided for in a separate appendix, are referable to pay loads and are expressed as daily rates. Each appendix is entirely separate to the other; they are not interrelated. The methodology in calculating wages to be paid to contract carriers on the one hand and employees on the other is not similar. Each is independent of the other. Nowhere in the Agreement (or in any evidence or submissions) is there any suggestion payments to contract carriers or their conditions of engagement were struck having regard to employees' pay rates, conditions of employment or job security or vice-a-versa."59
 It can be seen from this passage that the situation before the Full Bench was very different to that here. The intent of cl.17.6 is that employees of labour hire agencies working at Schefenacker should receive the same increase as the Schefenacker employees will receive under the agreement. This is sought to be achieved by obliging Schenefacker to give that directive to the agencies. Whether that means will be effective or not, the intent is that the relationship between the cost of labour supplied by the agencies and the cost of the labour of Schefenacker's employees will be relevantly the same after the agreement as it was before. For that reason we think that the sub-clause pertains to the relationship between Schefenacker and its employees. It directly concerns the security of employment of the employees covered by the agreement.
Trade Union Training Leave
 The agreement in Schefenacker contains the following clause:
"38.0 SHOP STEWARD TRAINING LEAVE
Each union shop steward covered by this agreement, and nominated by one of the two unions, shall be allowed up to 5 days paid leave per annum to attend trade union training courses conducted or approved by their union. The maximum paid trade union training leave for each of the two unions will be 15 days per annum. Unused leave can be used collectively by each union."
 The Senior Deputy President referred to a decision of a Full Bench of the Commission, cited before him in support of the proposition that leave is a matter which pertains to the relevant relationship regardless of the purpose of the leave:
" The AMWU argued that this provision pertains to the employment relationship. The AMWU relied on the Full Bench decision in Re Municipal Officers (Queensland) Consolidated Award 1975 and Municipal Officers (Queensland Harbour Boards) Award, 1977 [(1983) 290 CAR 181 (Print F2761)]. In that decision the Commission stated:
`These authorities confirm our view that a claim for a paid absence from work is a claim as to an industrial matter regardless of the purpose of the absence. It matters not whether the absence from work is for recreational purposes as in annual leave, or reasons arising out of the death of a relation as in bereavement leave, or on account of some religious or nation event as in some public holidays, or reasons associated with maternity or paternity, or for any other reason. The leave itself is a matter pertaining to the relations of employers and employees, and the purpose for which the leave is granted has no bearing on the question of whether such leave is an industrial matter.'"60
 It is clear that in the Municipal Officers' Queensland Case the Full Bench took the view that any demand for leave is a demand as to an industrial matter, regardless of the purpose for which the leave is sought. The Senior Deputy President went on to hold in this case, however, that leave itself is not of such a character that all leave claims must pertain to the relevant relationship. He relied in this respect on National Union of Workers v Le Cornu Furniture Centre and Others (Le Cornu).61 In that case a majority of the Full Bench decided that two demands in a log of claims were not matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees. The first demand was for the creation of the position of paid union delegate. The relevant passage is as follows:
"We have concluded that a claim by the union for a full-time or near full-time union delegate paid by the employer is not a claim about the "terms of employment and conditions of work" but rather one for the employer to provide the means for the union to advance its interests. The respondent argues that this claim is analogous with the claim for leave to attend training courses dealing with trade union matters. Such a claim, it submits, has been considered to be a matter capable of being the subject of an industrial dispute. We do not find the analogy persuasive. We think that a claim that the employer pay a person to be a largely or wholly full time union delegate is substantially different from a claim that an employee be allowed a period of absence from work to attend a training course or courses."62
 The second demand was that the employer pay an employee during absence from duty by the employee for any cause for which the employee could not reasonably be held responsible. The passage is:
"The claim concerning payment during absence from duty for any cause for which the employee cannot reasonably be held responsible is, we think, a "borderline" one, applying the tests which we have adopted. The doubt which we entertain arises from the nebulousness of the circumstances causing the absence. The claim is not one for payment in relation to a defined cause of absence such as illness, the death of a relative, training or study, or the care of a family member. Rather, it invokes a criterion which is devoid of specificity and may be characterised as a "catch all". We have not had the benefit of extensive argument in relation to this matter. The finding will therefore be amended so as to place this demand on a reserve list."63
 We think it can fairly be said that in relation to the first demand, the one for a paid union delegate, the members of the Commission concluded that the demand was in substance not about leave at all. In relation to the second demand the Commission seems to have been concerned more about the complete lack of a purpose for the absence, what it referred to as "the nebulousness of the circumstances causing the absence", rather than any particular purpose. Nevertheless it must be said that the passages in Le Cornu are less categoric on the question of leave always being a matter that pertains to the relevant relationship than the passages in the Municipal Officers' Queensland Case. The Senior Deputy President went on to find, relying upon Le Cornu, that the purpose of the leave sought, attendance at trade union training courses, was unrelated to the relevant relationship and so the provision could not be characterised as pertaining to the relevant relationship either.
