See Fair Work Act 2009 s.399A and s.587
An application for an unfair dismissal remedy can be dismissed by the Fair Work Commission for a number of reasons.
The Commission can dismiss an application under s.587(1) on its own motion or upon application.
The Commission can dismiss an application on the following grounds:
Generally, the Commission will not dismiss an application if there is a real question to be answered on the facts or the law.
The power of the Commission to dismiss an application should be used sparingly and approached with caution.
If an employee enters into a binding settlement agreement their application may be dismissed. This is because the cause of action forming the basis of the application no longer exists after settlement is reached.
If a party fails to prosecute their case their application may be dismissed.
In this context prosecute means to follow up or carry on with the case once it has begun.
If an applicant refuses to respond to directions or attend a conference or hearing in relation to a case that they have started, the Commission can dismiss the case.
An application will be considered frivolous or vexatious where the application:
Generally, for an application to have no reasonable prospect of success, it must be manifestly untenable and groundless.
The party raising the objection does not need to prove that the other party's case is hopeless or unarguable.
The Commission must use a critical eye to see whether the evidence of the party responding to the objection has sufficient quality or weight to succeed.
The party responding to the objection does not need to present their entire case, but must present a sufficient outline to enable the Commission to reach a preliminary view on the merits of their case.
The real question is not whether there is any issue that could arguably be heard, but whether there is any issue that should be permitted to be heard.
An application can be dismissed on the basis that it has no reasonable prospects of success after the Commission has heard the applicant's case but before the respondent has started to present its case. However, if a respondent applies at that point for the applicant's case to be dismissed, it may be required to elect not to call any evidence.
When an employee seeks to pursue an application:
the application can be dismissed for being frivolous or vexatious or for having no reasonable prospect of success.
An executed settlement agreement is an agreement where all of the specific terms and requirements have been met.
A key issue is whether the parties intended to be bound by a verbal agreement or whether the parties intended for the agreement to be put into writing and signed.
The question of whether there is a binding agreement or not depends upon the intention disclosed by the language the parties have used.
The parties may agree that a negotiated agreement will only be binding once it is seen in its final written form and signed, whether this was the parties intention will depend on the true construction of the evidence.
A binding settlement agreement can still be found to exist even if some aspects of the agreement were not finalised at the time.
The general principles for dismissing applications due to a defaulting party's failure to attend proceedings, may be summarised as follows:
A defaulting party may be either the applicant or the respondent.
See Fair Work Act s.399A
Section 399A of the Fair Work Act provides that the Commission may, on application by the employer, dismiss an application where the applicant has unreasonably:
 Fair Work Act s.587(3).
 Fair Work Act s.587(1).
 Shortland v The Smiths Snackfood Co Ltd  FWAFB 5709 (Lawler VP, Drake SDP, Lewin C, 16 September 2010) at para. 19, [(2010) 198 IR 237]; citing Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62, 91.
 Resta v Myer Pty Ltd  FWC 7080 (Gostencnik DP, 17 September 2013) at paras 32, 39. See also Kora v Cardno Staff Pty Ltd T/A Cardno  FWC 4699 (Richards SDP, 14 July 2015) at para. 9.
 See Howey v Mars Australia Pty Limited t/a Mars Petcare Australia  FWA 6259 (Sams DP, 15 August 2012) at para. 97; and Tomas v Symbion Health  FWA 5458 (Gooley C, 23 August 2012) at para. 59.
 Applicant v Respondent  FWA 1765 (McCarthy SDP, 4 March 2010) at para. 15; citing Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd  FCA 1500 (14 December 2009) at para. 43; and Davis v Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (No 3)  FCA 69 (12 February 2010) at para. 15.
 Townsley v State of Victoria (Department of Education & Early Childhood Development)  FWCFB 5834 (Hatcher VP, Hamilton DP, Wilson C, 20 September 2013) at paras 17‒24.
 Banister v Queensland Rail Limited  FWA 3973 (Asbury C, 9 May 2012) at paras 25–26; citing Australian Postal Corporation v Gorman  FCA 975 (25 August 2011) at paras 31‒33; and Butler v Fairclough  HCA 9 (29 March 1917), [(1917) 23 CLR 78].
 Masters v Cameron  HCA 72 (30 November 1954), [(1954) 91 CLR 353, at pp. 360‒362]; see for eg Badcock v N & HM Cooper Motor Search (SA) & Car Clearance Centre (SA) T/A Motor Search  FWC 6978 (Hampton C, 26 November 2018)..
 ibid., 362.
 ibid., 360.
 Zoiti-Licastro v Australian Taxation Office  AIRC 45 (Kaufman SDP, 25 January 2006) at para. 12, [(2006) 154 IR 1]..
 Carter v The Hanna Group Pty Ltd  FWA 31 (Sams DP, 14 January 2011) at para. 6; summarising the authorities in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW)(1964) 112 CLR 125; Kioa v West  HCA 81 (18 December 1985); [(1985) 159 CLR 550].; Australian Railways Union; Ex parte Public Transport Corporation (1993) 51 IR 22; and Grimshaw v Dunbar (1953) 1 All ER 350.
 Fair Work Act s.399A(1)(c).