 In our view the provision does pertain to the relevant relationship. It provides for paid leave of absence for a specified purpose. There is no basis for a distinction between a provision for paid leave of absence for that purpose and any other of the many purposes for which paid leave may be provided. One need look no further than the forms of leave referred to in s.89A(2)(e), (f), (g) and (h) of the Act. We note that a similar view was adopted in Le Cornu.64 Trade union training leave has for many years been regarded as a matter which pertains to the relevant relationship.65 We agree, with respect, with the reasons for decision on a similar provision in Re K L Ballantyne & National Union of Workers (Laverton Site) Agreement 2004.66
 We note that recently in Wesfarmers Premier Coal Limited v The Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (No. 2)67 French J adopted a similar view in considering whether certain claims pressed in negotiations for an agreement to be certified under the Act pertained to the relevant relationship. We respectfully agree with the following passage from his Honour's decision:
". . . The hours of an employees' availability for work and the conditions under which an employee may be absent from that work and whether or not he or she can be paid during that absence, in my opinion, lie at the heart of the employer - employee relationship. They affect employer and employee in their capacities as such.
97 It is no answer to that proposition to say that these provisions affect employees in their capacity as union members. So much may be correct, but if the provision in question also affects the employment relationship in a direct way that is neither consequential nor remote it pertains to the employer-employee relationship. Argument by reference to the multiple capacities of employees can lead into a morass of fine distinction. So maternity leave, leave to perform jury service and leave to train in the military reserve may all be said to attach to people in their capacities as parent, citizen, military reservist respectively. In my opinion, the provisions of such clauses pertain to the employment relationship."68
 His Honour went on to deal with an aspect of the claim in that case which provided for payment to employees to attend union meetings during a period when they were not rostered for work. Since that part of the claim did not concern leave as such it is not necessary that we deal with that part of the decision. In our view it does not detract in any respect from the conclusions His Honour expressed on the question of leave.
 For these reasons we have concluded that the provision for shop steward training leave in Schenefacker pertains to the relevant relationship.
Right of Entry
 The clause before the Commission in Schefenacker is in these terms:
"46.0 UNION OFFICIALS AND SHOP STEWARDS
46.1 An official or officer of the union/s shall have the right to enter the employer's establishment with the permission of the employer for the purposes of conducting legitimate union business."
 The clause before the Commission in Murray Bridge is as follows:
"CLAUSE 28. RIGHT OF ENTRY
28.1 An officer or employee of the Union authorised in writing by the branch secretary to act under this Clause may, for the purpose of ensuring the observance of this Agreement, Award or an order of the Commission binding on the Union:
28.1.1 at any time during working hours, enter premises that are specified in the authority or occupied by an employer specified in the authority;
28.1.2 inspect or view any work, material, machinery, appliance, article, document or other thing on the premises; and
28.1.3 interview on the premises, an employee who is a member, or is eligible to be a member, of the Union;
but officer or employee acting under this Clause shall not hinder or obstruct an employee in the performance of work during working time.
28.2 If an officer or employee of the Union proposing to enter, or being on, premises under sub-clause 1 is required by the occupier to produce evidence of authority to enter or be on the premises, the officer or employee is not entitled to enter or remain on the premises without producing to the occupier the authority referred to in clause 28.1."
 So far as can be ascertained the first occasion for judicial consideration of whether a claim for right of entry for union officials was capable of giving rise to an industrial dispute was The Australian Workers' Union v The Pastoralists' Federal Council of Australia and Others69 (Pastoralists Case). In that case the first President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, O'Connor J, considered whether a claim "the effect of which would be to entitle a duly accredited agent of the claimant Union with or without the permission of the pastoralists to visit the shearers' and labourers' huts immediately prior to or during shearing for the purpose of enrolling members and collecting their subscriptions" was an "industrial matter" within the meaning of s.4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904.70 His Honour decided that the claim did not give rise to an industrial dispute. The relevant passage is as follows:
"Mr. Shand has contended that the subject-matter of the clause is not an `industrial matter' within the meaning of section 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. That contention is in my opinion right. The pastoralist has the right at common law to determine who shall and who shall not enter into and remain in the shearer' and labourers' huts. That right has been modified by the Act in so far as it may affect the mutual duties and obligations of the shearers and labourers, and himself, in relation to their daily work or their accommodation when the day's work is over. But the modification extends no further, and it certainly does not authorize this Court to compel him to admit to his premises some third person whose business has not necessarily any relation to the carrying out of the contract between employer and employee. The principle laid down in Clancy's case (1 C.L.R. 181) in my opinion applies. I hold therefore that the subject-matter of the clause is not of an industrial matter, and that I have no jurisdiction to embody it in the award."71
 It should be reiterated that the claim in question demanded entry for the purpose of enrolling workers and collecting subscriptions, not for purposes related to the observance of the award.
 In the Union Badge Case72 two members of the High Court referred to O'Connor J's decision in the Pastoralists Case. The Union Badge Case was not concerned with right of entry but with a claim that employees be permitted to wear and display a union membership badge. In a dissenting judgment Barton ACJ referred to and applied what he described as the principle laid down by O'Connor J in the Pastoralists Case.73 Justice Powers, in the majority, referred to the Pastoralists Case without disapproval.74 No other member of the Court referred to the case.
 In Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v Archer75 (Archer) the High Court was concerned with a case stated pursuant to s.21AA of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 as to whether a number of demands were capable of giving rise to an industrial dispute within the meaning of that Act. The matters were:
 The Court held that there was an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act in relation to each of the three matters (Isaacs, Higgins, Powers and Rich JJ; Barton CJ and Gavan Duffy J dissenting).
 At the time Archer was decided, so far as presently relevant, s.4 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 defined an industrial dispute by reference to industrial matters. Industrial matters were in turn defined to be "all matters pertaining to the relations of employers and employees and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes - . . ." There followed a list of specific matters which it is not necessary to set out.
 Isaacs and Rich JJ, in a joint judgment, held:
"Limiting ourselves, however, to the Act as it stands, an "industrial matter", that is, one that can be made the subject of an award, must be one that the party of whom it is demanded can accede to. Granting that, the claims are within the reason of the matter, and within the precedents or their analogy." 76
 Their Honours went on to observe that:
"The only claim now under consideration as to which any further observation need be made is the first [ie the claim in relation to the labelling of garments], because it is the least obvious. But apart from the principle that it is a claim which the employer clearly has it in his power to grant, the reasonableness of it being for the arbitrator's consideration, it is clearly one which may conceivably affect the employees' wages." 77
 Higgins J implicitly accepted the suggestion of counsel "that an industrial dispute must be about some matter which it is within the capacity of the parties to grant or refuse" 78.
 His Honour was of the opinion that the claims in issue were industrial disputes within the meaning of the Constitution79. His Honour doubted whether the then Act covered a more limited area than the Constitution but, in the event that view was not accepted, considered the meaning of the expression "any dispute as to industrial matters". Having noted that industrial matters were defined comprehensively, His Honour then addressed the claim in relation to right of entry:
"Claim 71 asks that the officer of the union shall have power to inspect the workroom on due notice, with right of access to the wages book or time-sheet; that the employer shall keep a time-book showing the hours worked and the wages paid; and that the union be permitted to post notices on a board − as I understand, union notices of meetings, &c. In effect, the claim is that if the employer use the services of any member he shall not only observe certain conditions of labour, but that he shall enable the union to which the employee belongs to see that any agreement or award is being obeyed; and that the union, being an organization of employees devised for their mutual protection under the encouragement of the Act (sec. 2 (vi.)) shall be enabled to carry out its functions effectively. To me, these claims seem to be claims as to matters 'relating to the rights or duties of employers or employees,' and to 'the terms and conditions of employment'; as well as to 'matters pertaining to the relations of employers and employees,' and 'questions of what is fair and right in relation to any industrial matter.'" 80
 It will be apparent that the references in quotation marks in the last sentence of the passage are references to parts of the statutory definition of industrial matters. Powers J held that all of the claims were matters about which there could be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act because "they are matters which are in the control of, and can be enforced by, the respondents in connection with their industry"81.
 It may be important that none of the members of the Court referred to O'Connor J's decision in the Pastoralists Case. While in Archer the Court found that a right of entry claim based on a purpose related to the observance of the award was within the definition of an industrial dispute, a materially different claim was found not to be within the same definition in the Pastoralists Case. As we have previously noted, that claim sought a right of entry for the purpose of enrolling members and collecting subscriptions.
 The ACTU and the union parties in the present matter rely upon the decision in Archer, and, in particular, the decision of Higgins J, as authority for the proposition that right of entry as a subject matter pertains to the requisite relationship. Others submitted that the views expressed by Higgins J cannot be regarded as good law in the light of the later decision of the High Court in Cocks. In Cocks the Court rejected the principle expressed by the majority in Archer that an industrial matter, and therefore an industrial dispute within the statutory definition, is one to which the party of whom it is demanded can accede. The criticism of Archer in Cocks does not extend explicitly to the view expressed by Higgins J that the particular claims relating to right of entry in Archer were claims as to industrial matters. More importantly Cocks did not directly overrule the decision in Archer in relation to the demand for right of entry.
 In Meneling Station Pty Ltd v. Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union82 (Meneling) the Full Court of the Federal Court dealt with an appeal from a decision by Evatt J imposing penalties with respect to breaches of cl.23(c) of the Northern Territory Meat Processing Award 1984. That sub-clause was in the following terms:
"23 (c) The roster and time and wages record shall on demand upon reasonable notice be produced by the employer for inspection at the place where the employer carries on business and employs the employee whose time has been recorded or at the employer's election at the employer's head office at any time between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. Monday to Thursday inclusive and between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. on Friday, to an official of the Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union who has been authorised, in writing, to inspect it by the General Secretary or the Secretary of a State branch of the said Union or to an official of the Meat and Allied Trades Federation of Australia who has been authorised, in writing to inspect it by the General Secretary or the Secretary of a State division of the said Federation."83
 One of the grounds of appeal challenged the validity of sub-clause 23(c). That challenge was based on a statutory amendment relating to right of entry. It was argued that to the extent that cl.23(c) purported to impose conditions going beyond those contemplated by the amended statutory provision it was invalid. The Full Court of the Federal Court in a joint judgment addressed this argument as follows:
"The appellant's counsel conceded that, but for the insertion of s.42A into the Act in 1973, the High Court's decision in Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v. Archer and Ors. (1919) 27 CLR 207would have prevented it from submitting to this Court that the Commission lacked the power to make an award containing cl. 23(c) i.e. imposing upon an employer the duty to produce to an official of the Union for inspection a time and wages record, kept by the employer pursuant to the duty imposed by sub-cl. 23(a) of the Award. Counsel accepted that the grant of a right to inspect premises where award breaches are suspected and to have access to wage books and time sheets may be made in settlement of an industrial dispute created by a demand for such a right, or may be incidental to the settlement of an industrial dispute.
As to the use that had been made of that power, Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia (published in 1947), in dealing with the "usual provisions in an award" says (at 26-27 and 28):
"2. The Right of Entry Clause
A typical right of entry clause in an award provides for the right of accredited union officials to enter the premises of the factory or workshop, or other place of work, at reasonable times for the purpose of ... transacting the legitimate business of the union - e.g., ... the inspection of time and wages records ....
Judge O'Mara in the Keefer Brothers Pty. Ltd. Case warned employers that he took a 'serious view of any deliberate and unmitigated refusal to produce time and wages records' (47 CAR at p 563) for inspection by union officials. The Court, in fact, regards the union official while exercising the right of entry allowed to him, as acting in the capacity of a Court officer for purposes of policing the award. [Clothing Trades Case (1928) 26 CAR 76 at 91.]"
As early as 1922 an award requiring employers to keep records of hours and wages, and to produce those records to a union official on demand, was the subject of a prosecution for a breach of the award - see appeal proceedings in the High Court in Federated Carters and Drivers' Industrial Union of Australia v. McKay (1922)30 CLR 139."84
 The Full Court then considered s.42A, the right of entry provision, and rejected the argument that it placed limitations on the power of the Commission to make an award including a clause such as cl. 23(c).
 It is clear from the opening sentences of this passage that the decision in Meneling was made in the context of a concession by counsel that Archer decided that the Commision had the power to make an award in relation to right of entry in the terms referred to and a further concession that the grant of a right to inspect premises where award breaches are suspected and to have access to wage books and time sheets may be made either in settlement of an industrial dispute created by a demand for such a right or as incidental to the settlement of an industrial dispute. No occasion arose for the Court to consider the correctness of Archer.
 In Moranbah North Coal (Management) Pty Ltd v. CFMEU85 (Moranbah North) the Full Bench of the Commission was concerned with the nature of the Commission's jurisdiction to make an order pursuant to s.285G in Part IX of the Act. The appellant contended that the member at first instance did not have jurisdiction to make the order that had been made. Section 285G inter alia provides that:
"The Commission may exercise its powers under Part VI of this Act to prevent and settle industrial disputes about the operation of this Division."
 The member at first instance upheld a submission on behalf of the Union that the meaning of the expression industrial dispute in section 4(1) of the Act did not apply to the expression industrial disputes in s.285G. In considering the correctness of this conclusion the Full Bench considered whether a dispute between an employer and an organisation of employees about the matters dealt with in ss.285A to 285F would be a dispute about matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees.
 In the course of dealing with that question the Full Bench made the following observations about right of entry:
". . . There is very little authority directly in point. In Federated Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v Archer (1919) 27 CLR 207 Higgins J expressed the opinion that a claim by a registered organisation of employees that an employer agree to permit an officer of the organisation to inspect the workroom on due notice, with right of access to the wages-book or time-sheet, was a claim as to a matter pertaining to the relations of employers and employees (at 216). This conclusion was based on a construction of the statutory definition of industrial dispute which was criticised in direct terms by a number of members of the Court in R v Commonwealth Industrial Court Judges; Ex parte Cocks (1968) 121 CLR 313 (per Barwick CJ, Taylor and Owen JJ at 319, with whom Windeyer J agreed, and per Menzies J at 327-328). Counsel for the company also drew our attention to the decision in Meneling Station Pty Ltd v AMIEU (1987) 18 FCR 51. It was submitted that this decision provides support for the view that a dispute about right of entry is capable of being an industrial dispute in the statutory sense. It appears to us that the Court was primarily concerned in that case with whether the Commission had power to make an award dealing with right of entry rather than with the statutory or Constitutional source of that power. The Court did not decide, either expressly or by implication, that a dispute about right of entry is a dispute about a matter which pertains to the relationship between the employers and employees. In passing we note the possibility that the power to include right of entry provisions in awards, a power exercised by the Commission for many years before the WR Act came into effect, might well have been grounded in the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate in relation to incidental matters:
The Constitution, s 51(xxxix)." 86
 Later in the decision the following passage appears:
" When the matters dealt with in ss.285A - 285F are considered it appears that a demand made by an organisation of employees on an employer about any of those matters would be unlikely to give rise to an industrial dispute in the statutory sense. The issue (and revocation) of permits to representatives of organisations (s.285A), entry of premises by permit holders to investigate suspected breaches of the Act, an award or a certified agreement (s.285B), entry of premises by permit holders for the purpose of holding discussions with employees (s.285C), limitations on the exercise of the right to enter premises (s.285D), regulation of the exercise of right of entry (s.285E) and the penalty provision (s.285F) are all matters which are extraneous to the relationship between employees as such and employers as such. The notification which gave rise to the proceedings before the Commissioner in this case was about the Commission's powers pursuant to s.285C. The subject matter of the notification is primarily about the relationship between the CFMEU and the company. The subject matter may also be about the relationship between the company and its employees. Any dispute arising, however, would not affect the company and its employees in the capacity of employer and employees respectively, but in the capacity of employer and union members or potential union members."87
 It can be seen that the Commission was concerned to characterise the nature of the matters which might arise pursuant to ss.285A to 285F inclusive, and the matter which had arisen in that case pursuant to s.285C, in the course of deciding whether the term industrial dispute in s.285G should be construed in accordance with the statutory definition. The passage should be seen primarily as drawing a general conclusion concerning the nature of the disputes which might arise about the operation of those sections. It may be that the conclusion that all of the matters dealt with in the sections are extraneous to the relevant relationship is inconsistent with the more qualified statement in the opening sentence of the passage and is too general in its expression. Even if that is so it does not detract from the general conclusion that disputes about the operation of the various provisions of Part IX are unlikely to be disputes about matters that pertain to the relevant relationship.
 In Re Unilever North Rocks Enterprise Agreement 200388 (Unilever) a Full Bench of the Commission considered whether a right of entry provision pertained to the relevant relationship. Although the principal reasons for decision in that case are inconsistent with Electrolux some elucidation may be gained from the Bench's discussion of this question. In relation to the right of entry clause, which permitted entry to accredited union officials on "genuine union business", the Full Bench stated:
" As agreed, clause 22 is a comprehensive statement about accredited union representatives' right to enter the workplace. It provides a protocol to be observed about reporting entry and movement about the workplace. As the extracts of the whole of clause 22 and part of clause 17 demonstrate, the Agreement and the dispute settlement procedure envisage an operational role for delegates and organisers in various site consultative tasks. Cartwright SDP's discussion of the possible operation of the clause displays a lack of understanding or disregard of that linkage and of the practical necessity in many sites for intermittent involvement of the "organiser" level of union representation, on site, at interfaces with delegates, members and management.
 In relation to the principles to be applied, the points in the case presented by Mr Rothman in criticism of Cartwright SDP's decision are sound. There is no acceptable legal justification for not giving the observation of the Full Court in Meneling determinative weight, at least for the purpose of an agreed term of an agreement proposed for certification. The passage also demonstrates that the expression "genuine union business" has antecedents in industrial usage that overwhelm the speculative apprehensions about its meaning voiced in the decision subject to appeal . . .
. . .
 The reasons for the decision subject to appeal relied upon judicial criticisms of Archers case. That reliance is misconceived in relation to right of entry and inspection provisions [end note omitted]. We note that the Explanatory Memorandum note associated with the introduction of sections 286 and 286A contemplated conditions about entry of premises rights being supplied by certified agreement. Clause 22 includes a condition of that kind. It is reasonably incidental to the consultative obligations of the parties and persons bound by the Agreement." 89
 Although Moranbah North and Unilever were concerned with different questions of statutory interpretation much of the legal reasoning was common and in several respects the reasons are in conflict. There is no substantive reference to the earlier decision in the later one. It may be that the Full Bench which decided Unilever thought Moranbah North was irrelevant. On the other hand Unilever was decided in large part without the benefit of argument in support of the decision under appeal and perhaps the Full Bench was simply unaware of the significance of the earlier decision.
 In the present case the conflict must be resolved by the application the doctrine of precedent. Archer has never been overruled on the right of entry question. True it is that the law in relation to the statutory concept of matters pertaining to the relationship of employers and employees has been refined and developed and that some views, particularly those expressed in Cocks, suggest that if the case were decided again there might be a different result. Nevertheless we think the better course is to apply the conclusions of Higgins J in Archer on the question of right of entry. In applying Archer we think it should be confined to a right of entry for the purpose of ensuring the observance of the award and other matters related to the employment. We are not persuaded that a right of entry of a general kind, for example, to transact "legitimate union business", pertains to the relevant relationship. On its face such a right extends to matters extraneous to the employment relationship. Notwithstanding the reasoning in Unilever we think it proper to make a distinction between a right of entry which is appropriately qualified and one which is not. A right of entry which is confined to entry for the purposes of investigating and securing compliance with any relevant award, applicable agreement or other matters that pertain to the relations between employers and employees as such may be included in an agreement. A right of entry which is unconfined is capable of being exercised for purposes extraneous to the employment relationship. A right of entry of the latter kind might be used for the purpose of campaigning for union elections or for the purpose of raising the political awareness of union members in relation to a current political issue. It follows, in our view, that a right of entry confined in the fashion we have indicated may be included in an agreement that satisfies the requirements of s. 170LI.
 Applying this reasoning we have reached the conclusion that the provision in Schefenacker does not pertain to the relevant relationship, being a right expressed to be for the purpose of conducting legitimate union business. Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan reached the same conclusion for similar although not identical reasons. On the crucial issue of the significance of Archer he was undoubtedly correct.
 The provision in Murray Bridge confers a right of entry for the purpose of ensuring the observance of the agreement and awards and orders binding on the union and in our view, in light of the decision in Archer, pertains to the relevant relationship. In Murray Bridge Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan found that while the provision did not pertain it was nevertheless incidental to the relevant relationship. His decision was based on the conclusion that the demand in the log of claims giving rise to the foundation industrial dispute did not pertain to the relevant relationship. Accordingly there was no industrial dispute providing ambit for the right of entry provision in the agreement. The agreement being a Division 3 agreement this finding, if correct, is fatal to the application for certification.
 The relevant clause in the log of claims was:
"62. RIGHT OF ENTRY
Any official of the Federation shall be entitled to enter a Respondent's headquarters or office and to enter any place of employment of employees on Federation business and may do all things necessary or incidental to the furtherance of the interests of the Federation or employees including interviewing any person or employee, holding meetings of employees, obtaining or inspecting any information or document, or viewing any work."90
 With respect, while we would agree this claim cannot be described as wholly pertaining to the relevant relationship, the claim is not wholly outside the relationship either. The term "Federation business" is capable of including much that pertains to the interests of employees as employees and indeed the interests of employees are specifically referred to. We do not think that we should regard those references as excluding matters that pertain to the relationship between the employer and the employees. As a matter of construction of the claim, it cannot be said to be directed only to matters which are extraneous to the relationship between employers and employees. In our view a demand of that kind can provide the foundation for a provision which pertains to the relevant relationship.
 For these reasons we find that the right of entry provision in Murray Bridge is within the ambit of cl.62 of the log of claims. As we have already found that the provision itself pertains to the relevant relationship it follows that the provision is no impediment to the certification of the agreement.
 In this section of our decision we deal with the provisions concerning union representatives in the Schefenacker and Murray Bridge agreements. The provision in Schefenacker is as follows:
"46.0 UNION OFFICIALS AND SHOP STEWARDS
46.2 The employer shall recognise appointed union shop stewards in the enterprise upon notification by the union to which the employee belongs. The shop steward shall be allowed mutually agreed time during working hours to interview employees and the employer or the employer's representative on matters affecting employees whom they represent. The shop stewards shall be allowed reasonable time during working hours to interview a union official from their union on legitimate union business.
46.3 Each union will be allowed 2 shop stewards on day shift, 1 on afternoon shift and 1 on night shift. A maximum of 1 shop steward (per union) on day shift may be a tradesman.
46.4 Shop stewards will be given the opportunity to introduce themselves at the company off-the-job induction program. Shop stewards will also be given a list of new starters."
 The provision in Murray Bridge reads:
"CLAUSE 29. RECOGNITION OF WORKSITE REPRESENTATIVES
29.1 An employee elected as an ANF Worksite Representative will, upon notification to the employer, be recognised as an accredited representative of the Union. An accredited Worksite Representative is allowed reasonable time during working hours to interview and/or meet with the employer or the employers' representative on matters affecting employees whom they represent.
29.2 Subject to the prior approval of the employer, a worksite representative shall be allowed at a place designated by the employer a reasonable period of time during working hours to interview a duly accredited official from the Australian Nursing Federation, in accord with the provision of Clause 28 Right of Entry."
 Turning first to the provision in Schefenacker, the first sentence of cl.46.2 simply provides for recognition by the employer of the steward role of a particular employee. The provision for mutually agreed time-off for discussions with employees is unexceptional. The purpose of the time off does not take the clause outside the realm of the relevant relationship. The third sentence provides in effect for paid leave for discussion of union business with a union official. Similar considerations apply as to the previous sentence. Clause 46.3 is about the maximum number of stewards. Clause 46.4 facilitates communication between the steward and new employees.
 Overall the provision concerns the regulation of the role of an employee who is also the local union representative. It pertains to the relationship between the employer and on the one hand employees who are stewards and on the other hand the other employees, at least insofar as they are union members. This conclusion is reinforced by terms of the dispute settlement provision in the agreement, which give stewards a specific role in the settlement of disputes arising at the workplace.
 Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan found that this provision did not pertain to the relevant relationship but was nevertheless incidental to it. With respect, the better view is that the provision does pertain.
 Consistently with this conclusion, the provision in the Murray Bridge agreement pertains to the relationship between the employer and its employees covered by the agreement. The question remaining is whether the provision is within the ambit of any relevant dispute. Before the Senior Deputy President the parties relied upon the following demand in the relevant log of claims:
"64. WORKPLACE REPRESENTATIVES
(a) The Respondent shall recognize any employee duly accredited as a Federation Workplace representative and such representative shall be granted one day on full pay (including all penalties and allowances) each week to perform his or her duties and the Respondent shall provide such representative with an office for that purpose.
(b) A Respondent shall at all times respond to, and assist, workplace representatives."91
 The Senior Deputy President found that the cl.64 did not pertain to the relationship of employers and employees and could not therefore provide ambit for the worksite representation provision in the agreement. With respect we do not see why the demand is not capable of supporting a provision in an award or an agreement which is about workplace representatives and which pertains to the relevant relationship. It is true that the "duties" referred to in the claim are unspecified, but there is no reason to read down the claim so as to refer to duties which are extraneous to the relevant relationship. We refer in this connection to the conclusion we have expressed above concerning cl.62 of the log.
 In our view the workplace representatives provision is no obstacle to the certification of the Murray Bridge agreement.
Summary and Outcome of Appeal
 Turning first to the appeal in Schefenacker, there are two provisions which do not pertain to the relevant relationship, cl. 43 Payroll Deductions and cl. 46.1 dealing with union right of entry. The only provision in question in La Trobe concerned salary packaging. That provision pertains to the relevant relationship and we see no obstacle to certification. In Murray Bridge we find that each of the provisions in question pertains to the relevant relationship and that there is a finding of industrial dispute which provides a proper foundation for each of the provisions. In the circumstances we shall make orders confirming the decision in Schefenacker and quashing the decision in Murray Bridge. Since we are unaware of the full details of the application for certification in Murray Bridge we shall direct Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan to deal with the application for certification in accordance with this decision.
 We announced at the conclusion of the hearing that we intended to quash the decision under appeal in La Trobe and to certify the agreement and to reserve our reasons for decision. We made an order on 23 December 2004 granting leave to appeal from Commissioner Whelan's decision of 24 November, 2004 and quashing her decision.92 We certified the agreement on the same day.93
BY THE COMMISSION
R. Niall of counsel for the Australian Nursing Federation.
D. Wade for the Rural City of Murray Bridge.
S. Rothman SC with J.H. Pearce of counsel for the Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union.
P. Heywood-Smith QC with Mr A. Lazarentiz of counsel for the Australian Workers' Union.
J. Bourke of counsel for La Trobe University.
L. Rubinstein intervening on behalf of the ACTU.
C. Harris intervening on behalf of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
B. O'Donnell intervening on behalf of the Australian Industry Group and the Engineering Employers' Association of South Australia.
R. Bunting solicitor, intervening on behalf of the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations.
S. Moore of counsel intervening on behalf of the State of Victoria.
K. Bell QC with Mr A. Lawrence of counsel intervening on behalf of the Victorian Hospitals' Industrial Association.
December 20, 21.
1 PR952801, 28 October 2004.
2 PR953628, 24 November 2004.
3 PR952449, 29 October 2004.
4 (2004) 133 IR 49. Note: as at the date of this decision, Electrolux has not been reported in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
5 Workplace Relations Amendment (Agreement Variation) Act 2004, enacted 15 December 2004.
6  FCA 1600.
7 (2004) 133 IR 49 at para .
8 Ibid., at para  - 
9 ibid., at para  - .
10 Ibid., at para .
11 (1972) 127 CLR 353.
12 1994) 181 CLR 96.
13 Ibid., at para .
14 Ibid., at para  - .
15 Ibid., at para 
16 ibid., at para 
17  FCA 1600.
18 (2004) 133 IR 49 at para .
19 Ibid., at para .
20 Ibid., at para.
21 Ibid., at para .
22 Ibid., at para -.
23 Callinan J implicitly accepted the same distinction. At para  his Honour referred to the relationship between "a particular employee and its present and future employer".
24 (2002) 114 IR 62 at para  - .
25 (2004) 133 IR 49 at para .
26 Ibid., at para .
27 (1987) 163 CLR 117.
28 Ibid., at 136-7.
29 (2004) 133 IR 49 at para .
30 AWU v Energy Developments Limited and Others, Ross VP, Kaufman SDP and Lewin C, PR928057, 21 February 2003 at paras  - .
31 (2004) 133 IR 49 at para .
32 (1952) 86 CLR 34.
33 Ibid., at 40, per Dixon C.J., Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ.
34 See Re Alcan (1994) 181 CLR 96 at 104 - 105.
35 (1986) 160 CLR 341 at 353.
36 (1987) 163 CLR 117 at 133-4.
37 (1984) 154 CLR 472.
38 ibid., at 491.
39 ibid., at 493.
40 ibid., at 501 - 502.
41 ibid., at 503.
42 See, for example Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597, at para 51.
44 (1986) 160 CLR 341 at 355 - 356.
46 (1972) 127 CLR 353 at 357.
47 Ibid., at 364 - 366.
48 Ibid., at 360 - 361.
49 R v Galvin and Another; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1952) 86 CLR 34 at 40.
50 (2002) 114 IR 62.
51 Ibid., at 68-72.
54 (1968) 121 CLR 313.
55 (1978) 140 CLR 470.
56 Ibid., at 473.
57 Ibid., at 478.
59 Ibid., at para .
61 Print N2389, 27 June 1996.
62 Ibid., at p.7.
63 Ibid., at p.9.
64 Ibid., at pp.8 - 9.
65 See Re Business Equipment Industry (Technical Service) Award 1978 (1988) 26 IR 52; Australian Timber Workers Union v Integrated Forest Products and Others (1989) 35 IR 106; Re Various Northern Territory Awards Print J8371, 2 August 1991;  8 CAR 49.
67  FCA 1737.
68 Ibid., at para  - .
69 (1907) 1 CAR 62.
70 Ibid., at 95.
72 The Australian Tramway Employees Association v The Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust and Others (1913) 17 CLR 680.
73 Ibid., at 691.
74 Ibid., at 712.
75 (1919) 27 CLR 207.
76 Ibid., at 213.
77 Ibid., at 214.
78 Ibid., at 215
79 ibid., at 216.
80 Ibid., at 216 - 217.
81 Ibid., at 218.
82 (1987) 18 FCR 51.
83 Ibid., at 52.
84 Ibid., at 56.
85 (2000) 103 IR 267 (Giudice J, McIntyre VP, Simmonds C).
86 ibid ., at 273 - 274.
87 Ibid., at 274.
90 C No 31999 of 1990.
92 AG838123 PR954676.
93 AG838123 PR954673.
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